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


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NEW THINGS AND OLD
IN
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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NEW THINGS & OLD
IN
Saint THOMAS AQUINAS

A TRANSLATION OF VARIOUS WRITINGS
& TREATISES OF THE ANGELIC DOCTOR

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

H. C. O'NEILL



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TO
W. A. M. GOODE, Esqr.,
IN RECOGNITION OF
MANY BENEFITS WHICH I CAN NEVER REPAY
AND FOR WHICH
HE HAS NEVER THOUGHT TO CLAIM A RECOMPENSE

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SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

INTRODUCTION

LIFE OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

"All I have written seems chaff to me." Thus six months before his death spoke the greatest mind of the Middle Ages. He had up to this time lived a life full of labour, lecturing, writing, dictating, and praying; and now after having received a revelation he laid aside his pen and would write no more. His favourite disciple, with a directness characteristic of him, asked him why he would not write when he was in the midst of a great work; to which he simply replied, "I cannot." Being pressed still further he again said, "I cannot, for all that I have written seems chaff to me." This incident, well attested as it is, is so clearly sincere that no interpretation of it can rob it of its grandeur and pathos. The words were spoken by a man still only in his prime, as far as years go, but one whom incessant labour and devotion to a high cause had brought, at the age of forty-nine, into the valley of the shadow. His name is one that all men of education profess to know. His fame is noised abroad scarcely less by those who ignorantly condemn, than by those who injudiciously worship him. But his life, his real concrete life, is still in many ways a closed book. For while one class of men look on him as a great intellect, and another as a great holiness, the human lines of Aquinas have been singularly neglected. His holiness and his greatness in the eyes of a critical generation will depend, not on the mysteries of his extraordinary raptures, but on the way in

which he a man bore himself in the jostle of life with men. If this has not been overlooked by his many biographers it has, for the most part, been undervalued, and it is fitting that in this age, which bears some resemblance to the Renaissance in the re-discovery of the enduring masterpieces of olden time either from neglect or undiscerning attention, some attempt should be made to show Aquinas to the world, not as a saint on a pedestal or a statue above the rostrum, but as one faring in the road of life and faring manfully.

Thomas Aquinas was born in 1225 (or as some say 1227) at the castle of Rocca Sicca, not far from the town of Aquino, which is situated five miles north-east of Pontecorvo on the railway from Rome to Naples. His father was of the noble house of Sommacoli, and his mother of the Caracioli, Countess of Teano in her own right. Through his father, Count of Aquino, he was connected with most of the great reigning houses of Europe, including that of England. While he was still a baby a heavy thunderstorm broke over the castle, and his young sister, asleep by his side, was killed by lightning while the babe slept calmly on. It is owing to this, it is said, that the saint had such a fear of thunder in later life. The fact, whatever the reason, is sufficiently established. At Agnani he would take refuge in a cave during the thunderstorms, and on the wall he traced in the form of a cross the words:—

Crux mihi certa salus,
Crux est quam semper adoro,
Crux Domini mecum,
Crux refugium mihi.¹

When they tried to bath him on one occasion, he was found to have in his hand a roll of paper. His nurse tried to take it from him and he resisted with sobs and tears. His mother took it, and opening it found the words *Ave Maria* written

¹ The cross is my sure salvation,
The cross which I worship continually,
The Lord's cross be with me,
The cross be my refuge.

on it. She then quickly gave it back to the child, who seized it and eagerly swallowed it. A naïve biographer adds "some say in imitation of Ezekiel the prophet." I am inclined to think it truer to the invariable custom of very young children. When he cried at any time a book or manuscript would always comfort him. He loved to turn and scan its pages. When five years of age he was sent to the great Benedictine Abbey of Monte Casino, towards the abbatial chair of which the ambition of the child's parents looked as a fitting sphere for their young son's life. Here with other children he was taught, suitably to his age, by the monks. The child seems not to have been fond of play, nor to have been very sociable. But his mind was working and developing very rapidly, as may be inferred from the question he addressed to the old monk who was tending them, "Tell me, master, what is God?" He had struck thus early on what was to be the absorbing theme of his whole life.

After five years' stay with the monks, Thomas, being reported extraordinarily proficient, was sent to the University of Naples, which had only just finished the first decade since its foundation by Frederick II. Here the boy began rapidly to attract attention by his extraordinary mental gifts. At the same time his life was completely free from the looseness and debauchery of many of his companions. He became drawn to the Order of Preachers, which had set up a church in the city, and, it is said, sought to join it at an extremely early age, but the prior sent him away until he was older. Finally, at the age of eighteen, he entered the order at Naples.

I do not think that any one will ever, even imperfectly, understand the real Aquinas who cannot appreciate the sacrifice he had made in joining a mendicant order and the fact that it was to him no sacrifice but the entrance into the service of his Beloved. There were few high positions to which a man of St. Thomas's birth and extraordinary talents

might not have aspired. With every great reigning family he was closely connected, and as his grandfather had been in the service of Frederick Barbarossa, so his own brothers were in the service of the Emperor Frederick II. Yet on all this he turned his back. The world and its honours stretched in dazzling array at his feet and he spurned them; not that he could not appreciate their value, but because his singularly pure and untainted soul turned from them to the state of the mendicant friar. He interpreted the mediæval phrase, "the service of God is a reigning," with the emphasis on "reigning." Nothing in the life of the Angelical Doctor is so clear as this, that he felt that the gain was all on his side. Not so, however, his parents.

A child of such a house is not easily allowed to pledge himself to the life of a beggar, even if he and the world regard it as God's beggar. His mother endeavoured to see him that she might turn him from his purpose. St. Thomas fled. The countess followed, and then, finding that she could not come up with him, gave orders to her two soldier sons to take him prisoner. This was much to their taste, and so it fell out. His sisters whom he loved dearly were sent to influence him. One he won to become a nun. The other lived a good life outside the cloister. Almost every reputable and disreputable means was taken to move him, the most scandalous of all being the thrusting into his cell a young courtesan to tempt him to sin. He drove her forth in indignation with a flaming brand caught from the fire, and then besought God in tears for the gift of perpetual chastity, and, falling asleep, two angels bound him with a girdle to preserve him immune to the end. This was the last of his antagonists' resources, and, pressure being brought to bear on them from without to loose the young friar, they endeavoured to save their dignity by conniving at his escape. The Dominican friars being warned, he was let down in a basket, and met by them outside the castle walls. A final trial awaited him in being sent for by Innocent IV. But

his grace and charm of manner was such, when pleading before the Pope and papal court to be allowed to follow the life he had chosen, that all were moved to tears of sympathy and admiration. The cause was won.

He was now sent to Cologne that he might have the advantages of reading under Albert the Great. This was in conformity with the custom of the Dominicans of sending their students of promise to study under the most famous teachers and at the most celebrated schools. To Cologne then St. Thomas is sent, and here is strange testimony to the lack of communications in the Middle Ages, for both Albert and his students, knowing nothing of the talents of Aquinas, speedily named him, for his silence, "the great dumb Sicilian ox." There is evidence that he was called nicknames and taunted even to his face. He took all quietly and serenely. One incident ought surely to have given his fellow novices pause for thought. "Brother Thomas," one shouted, "here quick, quick—look at this flying ox." He walked to the window, and his appearance was instantly greeted with shouts of derision. A brother asked him how he could be so simple as to imagine that an ox could fly. "I did not believe that an ox could fly, nor did I till now believe that a friar could tell a falsehood," he said.

Yet the picture of this life at Cologne was not wholly dark. To most men it would have been supremely bitter to have been made the butt of master and equals, but there is nothing to show that he was even ruffled by it. No mark of evil it left upon his life. Some of his companions pitied the "Sicilian ox." If the smallest trace of pride had been in him this would have called it forth. One brother offered to assist the saint with his lessons. St. Thomas thanked him and accepted. But when the young helper stumbled in his explanations, Aquinas, betrayed for the moment, explained the passage with the greatest lucidity and precision. The brother, astonished, begged St. Thomas to assist him for

the future. He declined at first, but consented at length on condition that the student kept it secret. The tide was turning. About this time Albert gave to some of his students a very difficult question to answer from Denis the Areopagite. In joke or earnest they gave it to St. Thomas. He commenced to answer it. First, he wrote down all the possible objections to the thesis, and then the answer to them. This paper, seen at the door of Thomas's cell, was taken by a novice to Albert, who, seeing at once the extraordinary talent displayed, resolved to give him scope to show it publicly. Aquinas was told to defend a thesis before the assembled school next day. To many there was the most excited interest in the case. Aquinas took it as he did everything else as part of his work. What he was in himself was to him of the utmost, what to others of the least, importance. The morning came, and Thomas opened his thesis in the customary fashion of the schools, with such clearness and skill, anticipating all objections, that Albert was constrained to cry aloud, "You do not seem to be holding the place of replying but of deciding." "Master," replied St. Thomas, with frank sincerity, "I know not how to treat the question otherwise." Then Albert, past master in dialectics, sought to puzzle Aquinas by every means known to him. To each difficulty Thomas found the key, so that at length Albert cried aloud, "We call this young man the dumb ox; but so loud will be his bellowing in doctrine that it will resound throughout the whole world." Thomas was just twenty years of age, and the General Chapter of the Order of Preachers meeting at this time sent Albert to hold the professor's chair and take the doctor's cap at Paris.

As another mediæval saint had espoused poverty, Thomas, as a youth, had chosen wisdom as his spouse, the Eternal Wisdom, whom he defined in the first part of his greatest work as "the being that understands most deeply, and with no shadow of potentiality." To Paris he now goes—to the halls of wisdom. The memory of many great names were

still fresh in men's minds, of Vincent of Beauvais, tutor of the king's children, Alexander of Hales who had just died, and William of Paris. Here he remained, attending the schools, growing in wisdom and virtue. It is written of him at this time that so absorbed was he in contemplation that he had no knowledge of what he ate, but took whatever was set before him.

At length in 1248 the General Chapter, meeting in Paris, decreed that four more schools should be founded on the model of St. James', the Dominican college at Paris, and, in spite of his great fame at Paris, Albert was sent to that at Cologne to hold the chair and rearrange the studies, and Thomas was sent with him to be second professor and "Master of Students." He was twenty-three years of age, tall, well-built, and erect. His colouring, the chronicler notes, was that of wheat. His head was large and finely shaped, becoming later slightly bald; his eyes large and penetrating, and his constitution, though sensitive, was manly and vigorous. He was ever calm and serene, in fact, both in body and temperament, almost a typical Saxon rather than a Neapolitan. He possessed that rare gift of perfect charm of manner, so that he exercised a singular attraction wherever he went. Most lowly in his own esteem, he was full of kindness and sweet and peaceful in conversation. No rudeness could unsettle him or kindle any human heat in his heart.

At Cologne he first gave evidence of his great teaching powers. His vast memory and his keen mind fitted him for this office in an exceptional degree, and his calmness helped him in no ordinary measure. His ordering of life at this time is given as follows: after mass he immediately commenced lecturing; having finished lecturing he wrote and dictated to several scribes; then he had dinner and returned to his cell and occupied himself with the contemplation of divine things until the time for siesta; afterwards he would again write, and "so he ordered his whole time to God."

After four years spent at Cologne he was again commanded to depart to Paris, largely at the suggestion of Cardinal Hugh of St. Cher. Through Brabant (preaching before the Duchess Margaret) and Flanders he begged his way. On his arrival at Paris he was at once admitted among the bachelors, and commenced to teach under Elias, the Dominican master of theology at the time. It was from this time (1252) that the figure of Aquinas entered into European history.

At the end of his first year of teaching it was proposed that he should proceed to the licentiate in theology and perform the necessary acts which led to the doctorate. This was prevented by a controversy which is now a feature in the history of the times. A students' street brawl led to the patrol killing one and putting three others into prison. The university resented this as a breach of privilege, as they claimed the right of trying their own students. They therefore declared a "cessation" from teaching for two months to force the civil authorities to punish the patrol. The mendicants, however, continued to teach. When the university had obtained their point they decided that all who taught in the university must take an oath to cease teaching in the future when a case of this kind arose. There is a distinct suggestion here of the idea of the present trade unions, and the ill feeling against the mendicants may be gauged to some extent by comparing them with the non-union workers of to-day. The mendicants refused. The long smouldering jealousy against them now broke out into open flame. The university issued a decree excluding the mendicants from their body and depriving them of their chairs. The regulars appealed to Rome and were reinstated by Innocent IV., but he was unable to secure the enforcing of his decision before his death in 1254. Alexander IV., who succeeded Innocent, in several bulls achieved what his predecessor had failed to do. He re-established the Dominican and Franciscan professors, revoking all decrees against them, but at the same time he confirmed the decree

of the doctors binding all to cease teaching in case of insult. By the end of 1256 the dispute was finished and we find St. Thomas admitted to the licentiate.

But the dispute would not have lasted so long had it not been for the appearance of one strongly recalling an earlier romantic figure, Abelard. William of St. Amour appears to have been a man of great intellectual gifts, who concealed under the cloak of orthodoxy a strangely undisciplined mind. On the outbreak of the quarrel with the mendicants he became the vortex of the anti-mendicant party, and published a scurrilous attack on his enemies in his *Perils of the Last Times*, which appeared about 1254. The Dominicans came in for a special share of abuse. To certain minds if there is one thing more vexing than the advancement and success of others it is the fact that it is a deserved success. And this may account for St. Amour's special virulence against the Dominicans, now almost at the zenith of their fame. So much ill feeling had the gibes of the book aroused against the friars that not only were they subject to the most open insults, but they dared not leave their convent to beg the bread on which they depended for sustenance. At length the attention of the Pope was called to the book, and both sides sent representatives to the Roman court then (1256) at Anagni. The general of the Dominicans, Humbertus de Romanis, sent for Aquinas and handed him the book of William to read and refute. This he did in a book *Against the Adversaries of the Religious State*. On October 5 the *Perils of the Last Times* was condemned, and, on the 23rd of the same month, Odo of Douai and Christian of Beauvais (two of the Paris representatives) swore to obey Alexander's first bull reinstating the mendicants. St. Amour¹ did not

¹ In 1263 St. Amour, allowed to return to Paris by Urban IV., maintained his old position and a few years later in *Collectiones Sacrae Scripturae* republished his old contentions. This drew from the Angelic Doctor two works, *Against those who impugn the Worship of God* and the *Against those who dissuade others from entering the Religious Life*. The *Concerning the Perfection of the Spiritual Life* was also really an apology for the monastic life.

conform and was banished from France, but this was the end of the real quarrel. A year after the date on which the Paris representatives made their submission, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure were invited to take their doctorate.

One of the beautiful features of the character of Aquinas is his affectionate intercourse with other kindred souls. St. Bonaventure, the great Franciscan doctor, was one of these. He was hardly a year older and they had both achieved fame at an early age. St. Bonaventure was, at this time, general of the Franciscans. Frequent calls passed between the two men whose affection was strengthened by a great mutual respect. They took their doctorate together, and they died within a few months of each other, each being engaged on the work of the General Council which one (Aquinas) was never to see; and though each was the highest intellectual expression of his order, neither had the slightest pride in his own gifts.

St. Thomas now became master in one of the schools of St. James, and speedily drew around him a devoted band of disciples. It was not only that he was a teacher of the highest genius, but the fascination of an exceptional personality fell upon all who met him. On one occasion when a certain student arrogantly defended in public a thesis of which the Angelic Doctor disapproved, he was suffered to proceed without any remark. But his students, more zealous of their master's honour than he himself, represented to him that he should have checked the youth. He replied that he could not put so young a man to shame before all the Paris doctors. The students, however, urged the discredit that fell on *them* by the saint's action. The latter said he could, on the next day, supply the defect if such it were. And this he did to such effect that the young master confessed his error and begged St. Thomas to show him the truth, which he did with great clearness. The same graceful restraint is shown in a disputation with John of Paris. However much the latter strove to exasperate Aquinas with

"bombastic and violent words" the saint ever "courteously and humanely" replied to him; and this was his fashion in all disputations however acute and subtle. The saint's advice was now sought on questions of every description. It is said that, whenever any matter of moment was about to come before the Council of France, St. Louis sent for Aquinas the night before to obtain his advice. On one occasion invited to dine with the king, he excused himself because of his work. But under pressure he went; however, being abstracted, in the middle of dinner he struck the table, saying, "That finishes the Manichæan heresy." The prior, being anxious, touched him on the shoulder and said, "Remember, master, that you are at table with the King of France," and he pulled him vigorously by the cappa to rouse him. But he, bowing to the king, begged pardon for his abstraction.

After his year of teaching he retired from his chair, according to the law of the university, and preached the sermons during the next Lent (1259) at St. James'. One of his biographers notes that "his words were listened to as though they were of God," and it is said that when he preached on the sufferings of Christ upon the cross he was interrupted by the sobbing of his audience. The fervour of his sermons welled from his heart's deep emotion. It is recorded that he was often carried away when singing at compline the words of the antiphon "Cast us not off in our failing years when our strength shall fade."

In this same year he was sent to the General Chapter of the Dominican Order at Valenciennes, and was charged to draw up a new course of studies for the students of the Dominican Order with Albert the Great, Peter of Tarentaise (Innocent V.), and two other Paris doctors. This being accomplished, he was invited back to hold a chair at Paris by the university, who, feeling his loss, waived the law relating to the tenure of chairs for one year only. In 1261 Urban IV. became Pope and asked for St. Thomas to be sent to

Italy so as to have the benefit of his counsels. He accordingly went to Rome and lectured in the Dominican schools there. At the command of the Pope he wrote two small works, *Against the Errors of the Greeks*. St. Thomas also preached the Lenten sermons in St. Peter's. Urban pressed money upon him to help him to work at greater ease, and announced his intention to raise him to high ecclesiastical dignity. Eager to do all that savoured of labour at the Pope's command, he would not accept anything that suggested ease. The Pope, however, repaid him in another way by inviting his dear friend and brother in the order, Richard Annibaldi di Molaria, to Rome. He was made Master of the Sacred Palace. Urban had called the Angelic Doctor to Rome to have the benefit of his advice, and he kept him at his side. In this way St. Thomas lectured wherever the papal court went, at Viterbo, Orvieto, Fondi, and Perugia. In the May of 1263, St. Thomas, as Definitor of the Roman Province (of the Order of Preachers), attended the General Chapter held in London. It is a striking thought to picture the Angelic Doctor in Holborn where the old Dominican priory was situated. It was at this chapter that Peter of Tarentaise was chosen vicar-general on the resignation of Humbertus de Romanis. At this time Urban again pressed St. Thomas to accept a bishopric, and he again refused. But he composed, at the Pope's command, the "Office of Corpus Christi."¹

On the death of Urban IV., Clement IV. was elected (1265), and in the first month after his election he made out the brief for the appointment of Aquinas as Archbishop of Naples. St. Thomas on hearing this fell into deep melancholy, and could in no way be persuaded to accept the office. The brief was then withdrawn and the saint left for the future unmolested. In this year the *Summa Theologica* was commenced. Two years later (1267) Aquinas went to the General Chapter held at Bologna, and he was appointed

¹ Now for the first time done into English.

to the chair of theology at that university. A characteristic anecdote is related of him at this time. A brother from another house had been sent on an errand, and had been told to take as a companion the first brother he met. Hastening away, the first one he met was St. Thomas enjoying his favourite recreation of walking in quiet thought along the cloister. He accosted the saint thus, "Good brother, the prior has bid you come with me." St. Thomas must have known there was a mistake, but he went without a word. The brother hurried along, and as Aquinas could not keep up with him because of a painful limp, he took the saint to task frequently; but he only replied by humbly excusing himself. At length the brother saw the signs of respect paid to his companion, and then some one pointed out who it was. The brother begged the saint's pardon for his ignorance, but the latter took the fault to himself for not being able to keep up.

In 1269 he went as Definitor of the Roman Province to the General Chapter at Paris, and, at the earnest request of St. Louis, he was once more appointed to teach theology there. As St. Louis consulted St. Thomas on important matters it seems probable that he had some influence in sending the king on the crusade. On July 1, 1270, he set out and died at Tunis on August 25. Some little time after this the Angelic Doctor resigned his chair and retired to Bologna, but he had not been there long before he was appointed to the chair of the university where he had first studied as a boy. The "first part" of the *Sum of Theology* had been finished at Bologna and, its fame having gone forth, many universities strove for the possession of the increasingly famous doctor.

In 1271, then, by the influence of Charles of Anjou, King of the two Sicilies, he was appointed to the chair at Naples. On his way thither he broke his journey to call on his dear friend Cardinal Richard of Annibaldi at Molara. Another beloved companion who was with him to the end of his life,

Brother Reginald, travelled with him as his *Socius*. On the way the latter nearly died of fever, and the saint was constantly at his side. At Naples a great public reception had been arranged which was extremely distasteful to him. There is a perfectly characteristic anecdote told of this time. Romanus, to whom he had but recently resigned the chair of theology at Paris, appeared to the saint and told him that he was in Heaven. The Angelic Doctor immediately asked, "Do acquired habits remain to us in Heaven?" Romanus replies that God absorbed all his thoughts. St. Thomas, not to miss the opportunity, immediately rejoins, "Do you see him immediately or by means of some similitude?"

After three years' interregnum Gregory X. was elected towards the end of 1271. Two objects of the Pope's reign were to improve the condition of Christians in the Holy Land and to put an end to the Greek schism. He appointed (1272) Agni di Lentino Patriarch of Jerusalem. It was this friar who had given St. Thomas the Dominican habit. Another wrench at the same time was the death of one of the dearest of his brethren, Cardinal Richard of Annibaldi. Shortly afterwards (1273) St. Bonaventure was made cardinal, and this was another trial of heart. But at this time when he had laid his manuscript on the blessed sacrament before the crucifix, he heard a voice from the crucifix say, "Well hast thou written of me, Thomas. What reward, then, wouldst thou?" To which the Angelic Doctor made reply, "None other than thyself, Lord." Towards the end, also, of 1273, he went into ecstasy in the sight of all at mass in the Dominican Church. On this rapture he refused to answer the questioning of even his most confidential friends, saying that what he had seen and heard had filled him with wonder "and must be respected by silence."

It was on December 6, 1273, that he received the revelation and laid aside his pen as I have already described at the commencement of this life. He went, shortly after, to

see his sister whom he dearly loved, Theodora, Countess of San Severino, wife of the Count of Marsico. But when he came up to her he was so wrapt in contemplation that, at first, he hardly noticed her. But Brother Reginald pulled his cappa¹ and he returned to consciousness of what he was doing, and told his sister under pledge of silence of his approaching death. She asked him, "How can one become a saint?" to which he replied, "By willing it." She also inquired what one ought most to desire in life, and he answered, "To have a good death." He bade her farewell and returned to his convent and was almost immediately attacked by fever. A summons came, now, from the Pope for the saint to attend a General Council at Lyons for the following May. One of the chief objects of the council was to terminate the Greek schism, and the Angelic Doctor's influence with the Greeks, by reason of his writings on the schism, done at the command of Urban IV., made his presence necessary. His friend St. Bonaventure was also summoned.

In spite of weakness and ill-health St. Thomas rose at the word of authority, took leave of the King of Sicily at Naples, and left the city on January 28, 1274. Brother Reginald and another accompanied him. He went first to Aquino, to take leave, and from here he wrote a long letter to the Abbot of Monte Casino on a difficult text referred to him. Passing through Teano, he hurt his head against a tree that had partly fallen on the road and he was rendered nearly unconscious. He went on to the Castle of Magenza to take leave of his niece, Frances of Aquino, who was the wife of Count Annibaldi of Cecano. At the castle he fell ill, and an absolute disgust of food falling on him, he told the physicians that he could only eat a certain kind of herring that he had once

¹ This seems to have been the recognised way of recalling Aquinas to earth. The cappa, a black cloak fastened under the neck, was pulled vigorously (*fortiter*). One other famous occasion on which the method was used was when the Archbishop of Capua used it to recall him to the fact that he had brought a cardinal to see him.

tasted. These, however, had never been heard of in the district. Search was made and a fisherman who strongly denied having any such fish was found to have some at the bottom of his basket. When the fish was brought to the saint he said, "Doctor, it is better that I should commit myself to the will of Divine Providence, than that I should eat of the food, divinely sent, that I desired over ardently." But the doctor, urging him not to slight the present of God, prevailed.

He set out once more, and, again overcome with sickness, he took refuge with the Cistercians of Fossa Nuova, the abbot of which monastery pressed him to stay. The abbey is two leagues from Magenza in the province of Terracina. Going slowly through the cloister he said to Brother Reginald, "This is my rest for ever and ever, here will I dwell for I have chosen it." Those who heard him wept bitterly. The monks did everything they could to show him honour. The wood for his fire they cut from the forest and bore back upon their own shoulders. The Angelic Doctor astonished all by his genius of patience and forethought for them. The Countess of Cecano came to offer the saint all she had. He thanked her but said that his one wish was to be speedily with God. Since December he had not written or dictated anything, but now the monks asked him for a commentary on the Canticle of Canticles as St. Bernard had written one. In the end he yielded, not wishing to deny his kind hosts anything in his power to give. He began to expound. Coming to the seventh chapter, "Come, my Beloved, let us go forth to the fields," he was seized with faintness and knew his end was near. He desired to make his confession. He then asked to receive the blessed sacrament, and was laid on the floor at his own request. When he saw the priest approaching he said with a clear voice, "I receive thee, the price of my soul's redemption, for love of whom I have studied, watched, and laboured; thee have I preached and taught; against thee

no word have I spoken; neither am I wedded to my own opinion, but if I have said aught untrue of this sacrament, I leave all to the correction of the Holy Roman Church, in whose obedience I now pass away from this life." Just before he received he said, "Thou, O Christ, art the King of Glory; Thou art the everlasting Son of the Father." When he had finished his thanksgiving he was put back to bed. To Brother Reginald, who was full of distress that the saint could not now be made a dignitary for the glory of the order, he spoke gentle words of comfort. He died in the early morning of March 7, 1274.

When questioned about an ecstasy the Angelic Doctor said it "must be respected by silence." The whole of the life of a saint can never be known. When the keep has been reached there still remain fastnesses into which it is impossible for any external critic to venture; there still extends a sanctuary into which the saint himself penetrates but seldom and that by rushlight only, lest he lay bare the shrinking self, a sanctuary in which mysterious happenings occur. Into this part of the life of Aquinas I have not ventured. I have mentioned but slightly those traces of a sacred commerce with him to whom the saint had plighted his life. The mysterious things he wrought upon the sick or infirm I have not recounted. They are at first and last best "respected by silence." But what does appear is that the Angelic Doctor was devoted to prayer, that he performed penances and austerities that helped to weaken his frame, that he was quite indifferent as to what food was put before him, that he bore the cauterisation of a large abscess on his thigh and incessant trouble with his legs with sublime patience, that to see or speak with him gave one singular consolation, that in body and mind he was most pure, that his low esteem of himself amounted to complete self-effacement. These things are sufficiently wonderful. But added to them it must be recorded that "he was sweet and tractable in conversation," that his cell was ever open to his

brethren, that his delicate sympathy had the power of putting depression to flight, and that he was bound by the cords of a strong affection to many kindred souls. His charm and grace of manner it was that overcame—apart from his great gifts—the jealousy of the secular professors at Paris and held all in sympathetic agreement when he pleaded for his beloved order before the papal court at Anagni. His calmness and serenity were the result of his strength and not of stolidness. He had a ready wit and could point a joke at himself, as when he concealed the fact that he had unconsciously eaten a dish of salt olives that had been set before the friars by mistake and no one else could touch. “Do you not know,” he said, “that a large amount of salt is necessary to season such a mass of flesh as mine?” Of his work it yet remains to say something.

HIS WORK

Aquinas was what is called a scholastic. Indeed he is the chief of them; and it is a thing far easier to say who are scholastics than what is scholasticism, the system they espouse. Scholasticism is not mediæval philosophy but *a* mediæval philosophy. Greek philosophy of Byzantium and Arabian of Bagdad, as well as Chinese and Indian philosophies, flourished in the Middle Ages. The Albigensians and the Cathari were psychologically descendants of Lucretius, and Epicurus, as David of Dinant of the early pantheists. But scholasticism means a certain oneness of method in approaching vital problems, and, more than a method, a certain number of tenets which serve to mark off such men as Anselm, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, William of Occam, and St. Thomas Aquinas from a Platonist, a Leibnitzian, or a Kantian. Neither is scholasticism scholastic theology, though by many it has been used to describe it, and in this way it has come to be regarded as an *orthodoxy*, with its aim apologetic. But scholasticism is a philosophy,

and the scholastic synthesis, which was not fully completed until the thirteenth century, owes much to him of whom St. Thomas speaks as "the philosopher"—Aristotle. The Angelic Doctor borrowed much from Aristotle, but what he borrowed he amplified and perfected to an extraordinary degree. Some of these features were new to the schools of his day. He taught unity of form as against a plurality of forms in the individual, self-existing (subsisting) forms as against a matter and form composition of spiritual substances, and the real distinction of the soul and its faculties as against the Augustinian theory of their identity.

These innovations, as many others for which the Angelic Doctor is responsible, did not gain their way all at once. They caused him to be received with suspicion even by his own brethren. Indeed one of them plays a not wholly inconspicuous part in mediæval controversies and in English history. The Dominicans at Oxford, January 1, 1285, declared, in spite of the reprobation of Peckham, Archbishop of Canterbury, repeating his predecessor, Kilwardby (a Dominican), of one of their Thomistic tenets, "that it and other opinions of Brother Thomas they were willing to defend against all comers." This is sufficient to show that the saint was not blindly followed and that some of his new contributions won their way as by fire.

He seems to have written on every possible subject. Theology, dogmatic, ascetic, moral, and mystical, he treated of with such sublimity as to earn for himself the title of the "Angelic Doctor." He expounded almost all the books of the New, and many of the books of the Old Testament. He also made a "Golden Chain" of quotations from the fathers on the four Gospels as a commentary, which the editor of the English translation spoke of as exhibiting "learning of the highest kind . . . a thorough acquaintance with the whole range of ecclesiastical antiquity . . . a familiarity with the style of each writer so as to compress into a few words the pith of a whole page . . . and a power of clear and orderly

arrangement . . . which makes this *Catena* perhaps nearly perfect as a conspectus of patristic interpretation." He also wrote expositions on "the two precepts of Charity," "the first and second Decretals," "on the Divine Names" (Denis); discussions on "Truth," "Evil," and "Potentiality." He composed an "Office of Corpus Christi," wrote a book on the "Ruling of Princes" for the King of Cyprus, and on the "Ruling of the Jews" for the Duchess of Flanders. For Urban IV. "on the errors of the Greeks;" a "Compendium of Theology" and a treatise "on Angels" for Brother Reginald; on astrology, the principles of Nature, and many questions of science. He wrote as he best could, saying, as to the Duchess of Flanders, "I wished that in these things you should have the counsel of others more skilled in such matters." He ends these works undertaken for others often with a graceful wish, "*Valeat caritas vestra diu*," and a request for prayer if his correspondent felt under any obligation—"Pro quo mihi, si placet, orationum suffragia impendatis." On at least one occasion there is a fine outburst of sarcasm and one can only infer the dishonesty that called it forth. He challenges the Averroists if they have anything to say about his work to say it "*non in angulis nec coram pueris*," who cannot understand arduous things.

There is a phrase of the Angelic Doctor which is sufficient to make one pause. He notes some tenets "*quoe modernis dubia esse videntur*." So St. Thomas was a "modernist," but I think there can be no doubt that he was no modernist in the sense in which the term is used at present. He is opposed to modernism, not as the exponent of mediævalism or scholasticism, but simply by the cardinal difference of looking to authority as the final court of appeal in faith and morals. "Modernists," too, might assert that they hold by authority in the ultimate resort, but their conception of it is different. Following a tendency which is as old as Christianity itself, they insist on the value of the personal and interior as against the corporate and exterior voice. The

Angelic Doctor would have urged the paramount necessity of the former but not to the destruction of the latter. The implied opposition in the saying that the modernist "drinks first to conscience and then to the Pope" would have suggested to St. Thomas aspects of the question which are too deeply grounded to sound here. One of the best known adherents of modernism opposes, again, the "individual mind of the Pope" to the "collective mind of the Church;" but as he goes on to suggest that those who espouse his tendencies are in the minority, at this point at least there is no opposition, and appeal to one or the other, or to both, means his condemnation. There must be some acknowledgment of the corrective of the corporate consciousness over the personal even in modernism if it is to live, since it is no very obvious proof of the validity of modern methods that it can find no other basis of unity than its very method and its *terminus a quo*. Again the writer I have quoted above as expressing the modernist position says, "One cannot help wondering where St. John of the Cross, St. Teresa, and a host of canonised contemplatives differ from pseudo-mystics." Perhaps I may not be understood if I say that this *reductio ad absurdum* gives the key to the position. It is a difference of mentality; and when the pseudo-mystic can get round to the mentality and temperamentality of these canonised saints he may have the freedom of saying, as they said, what things are within his purview.

No enlightened scholastic claims to follow St. Thomas blindly in all things. As one has said, he "should be a beacon to us but not a boundary." But Aquinas will still remain opposed in spirit as in tenets to modernism. He would acknowledge the inadequacy of definitions to include some things within their content, but he would not therefore sanction a complete lack of definition. He would acknowledge the possibility of error of judgment in policy on the part of the Holy See, perhaps even in such border-line acts as the sanctioning of religious orders, or in "Dogmatic

Facts," but speaking formally and finally he would own no error there, no possibility of it.

There was some hesitation, as has been shown, in the full acceptance of the Angelic Doctor, but by the time of the Council of Trent he had come to his own. Two books were placed upon the table during the sittings of this council. One was the Bible and the other the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. Since then he has received every official recognition from the popes, and unofficial recognition from scholars of every cast of thought even to the present day; and if the stream of scholars to-day flows past his door, it is because of the indiscretions of some of his followers who attempted to contradict observed fact from the Angelic Doctor.

THE IDEA OF THIS WORK

Not only has each age its *idée fixe*, but also its special mode of expression, its antipathies, its heroes, its attractions, and its repulsions. Any one who truly comprehends his time notes these elements, and, if he is a strong man, has his reasons for the one and his answers for the other. And yet the age is ever gradually growing away from them, so that, just as in variable velocity, it is only at a hypothetical mid-point that the age is truly wedded to them. A generation and they are no more. Ten generations and they are almost forgotten, and a special sympathy is needed to appreciate the sway they held, the enthusiasm they aroused, the passions they excited, and the sufficient outlook they supplied. Seven centuries have, then, carried the world far from that position which confronted the Middle Ages; it may be that they have almost carried it back to a similar position. It is at least certain that there has been a revival of interest in the Middle Ages and its greater ideals which must put all nations under their feet by the element of permanency in them. Still, the present age must express those ideals after its own fashion. And one can hardly hope that its mode of

expression will be less provisional than that of the enlightened times of other ages. This suggests the point of view of those Christians who refuse to assent to the findings of modern science, or to see any necessity for re-statement in view of them. It is for this reason, too, that I have omitted some things in the writings of Aquinas, even in the midst of treatises I have translated, because if the foes be old they have ever a new face; and some old dragons have been slain once for all by their St. Georges, and few if any are interested in their life story. But I have striven everywhere to omit nothing which is material to the argument of Aquinas.

My chief aim has been this, to allow Aquinas to speak for himself. One of the most lamentable things in life is the vast amount of art and science that is lost through our dumbness or deafness. The music, the poetry, the art of eye and touch that is latent in numbers of men who lack the technique of language to express them is shown by the numbers who deeply appreciate them. How many fine works of the great ones of the past lie unread on the shelves because the writers had the art of one tongue only! But this second case is less hopeless, for one can act as interpreter. This is my sole object in the pages of this book, to give Aquinas speech of the English-speaking peoples, that the many who praise may have at least some reason for their praise, that they who condemn may not do so in ignorance.

The parts I have selected for translation have been chosen for different reasons as being characteristic or apt to the present time to show the position of Aquinas. I have endeavoured to translate his work into the simplest language at my disposal, and feel fairly confident that I have achieved a measure of success. Most of the passages translated have never appeared in English dress before, but have been quoted even by scholars from foreign digests. It has not seemed necessary to them to inquire what is of Aquinas and what belonged to the disciples who completed some of the

works he left unfinished. I have made no digest here but given the complete text when translating in the vast majority of cases, except when it meant simply useless repetition. The objections have for the most part been suppressed, but if any new idea comes in the answers to them it has been included. The references to the works of the authorities whom St. Thomas quotes have been suppressed consistently to avoid the tedium of a constant interruption of the text. They may be found by any one with the aid of the reference to the source in St. Thomas from which I have chosen the passages. A key to the abbreviations of the latter references is given in the Appendix, which I have endeavoured to make useful to the casual student of St. Thomas. To the professional scholar it can have little, if any, worth. If by this means I succeed in throwing some light on one of the greatest intellects of history, and introducing him where he must otherwise have remained unknown, I have succeeded in the end I set myself, and that is success indeed.

OFFICE OF CORPUS CHRISTI

ON THE FEAST OF CORPUS CHRISTI

AT FIRST VESPERS

Antiphon. Christ the Lord, a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedeck, offered bread and wine.

Psalm. The Lord said.

Ant. The compassionate and merciful Lord gave meat to them that feared him being mindful of his wonderful works.

Ps. I will praise thee, O Lord.

Ant. I will take the cup of salvation, and offer a sacrifice of praise.

Ps. I have believed.

Ant. As young olive plants shall the children of the Church be round about the table of the Lord.

Ps. Blessed are all they.

Ant. The Lord, who hath set peace in the borders of the Church, filleth us with the fatness of corn.

Ps. Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem.

CHAPTER

The Lord Jesus in the night that he was betrayed, took bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it and said: Take and eat: this is my Body, which shall be delivered for you. *Res.* Thanks be to God.

Responsary. A certain man made a great supper, and he sent his servant at the hour of supper to tell those invited to come: for all things have been made ready.

Ver. Come, eat my bread, and drink my wine which I have mixed for you. For all . . . Glory be to the Father . . . For all . . .

HYMN

Sing, my tongue, the mystic teaching
Of the body glorious,
And the precious blood, far-reaching,
That the nations' King for us,
At a stainless maid's beseeching,
Drew from her and gave to us.

Of a maiden to us coming
Whose pure whiteness pales the snow,
Nought of human converse shunning,
Teaching all the truth to know,
Reached he last in wondrous running
His fixed time his way to go.

On the night of their last eating,
With his brethren seated round,
All the law's demands completing
In symbolic food profound,
He to seal the twelves' sad meeting
Made their food in him be found.

The Word Incarnate, by a word,
From bread his own Flesh Divine;
And from pure wine his Blood prepared;
But if senses fear the sign,
Then faith's sure promptings meekly heard
Guileless hearts to strength incline.

To this Sacrament then bowing
Low the head and spirit too;
The great rite of old endowing
With its virtue all the new;
Faith alone the aid allowing,
Where the senses lose their view,

To the heavenly Sire all praises,
And the Son co-equal be;
Honour, might, the world now raises,
And to thee dread majesty,
Who from both in wondrous way is
Ever equal endlessly. Amen.

Ver. Thou didst give them bread from heaven.

Res. Having in itself all sweetness.

Antiphon at the Magnificat. Lord, how sweet is thy Spirit, who to show thy delight to thy children, with a most sweet bread from heaven dost fill the hungry with good things, and send empty away the disdainful rich.

PRAYER

O God, who hast left us under a wonderful sacrament a memory of thy passion, grant us, we beseech thee, so to revere the sacred mysteries of thy body and blood, that we may ever experience within us the fruit of thy redemption who livest and reignest through all ages of ages.

AT COMPLINE

Antiphon for the Psalms, and the Psalms as usual

Ant. at the Nunc Dimittis. Alleluia, Alleluia. The bread which I shall give, Alleluia. Is my flesh for the life of the world, Alleluia.

AT MATINS

Invitatory. Let us adore Christ our king, the ruler of nations, who to them that eat of him granteth fulness of spirit.

Psalms. O come . . .

HYMN

Hail, blest solemnity, full be our joy to-day,
From every breast ring out the one same gladsome lay;
May all be fresh and new, and old types pass away,
New hearts, and songs and actions new.

Back to that holy feast wings every thought again,
When Christ, our faith believes, of bread and victim slain
Gave to the brethren round, as olden laws maintain
Was of our fathers' ordinance.

After the paschal lamb, when the feast's course was run,
Gave he his body entire to each single one;
So each disciple received—thus we hold it done—
The Lord from his own sacred hands.

To each weak heart he gave his flesh to strengthen it,
To each sad heart he gave his blood to gladden it,
Saying, "Take, receive the cup with my bounty lit,
Take, and drink of it all of you."

So the blest sacrifice he deigned to celebrate,
The service of which he left to the priestly state,
That they, thus fittingly, might ever consecrate,
Take themselves, and to others give.

So bread angelic becomes food for human kind:
And, in the heavenly food, end of all types we find;
Eateth his very Lord—what heart could have divined?—
The servant low in poverty!

O triune deity, one thing we ask of thee,
Do thou thy presence give, as all our worship we;
By thy own paths lead us to what we toil to see,
The light wherein thy dwelling is.

Amen.

THE FIRST NOCTURN

Ant. The Lord gave us to taste of the fruit of salvation at the time of his death.

Ps. Blessed is the man . . .

Ant. The faithful, multiplied by the fruit of corn and wine, rest in the peace of Christ.

Ps. When I called upon him . . .

Ant. Not by the blood of calves, but by the communion of the chalice wherein God himself is received hath the Lord called us together.

Ps. Preserve me, O Lord.

Ver. The bread of heaven he gave to them.

Res. The bread of angels did man eat.

LESSON I

The immense benefits bestowed by the divine bounty upon the Christian people confer on it a dignity beyond all price. For neither does there exist now, nor was there at any time, so great a nation, which had its gods so intimately near it, as our God is nigh to us. Since the only begotten son of God, wishing to make us sharers of his divinity, took to himself our nature, and, that he might make men gods, was made man. And, moreover, all that he took from our nature, for our saving, he gave back to us. For his body he offered as a sacrifice for our reconciliation on the altar of the cross to God the Father, and his blood he shed, to be at once our price and our cleansing, so that, redeemed from a miserable slavery, we may be cleansed from all our sins.

Res. The multitude of the children of Israel shall offer up a kid on the evening of the Pasch. And they shall eat flesh and unleavened bread.

Ver. Christ our Pasch is sacrificed; let us therefore feast with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth. And they shall eat flesh . . .

LESSON II

But, that the memory of so great and so far-reaching a gift should not fade from our minds, he left to the faithful his body for their food, and his blood for their drink, under the appearance of bread and wine. O most precious and most wonderful banquet, full of health and all sweetness! For what could be more precious than this feast, since in it not the flesh of calves and goats, as in the law of old, is set before us, but Christ, the very God. What then more wonderful than this sacrament? For in it the substance of bread and wine is changed into the body and blood of Christ. And therefore Christ, God, and perfect man, is hidden under the veils of a little bread and wine.

Res. Ye shall eat flesh and be filled with bread. This is the bread that the Lord hath given you to eat.

Ver. Moses gave you not bread of heaven, but the true bread from heaven giveth you my Father. This is the bread . . .

LESSON III

And so he is eaten by the faithful, but not therefore torn: moreover, when the sacrament is divided under each separate particle he dwelleth whole. But in it the accidents exist without a subject, that faith may have scope while he, the visible, is invisibly taken, hidden under a different appearance; and the senses, which judge of accidents known to them, suffer no deception. No sacrament is there more healthful than this, which purges away sins, makes virtue grow, and enriches the mind with the abundance of all spiritual gifts. It is offered in the Church for the quick and the dead that it may profit all, which for the saving of all was instituted.

Res. Elias saw at his head a hearth cake, and, rising, he

ate and drank, And walked in the strength of that food,
Even to the mount of God.

Ver. If any one shall eat of this bread, he shall live for
ever. And he walked in the strength . . . Glory be to
the Father . . . Even to the mount . . .

THE SECOND NOCTURN

Ant. May the Lord be mindful of our sacrifice and may our
whole burnt offering be made fat.

Ps. May the Lord hear thee . . .

Ant. The table of the Lord is made ready for us against
all them that trouble us.

Ps. The Lord ruleth me . . .

Ant. May they who feast at the table of the Lord shout
for joy.

Ps. As the hart panteth . . .

Ver. With the fat of wheat he fed them.

Res. And with honey from the rock he filled them.

LESSON IV

Finally, no one can sufficiently tell the sweetness of this sacrament, by which spiritual sweetness is tasted in its very source, and the remembrance is brought back of that most excellent charity, which Christ showed in his passion. Whence, that the immensity of this charity might be more closely impressed upon the hearts of the faithful, in the last supper when the Pasch had been celebrated with the disciples and he was about to pass from this world to the Father, he instituted this sacrament as a perpetual memorial of his passion, the fulfilment of olden types, the greatest of the miracles he performed, and he left to those saddened by his absence a singular consolation.

Res. The bread what I will give is my flesh for the life of

the world. The Jews therefore strove amongst themselves saying, how can this man give us his flesh to eat?

Ver. The people complained against the Lord: our souls loathe this light food. How can this man . . .

LESSON V

And so the devotion of the faithful wishes to make a solemn recalling of the institution of so saving and wonderful a sacrament, that we may venerate the ineffable manner of the divine presence in a visible sacrament; that the power of God which works so many deeds of wonder in the same sacrament may be praised, and that due thanks may be rendered to God for so salutary and sweet a gift. But although on the day of the last supper, when the sacrament was instituted, a special commemoration is made of the institution, all the rest of the office of that day is given over to the passion of Christ, in venerating which the Church is, at that time, occupied. In order that, however, the faithful, by the entire office of a feast, might recall the institution of so great a sacrament, the Roman Pontiff, Urban IV., moved by devotion to this sacrament, piously decreed that, on the Thursday after the octave of Pentecost, the memory of this institution should be celebrated by all the faithful, so that they who, during the whole year, take the sacrament to the health of their souls may at that time specially call to mind its institution when the Holy Spirit taught the hearts of the disciples fully to know the mysteries of this sacrament. For at that same time this sacrament commenced to be used by the faithful.

Res. Whilst they were at supper Jesus took bread and, when he had blessed it, he brake it and gave to his disciples saying: Take and eat, this is my body.

Ver. The children of my tabernacle said: Who shall give us his flesh that we may be filled? Take and eat . . .

LESSON VI

But that, on the aforesaid Thursday and during the following octave, the memory of that saving institution might be celebrated with more dignity, and that from this the solemnity might be more widely held, in place of the distributions of material bounty, which, in cathedral churches, are made to them that assist at the canonical hours both of night and day, the Roman Pontiff before mentioned granted, from his apostolic bounty, to those present at these hours on the feast, spiritual alms, in order that by means of these the faithful might come to the solemnity of so great a feast more eagerly and in greater numbers. To all those being truly penitent and having confessed their sins, therefore, who are present at the office of Matins in a church in which it is celebrated he granted an indulgence, to endure for ever, of a hundred days from the penances they have incurred; for being present at mass—the same number, and similarly to those hearing the first or second vespers; to those present at prime, terce, sext, and compline—forty days for each part of the office; to those hearing the offices of matins, vespers, and mass, and the hours mentioned before during the octave—on each of the days, a hundred days.

Res. After supper Jesus took the cup saying: This chalice is the new testament in my blood. Do this for a remembrance of me.

Ver. I shall surely remember, and my soul will faint within me. This chalice is the new . . . Glory be to the Father. Do this for a remembrance. . . .

THE THIRD NOCTURN

Ant. I will go to the altar of God and take to myself Christ, who reneweth my youth.

Ps. Judge me, O God. .

Ant. The Lord hath fed us with the fatness of wheat, and with honey from the rock hath filled us.

Ps. Rejoice to God.

Ant. From thine altar, O Lord, we receive Christ, in whom both heart and flesh rejoice.

Ps. How beautiful are thy tabernacles . . .

Ver. Thou bringest forth bread from the earth.

Res. And wine that maketh glad the heart of man.

LESSON VII

According to John

At that time Jesus said to his disciples and to the multitude of the Jews: My flesh is indeed meat, and my blood is drink indeed . . . *and the rest.*

Homily of the blessed Bishop Augustine

Since men desire meat and drink that they may neither hunger nor thirst, this verily none can bring about save only that meat and drink that maketh them who partake of it immortal and incorruptible, namely, that fellowship of the saints where dwelleth peace, and the fulness of perfect unity. And hence it is that our Lord Jesus Christ, as men of God before our days have understood, hath set before us his body and blood in these signs, that from many are become one. For bread is made from many grains, and the stream flows from many grapes to produce wine.

Res. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood abideth in me, and I in him.

Ver. There is no other nation so great that hath its gods so nigh unto it as our God is present with us. Abideth in me.

LESSON VIII

And now he maketh clear how that shall be which he saith, and what it is to eat his flesh and drink his blood. He

that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood abideth in me and I in him. This then is to eat his flesh and to drink his blood to abide in him and to have him abiding in us. And so he that abideth not in Christ and in whom Christ abideth not assuredly does not spiritually take his flesh (although he carnally and outwardly press with his teeth the mysteries of the body and blood of Christ), but rather eateth and drinketh he this great sacrament to his own condemnation, since, unclean, he presumes to draw near to the secret things of Christ, that none can take save such as are without spot, of whom it is said: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.

Res. The living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father. So also he that eateth me liveth by me.

Ver. The Lord hath fed him with the bread of life and understanding. So also he that eateth . . .

LESSON IX

He saith, as the living Father hath sent me and I live by the Father, so also he that eateth me the same shall live by me. For the Son is not made better by the participation of the Father, for he is equal to the Father, as by the participation of the Son by the unity of the body and blood, which that eating and drinking signify, makes us better. Eating him, therefore, we live by him, that is to say, through Christ receiving eternal life, which we have not of ourselves. But he liveth by the Father as being sent by him, for he emptied himself, being made obedient even to the death of the cross. As the Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father, so also he that eateth me shall live by me; as though he would say: and I live by the Father, that is, the emptying of myself in which he sent me brought about that I should owe my life to him as to a greater; but the sharing by which any one eats of me brings about that he should live by me. I indeed brought low live by the Father, and he raised on high liveth

by me. He speaketh not of that nature, by which he is ever equal to the Father, but of that in which he is made less than the Father: of which also he spoke before: As the Father hath life in himself so he hath given to the Son that he should, also, have life in himself.

Res. All we who partake of one bread and one chalice, being many, are one bread and one body.

Ver. In thy sweetness, O Lord, thou hast provided for the poor, who maketh to dwell with one mind in the house. All we . . . Glory be to the Father . . . We who partake . . .

Ver. Eat my honeycomb with my honey.

Res. Drink my wine with my milk.

AT LAUDS

Ant. Wisdom hath built herself a house, she hath mingled her wine and made ready her table. Alleluia.

Ps. The Lord hath reigned . . . *and the rest, as usual.*

Ant. Thou hast nourished thy people with the food of angels, and thou hast given them bread from heaven. Alleluia.

Ant. The bread of Christ is rich, and it shall yield its delights to kings. Alleluia.

Ant. The priests of God offer incense and bread to God. Alleluia.

Ant. To him that conquereth I shall give the hidden manna and a new name. Alleluia.

CHAPTER

The Lord Jesus . . . *as in the first vespers.*

HYMN

The word of God from heav'n proceeding,
Nor turning from the Father's light,
Treading the press with members bleeding,
Reaches at length his life's chill night.

Yet waits he not his friends betraying
To pain and death at envious hands;
Himself betrays, before men laying
His flesh to fill their life's demands.

Twofold the gift he left his proven,
His sacred flesh, his precious blood;
That man of twofold fibre woven
Might find for each its fitting food.

The manger makes him kinsman lowly,
In supper-room he is our food;
In death he is our ransom holy,
In heav'n our all-sufficing good.

O Victim for mankind's undoing
Restoring us our home above,
Our footsteps snares are ever wooing,
Grant strength and help lest lost we prove.

To thee, O Lord, of earth and heaven,
Be glory everlastingly,
Who life for us hast likewise given
In our own Father's home to see.

Amen.

Ver. He hath placed peace in thy borders.

Res. And with the fatness of corn he feedeth thee.

Ant. at the Benedictus. I am the living bread that descendeth from heaven: if any one shall eat of this bread, he shall live for ever.

Prayer as in the first vespers

At Prime and all the hours the Antiphons of Lauds, excepting the fourth

Res. Jesus Christ . . .

Ver. Who was born of the Virgin Mary . . . *and through the whole octave.*

Chapter at terce. The Lord Jesus . . .

Res. Bread of heaven he gave them. Alleluia, Alleluia.

Ver. Man did eat the bread of angels. Alleluia, Alleluia.
Glory be . . . Bread of heaven . . .

Ver. He fed them with the fatness of corn.

Res. And with honey from the rock he filled them.

Chapter at sext. For as often as you eat this bread and drink this chalice you shall announce the Lord's death until he come.

Res. He fed them . . . Alleluia, Alleluia.

Ver. And with honey . . . Alleluia, Alleluia. Glory be . . . He fed . . .

Ver. Thou bringest forth . . .

Res. And wine . . .

Chapter at none. As often as he shall eat the bread and drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, he shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord.

Res. Thou bringest . . . Alleluia, Alleluia.

Ver. And wine . . . Alleluia, Alleluia. Glory be . . .
Thou bringest . . .

Ver. He hath placed peace in thy borders.

Res. And with the fatness of corn he feedeth thee.

At vespers : Antiphons of Lauds, Psalms, Chapter, and Hymn as in first vespers

Ant. at Magnificat. O sacred banquet in which Christ is received, the memory of his passion is recalled, the mind is

filled with grace and a pledge of future glory is given us.
Alleluia, Alleluia.

Prayer as in first vespers

Through the octave

Invitatory. Come let us adore Christ, the bread of angels and men.

Ant. at the Benedictus. I am the living bread that cometh down from heaven: who eateth of this bread shall live for ever.

Ant. at Magnificat. The compassionate and merciful Lord hath made a memory of his wonderful works; he hath given meat to them that fear him.

All the rest as on the day

AT MASS

He hath fed them with the fatness of corn, Alleluia: and with honey from the rock he hath filled them, Alleluia, Alleluia, Alleluia.

Ver. Rejoice in the Lord our helper, rejoice in the God of Jacob. Glory be . . .

Prayer as in vespers

Lesson from the Epistle of the Blessed Apostle Paul to the Corinthians

For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, that the Lord Jesus, the same night in which he was betrayed took bread, and giving thanks, broke and said: Take ye and eat: this is my body which shall be delivered for you: this do for the commemoration of me. In like manner also the chalice, after he had supped, saying: This chalice is the new testament in my blood: this do ye as often as you shall drink, for the commemoration of me.

For as often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall shew the death of the Lord until he come. Therefore whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord. But let a man prove himself: and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice. For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord.

Res. The eyes of all hope in thee, O Lord, and thou givest them their meat in due season.

Ver. Thou openest thy hand and fillest every animal with blessing. Alleluia.

Res. My flesh is meat indeed and my blood is drink indeed, He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, abideth in me and I in him.

THE SEQUENCE

Praise, O Sion, praise thy leader,
Saviour, and thy daily feeder,
Praise in hymns and tuneful song;
Be thy lay a full heart's telling,
For his praise is all excelling,
All thy power howe'er so strong.

Special theme to-day is giving,
Bread life-giving aye and living—
Living for his chosen few;
Bread that, for the holy eating
To the twelve at their last meeting,
Was giv'n is no doubtful view.

Let the praise be full and rounded,
Sweet and seemly as e'er sounded
From a mind's pent jubilee;

For to-day the solemn founding
Is recalled, of that first sounding
Of the table's mystery.

In the new king's banquet spreading,
New pasch of the new law's reading,
Olden rite doth fade away;
Here newness puts to flight the old,
And truth the shadows manifold;
Night speeds from the light of day.

What Christ wrought, at supper seated,
Ordered he to be repeated
In his sacred memory;
As a victim for salvation,
Taught of his blest revelation,
Bread and wine then offer we.

That true bread to flesh is turnéd
Is in Christian dogma learnéd,
And to blood the holy wine;
What mind and eye both fail to reach,
From fixed accustomed order's breach,
Firm faith sanctions every line.

Lo, beneath the twofold token,
Signs of things to eye not broken,
Priceless gifts lie hid indeed;
Flesh for food, and blood for drinking,
Christ entire, who knows no shrinking,
Dwells in each blest sign, we read.

Every one his whole Lord taketh,
Nor makes short, nor eating, breaketh,
Nor does he his Lord divide;
Whether one or many eat him
He is there for all who need him,
And, consumed, does still abide.

Saint Thomas Aquinas

The good and e'en the bad draw near;
What diff'rent gain away they bear
From the food that each receives;
The good full life, the evil death,
From the same table gathereth;
Each one firm and true believes.

When the sacrament is broken,
Doubt not, but believe the token
To the word that erst was spoken:
Every part the whole conceals;
The sign alone is rent in twain;
The signified preserves his reign;
Nor does his state or size sustain
Any lack that faith reveals.

Lo! the bread of angels given
Pilgrims on their path to heaven,
Children's bread not to be riven,
Or to dogs distributed;
In divers types foreshown of yore,
In the offering Isaac bore,
In Paschal lamb, and manna's store
To our sires contributed.

O good shepherd, our bread most true,
Jesus, we ask mercy of you;
Feed and keep us 'neath thy purview;
Grant that we thy goodness may view
In the land where life has sway.
Thou who truth and power hast o'er us,
Yield'st the food that can restore us,
Set thy table there before us,
Who as heirs and friends rebore us,
Sharers of the saints' blest day. Amen.

According to John

In that time Jesus said to his disciples, and to a multitude of the Jews: My flesh is meat indeed: and my blood is drink indeed. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, abideth in me, and I in him. As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, the same also shall live by me. This is the bread that came down from heaven. Not as your fathers did eat manna and are dead. He that eateth this bread shall live for ever.

Offertory

Incense and bread the priests of the Lord offer to God; and therefore they are sacred to God, and they shall not pollute his name. Alleluia.

The Secret Prayers

Grant, O Lord, we beseech thee, to thy Church the gifts of peace and unity, which are mystically typified under the gifts we offer.

Preface. Since through the mystery of the Incarnate Word . . . as at Christmas time.

Holy. The divine mystery is ever declared, the proud mind of the unbelieving is clouded and the firm hope of believers is strengthened by faith.

Holy. Faith is to believe vehemently in God, to eat the holy bread and to handle it. For so he ordered: Take, this is my body.

Holy. Bread is first perceived, but when consecrated it is changed into the flesh of Christ; and God contrives the manner of its changing.

Lord God of Sabaoth. We hold it true and no fiction that

from wine also the true blood of Christ is obtained when it has been blessed.

Heaven and earth are full of thy glory : hosanna in the highest. To us who celebrate this sacrament and to all the faithful it becomes food, but to the Jews who deny it a loss.

Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord : hosanna in the highest.

Communion. As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink this chalice, you shall announce the death of the Lord until he come. And so he that eateth this bread and drinketh this chalice of the Lord unworthily shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord. Alleluia.

Post Communion. Make us, O Lord, we beseech thee, to be filled with the perpetual delight of thy divinity, which is prefigured by the temporal receiving of thy precious body and blood. Who liveth and reigneth with God the Father in the unity of the Holy Spirit God through all ages of ages. Amen.

THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER

THREE objections have been raised against prayer. Some have said that the divine providence does not control human affairs: from which it follows that prayer is vain, as, indeed, is all worship. Others have said that all things, even human affairs, are brought about of necessity, or by the immutability of the divine providence, or by the necessity of the stars, or from a connection of causes: and according to these, also, praying is of no avail. Others, again, have said that human affairs are subject to divine providence, and they do not come to pass through necessity, but, at the same time, the disposition of divine providence is liable to change, and that by prayers, and other acts associated with divine worship, the disposition of divine providence is changed. . . .

And, therefore, it is necessary so to determine the use of prayer that neither shall we impose necessity on human affairs subject to divine providence, and neither shall we reckon the divine ordinance to be changeable.

To make this evident we must remember that by divine providence is directed not only which effects shall have being, but also from what causes, and in what order they shall proceed. Amongst other causes must be reckoned human acts. Whence it behoves men to perform certain things, not that by them they may change the divine ordinance, but that, by their acts, they may bring about certain effects according to the divine plan; and the same is true in natural causes. Similarly, with prayer: we do not pray in order to change the divine scheme, but to ask those things which God has decreed to be brought about by prayer, that, namely, "*Men by their petition may deserve to receive what*

Almighty God, before all time, determined to grant them" (Gregory). (2-2—83—2-0.)

Prayer is not necessary in order that God may know our needs and desires, but that we may remember that in these things we must have recourse to the divine help. (1m.)

As Maximus Valerius says: "*Socrates thought that nothing should be sought from the immortal gods save that they might bestow good things: for they indeed know what is to each one's profit; but we seek by our prayers mostly what it would have been better we had not asked.*"

And this opinion is to a certain extent true, with respect to those things which may turn out badly, or which we may well or evilly use. . . .

But there are certain good things which man cannot turn to evil use. Such are things that tend to our perfection, or by which we earn it: and these indeed the saints sought in prayer absolutely, according to that of the Psalm: "*Show us thy face and we are safe*" (lxxix. 4),¹ and again: "*Lead me in the way of thy law*" (cxviii. 35).² (83-5-0.)

God calls us to his good things in such a manner that not by our bodily steps, but by holy desires and devout prayer we may come to him. (3m.)

VOCAL PRAYER

Prayer is of two kinds, that which is made in common, and personal prayer. Common prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church as representing the whole of the faithful, and hence it is necessary that it should be made known to the people for whom it is offered, which could not be unless it were vocal. Whence it has been wisely instituted that the Church's ministers should pronounce these prayers with a loud voice, that they may come to the notice of all. But personal prayer is that which is offered by any single person whether for himself or for another;

¹ These index figures refer to Appendix, page 317.

and there is no necessity that this kind of prayer should be vocal. But the voice is used in such prayer for three reasons: firstly, to stimulate the interior devotion, by which the mind of him praying is raised to God; since by exterior signs, whether words or actions, the mind of man is moved to apprehend, and consequently to bring forth affections. Whence Augustine says to Proba that: "*We stimulate ourselves more intensely by words and other signs to the increase of holy desire.*" And hence in praying alone words and such signs are to be used only so far as they are of profit in interiorly exciting the mind. But if the mind draws distraction or any other hindrance from them, they should be given up, which especially happens in those whose minds are sufficiently prepared for devotion without these signs. Whence the Psalmist (xxvi. 8)¹ said: "*My heart hath said to thee: my face hath sought thee,*" and of Anna it is read (1 Kings i. 13):² "*She spoke in her heart.*" . . . Secondly, vocal prayer is used as the repaying of a debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has received from God, that is, not only in mind, but also in body, and this especially agrees with the notion of prayer, regarded as a satisfaction. Whence it is said (Osee, last chap. 3):³ "*Take away all iniquity, and receive the good, and we will render the sacrifices of our lips.*" Thirdly, vocal prayer is used from a kind of redundancy of the soul on the body, from its vehement affection, according to that (Psalms xv. 9):⁴ "*My heart made merry, and my tongue rejoiced.*" (2-2—83—12—0.)

ATTENTION IN PRAYER

The question of attention more especially regards vocal prayer. And in speaking of the necessity of attention, it must be remembered that necessity may be of two kinds; firstly, by which the end is better achieved, and in this light, attention is absolutely necessary to prayer.

Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary when without it

the effect cannot be arrived at. Now there is a triple effect of prayer: firstly, that which is common to all acts which proceed from charity, and this is to earn merit; and to achieve this effect, it is not necessary that attention should endure throughout the whole prayer, but the force of the first intention, by which any one comes to prayer, renders the whole prayer meritorious, as it happens in other meritorious acts.

But the second effect of prayer is proper to it alone, and this is to obtain gifts by its entreaty; and to bring about this effect also a right first intention is sufficient, for to this God chiefly looks. But if the first intention is wanting, prayer wins neither merit, nor any petition, for the ear of God is not open to him that does not look to him while praying, as Gregory says.

The third effect of prayer is, however, what it brings about at the time, namely, a certain spiritual refreshment of mind; and for this attention is necessarily required in prayer. Whence it is said (1 Cor. xiv. 14):¹ “*If my tongue pray, my mind remains fruitless.*” But it must be remembered that the attention which can accompany vocal prayer is of three kinds: firstly, that by which any one is careful lest he make any mistake in the words; secondly, that which looks to the sense of the words; thirdly, that which fixes its gaze on the end of prayer—God, and on what is asked of him, which indeed is especially necessary, and this also the ignorant can have; and, at times, so much may this attention abound that the mind may forget all other things, as says Hugh of St. Victor. (83—13—0.)

The human mind, by reason of its weakness, cannot long maintain its poise on high, for the soul is overbalanced by the weight of its weakness and brought low; and therefore it happens that when the mind of one praying is raised to God in contemplation, suddenly it strays away by reason of its infirmity. (2m.)

If the mind of any one is purposely distracted in prayer

this is sinful and renders the prayer fruitless; and, against this, Augustine in his rule says: "*When you pray to God in psalms and hymns, let the heart ponder what the tongue sings.*" But the wandering of the mind which is beyond our set purpose, does not rob the prayer of fruit. Whence Basil says that "*if, truly weakened by sin, you cannot fixedly pray, urge yourself as far as is in your power, and God pardons you, because not from any negligence, but from weakness you cannot, as you ought, stand before him.*" (3m.)

DAILY PRAYER

Prayer may be considered in two ways, firstly in itself, secondly, as to its cause. Now the cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought to proceed, and this may be continuous in us either actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in all things that we do of charity. But we ought to do all things to the glory of God, as is said (1 Cor. x.).¹ And according to this, prayer ought to be continuous. Whence Augustine says to Proba: "*In faith itself, hope and charity, by continued desire, we pray always.*"

But prayer itself cannot be continual since other works call for attention; and as Augustine says: "*Therefore at certain times and seasons by words also we pray to God, that by these signs of things, we may come to know how far we have made progress in this desire, and may more sharply stimulate ourselves to its increase.*"

Now the amount of everything ought to be measured by its destined end, as the quantity of drink that is requisite for health. Whence it is a good rule that prayer should last only as long as it is of use in exciting the fervour of interior desire. But when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be prolonged without weariness, it should not be further maintained. Whence Augustine says to Proba: "*The brethren in Egypt are said to have made, indeed, frequent*

prayers, but yet of the briefest, and ejaculated hastily, as it were ; lest that intention, watchful and alert, which is so greatly necessary to the prayer, should break away and be blunted by more protracted communings : and by this also they themselves sufficiently show that just as this intention is not to be dulled if it cannot endure, so also if it shall have endured it is not readily to be interrupted."

And just as this is to be observed in individual prayer as to the intention of him that prays, so also in public prayer as to the devotion of the people. (2-2-83-14-0.)

THE LORD'S PRAYER

Among other prayers the Lord's Prayer stands out as the chief, for it has five excellences that are requisite in prayer. Since prayer ought to be secure, fitting, in due order, devoted, and lowly. It should be secure indeed, that we may go to the throne of his grace with confidence, as is said (Hebrews iv.):¹ "*In faith also not failing:*" and it is said (James i. 6):² "*But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.*" Now with reason is this prayer most secure: for it is formed by our advocate, who is the wisest suppliant, in whom are all treasures of wisdom, as is said (to the Colossians ii.),³ and: "*We have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous*" (1 John ii. 1).⁴ Whence Cyprian says in his book on the Lord's Prayer: "*Since we have Christ an advocate with the Father for our sins, when we beg for our transgressions, we use the words of our advocate.*" It appears, further, more secure since he who hears the prayer, with the Father, taught us to pray, according to that of Psalm (xc. 15):⁵ "*He will cry to me and I shall hear him.*" Whence says Cyprian: "*Friendly, familiar, and devout is the prayer, to ask the Lord with his own.*" And hence one never leaves this prayer without fruit: for by it venial faults are pardoned, as says Augustine. Our prayer ought also to be fitting, that he who prays may ask of God what things are good for him. For Damascene

says: "*Prayer is a seeking of the fitting from God.*" Many times indeed prayer is unheard, because unseemly things are sought. "*You ask and receive not, because you ask amiss*" (James iv. 3).¹ But to know what to seek is most difficult, as it is most difficult to know what to desire. For what things it is lawful to ask in prayer, it is lawful to desire: and hence the Apostle says to the Romans (viii. 26):² "*For we know not what we should pray for as we ought.*" But Christ himself is our teacher: for his it is to teach us what we ought to ask. For the disciples said to him (Luke xi. 1):³ "*Lord, teach us to pray.*" Those things, therefore, which he taught us to pray for, are most fittingly sought: whence Augustine: "*But whatever words we may say, we say nothing other than what is set forth in the Lord's prayer, if we pray justly and fittingly.*" Prayer ought also to be in due order, as also desire, since prayer is the voice of desire. Now this is due order, that we set spiritual things before carnal, heavenly before earthly in desire and prayer, according to that of Matthew (vi. 33):⁴ "*Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice: and all these things will be added to you.*" This the Lord taught to be observed in this prayer: in which firstly are sought heavenly, and afterwards earthly things. Prayer ought also to be devout, since the marrow of devotion makes the sacrifice of prayer acceptable to God, according to that of Psalm lxii. (v. 5):⁵ "*In thy name I will lift up my hands: let my soul be filled, as with marrow and fatness.*" But devotion is much weakened by the prolixity of prayer: whence the Lord taught us to shun a superfluous drawing out of prayer, saying (Matthew vi. 7):⁶ "*When you are praying speak not much.*" And Augustine says to Proba: "*Let much speech be far from prayer; but let there be no lack of appealing if the intention remain fervent.*" Whence the Lord made this prayer short. Now devotion is born of charity, which is the love of God and our neighbour, both of which are shown in this prayer. For to insinuate divine love, we call him "*Father*;" but to insinuate the love of our neigh-

bour, we pray universally for all, saying, "*Our Father*," and "*Forgive us our trespasses*," to which we are led by the love of our neighbour. Prayer ought also to be lowly, according to that of the Psalm (ci. 18):¹ "*He hath had regard to the prayer of the lowly :*" and Luke (xviii.),² speaking of the pharisee and the publican: and of Judith (ix. 16):³ "*The prayer of the lowly and the meek hath always been pleasing to thee.*" And lowliness is preserved in this prayer: for that is true humility when one presumes nothing of his own powers, but looks for all from the divine power. (*Exposition on the Lord's Prayer—beginning.*)

THE NATURE OF TRUTH

It is to be said that, just as in demonstration, it is necessary that there should be a reduction to principles that are of themselves known to the intellect, so also in prosecuting an inquiry into the nature of anything; otherwise, on both sides, one would go on to infinity, and so the science and knowledge of things would perish completely. Now that which the intellect conceives first as most known, and that into which it resolves all conceptions, is entity, as Avicenna says. Whence it is necessary that all other conceptions of the intellect should be obtained from the addition of something to entity. But there cannot be added to entity anything as an extraneous nature, in the way in which a difference is added to a genus, or an accident to a subject, since every nature is essentially entity; whence also the philosopher proves that entity cannot be a genus; but, according to this, are certain things said to add something above entity, in so far as they express its mode, which by the name of entity itself is not expressed. And this happens in two ways. Firstly, the mode expressed is a certain special mode of entity; for there are diverse grades of entity, according to which arise diverse modes of being, and consequent upon these are the diverse genera of things: for substance does not add above entity a difference, which means some nature superadded to entity; but by the name of substance is expressed a certain special mode of being, namely that which is entity of itself; and so it is in other genera.

Secondly, the mode expressed is one that generally follows all entity, and this may be taken in two ways: firstly, in so far as it is attached to every entity in itself; secondly, in so far as it pertains to every entity with reference to something

else. If it be in the first way, it is said to express in entity something affirmatively, or negatively. But nothing absolutely affirmative is found that can be observed in every entity, except its essence, according to which it is said to be; and hence arises the name *thing*, which differs from entity, according to Avicenna, in that entity is taken from the act of being, but the name of thing expresses the quiddity or essence of entity. But the negation which follows every entity, absolutely, is indivisibility; and the term *one* expresses this: for nothing else is one, but undivided entity. But if the mode of entity is taken in the second way, namely, as to the relation of one thing to another, this may be in two ways. Firstly, as the dividing of one thing from another; and the term *something* (*aliquid*) signifies this: for something means, as it were, other thing (*aliud quid*); whence, just as entity is called one in as much as it is undivided in itself, so also it is called something, in so far as it is cut off from other things. Secondly, one thing may be related to another, as to the agreement of one entity with another; and this is impossible, unless it receives something that, of its nature, agrees with every entity. Now this is the soul, which, in a certain manner, is all things, as is said in the third book "On the Soul." But in the soul there is a knowing and desiring power. The agreement, then, of entity with desire is expressed in the term *good*, as is said in the beginning of the "Ethics:" "*The good is what all things desire.*" But the agreement of entity with the intellect the term *true* signifies.

Now all knowledge is perfected by the assimilation of the one knowing to the thing known, so that the assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge; just as sight through being disposed by the species of colour knows colour. Hence, the first agreement of entity with the intellect is that entity corresponds to the intellect, and this correspondence is called the adequation of the thing and the intellect, and in this, strictly, the notion of truth is complete. This then it is that truth adds above entity—the conformity or adequation

of the thing and the intellect; and upon this conformity, as has been said, the knowledge of the thing depends. And, hence, the entity of a thing precedes the notion of truth; but knowledge is an effect of truth.

According to this, then, truth, and the true, may be defined in three ways. Firstly, as to that which precedes the notion of truth and in which the true is founded; and so Augustine defines, "*the true is that which is*;" and Avicenna, "*the truth of anything is the property of its being, which is the establishment of the thing*;" and others again, "*the true is undividedness of being, and of that which is.*" And in another way it is defined as to that which strictly completes the notion of the true; and so Isaac says, that "*truth is the adequation of the thing and the intellect*;" and Anselm, "*truth is the rectitude only to be perceived by the mind.*" For that rectitude is named as being a certain adequation, in accordance with what the philosopher says, that when we define the true we say it is what it is, or it is not, what it is not. And, in a third way, the true is defined according to its consequent effect; and so Hilary defines, that "*the true is that which manifests and declares its being*;" and Augustine, "*the truth is that by means of which is shown that which is,*" and again, "*the truth is that according to which we judge of inferior things.*" (*On Truth—I—I—O.*)

TRUTH AND THE MIND

In those things that are applied to many things primarily and secondarily, it is not always necessary that that to which the common thing is ascribed primarily should be the cause of the others, but it must be that in which, primarily, the notion of that common thing is found complete; just as health is primarily applied to an animal, in which, firstly, the perfect notion of health is found, although medicine is called healthy as producing health. And, hence, when truth is attributed to many things primarily and secondarily,

it is necessary that it should be ascribed to that primarily in which the perfect notion of truth is found. Now the complement of any motion exists, through the animal's operation, in the terminus. But the motion of the knowing power has its terminus in the soul; for it is necessary that the known thing should be in the knower in the manner of the knower; but the motion of the desiring power has its term in the thing: and thence it is that the philosopher holds that there is a sort of circle in the acts of the soul, according as the thing which is without the soul moves the understanding, and the thing understood moves the desire, and then the desire leads to the attaining to the thing from which the motion commenced. And for as much as goodness, as has been said above, means a relation to desire, but truth to the intellect, the philosopher says that good and evil are in things, but truth and falsity in the mind. But a thing is not said to be true, except in so far as it is adequated to the understanding: whence, secondarily, truth is found in things, but primarily in the understanding.

But it must be remembered that things bear a different relation to the speculative intellect from that which they bear to the practical intellect. For the practical understanding is the cause of things, whence it is the measure of the things that are brought about by it; but the speculative understanding since it receives from things, is in a sense moved by the things themselves; and so the things are the measure of it. From which it is clear that natural things, from which our understanding receives knowledge, are the measure of our understanding, as is said in the "Metaphysics;" but they are measured by the divine intellect, in which are all created things, just as all the works of art are in the mind of the artist. And, hence, the divine intellect measures but is unmeasured; natural things measure and are measured; but our understanding is measured, and does not measure natural things, but artificial only.

The things of nature then, constituted between two

intellects, are called true according as they respond to both; for by their correspondence to the divine intellect they are called true, in so much as they fulfil that to which they are directed by the divine intellect, as is clear from Anselm, and from Avicenna. But, according to their correspondence to the human understanding, the things are called true, in so far as they are constituted to give a true judgment of themselves; just as, on the other hand, things are called false, which of their nature seem to be when they are not, or in a manner in which they are not, as is said in the "Metaphysics." Yet the first notion of truth is prior in the thing to the second, since the comparison with the divine mind precedes that with the human; whence, also, if the human intellect were not, still things would be called true in relation to the divine intellect. But if both intellects could be supposed to be removed, which is impossible, in no sense would the idea of truth remain. (*On Truth*—1—2—0.)

DETERMINISM

It seems that the will is moved under necessity by God. For every agent which it is impossible to resist moves things under necessity. But it is impossible to resist God, since his power is infinite; whence it is said: "*Who resisteth his will?*" (Rom. ix. 19).¹

Besides, the will is moved under necessity towards those things which it is its nature to will. But to each thing is natural what God works in it. Therefore the will, under necessity, wills everything to which it is moved by God.

Further, the possible never results in the impossible. But the impossible results from the assumption that the will may not will that to which God moves it: for, in this way, the action of God would fail of its effect. Hence it is not possible that the will should not will that to which God moves it. Therefore, the will is under necessity to will it.

But, on the contrary, Ecclesiasticus (xv. 14)² says: "*God in the beginning established man and left him in the hand of his own counsel.*" Therefore he does not move the will under necessity.

I reply it must be said that (as Denis says) it is not the way of divine providence to destroy but to preserve the nature of things. Whence he moves all things according to their several natures; so that from necessary causes, by the divine action, there should proceed effects under necessity, but from contingent causes effects contingent should result.

Since, therefore, the will is an active principle not determined to one thing, but unrestrictedly regarding many, God moves it in such a way that he does not determine it to one thing under necessity, but its movement remains contingent

and not necessary, except in those things to which its nature moves it.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that the divine will not only contrives that on a time there should happen something through the thing which it moves, but also that it should fall out in the manner which is in keeping with its nature. And hence it would be more unthinkable, in the divine motion, if the will should be moved under necessity, which is not natural to it, than if it should be moved freely, which is after its own nature.

To the second: that is natural to a thing which God works in it, for things are congruous one to another for as much as God wills them so to be. Not that he wills that whatever he should work in things should be natural to them, *e.g.*, the resurrection of the dead; but this he wills that it should be natural to everything to be subject to the divine power.

To the third: if God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this (fact) that the will should not be moved to that thing, but it is not impossible simply. Whence it does not follow that the will is moved by God under necessity. (1-2—10—4.)

WHETHER GOD OPERATES IN NATURE'S OPERATION

It seems he does not. For nature neither falls short in necessary things nor abounds in the superfluous. But for natural action, the active power on the part of the agent and the passive on the part of the recipient are sufficient. Hence there is no need of the divine power operating in things.

9. Besides, things which are quite unlike can be separated from each other. But the action of God and that of nature are completely unlike; since God acts voluntarily, but nature of necessity. Hence the action of God can be separated from the action of nature: and so it is not necessary that God should work in nature that is acting.

12. Besides, in Ecclesiasticus it is said that "*God made man*

and left him in the hand of his own counsel” (xv. 14).¹ But he would not have left him if he had always operated in his will. Therefore he does not work in the will’s act.

13. Besides, the will is master of its own act. But this would not be if it could not act without God working in it; since our will is not master of the divine operation. God then does not work in our will’s operation.

14. Again, that is free which is its own cause, as the philosopher says. What then cannot operate except by a cause acting in it, is not free in acting. But our will is free in acting. Hence it can act, without any other cause working in it; and hence the same conclusion follows.

15. Moreover, the first cause bears more upon the thing caused than the second cause. If therefore God works in the will, and nature, as first cause on the second, it would follow that the defects which happen in the operation of the will, and nature, are rather to be attributed to God than to nature or the will, which is not seemly.

But on the other side is that which is said in Isaias (xxvi. 12):² “*Thou hast wrought all our works in us, O Lord.*”

Moreover, just as art presupposes nature, so nature presupposes God. But in the working of art nature operates: for without the operation of nature the operation of art is not effective, as iron is made soft by fire, that it may be stretched about by the smith. Hence also God works in nature’s operation.

Besides, nothing can operate unless it is entity. But nature cannot be unless God operates: for it would fade into nothingness, unless by the action of the divine power it were preserved in being, as is clear from Augustine. Hence nature cannot act unless by God’s action.

Again, the power of God is in every natural thing: since God is said to be in all things by essence, power, and presence. But it must not be said that the divine power, as it is in things, is idle. Therefore, in so far as it is in nature, it operates. Nor can it be said that anything other than

nature works, since there results but one operation. Therefore in every operation of nature God works.

I reply that it must be said that, without any reservation, it must be granted that God works in nature, and the will's operation. But some, not understanding this, fell into error, attributing to God in this way every operation of nature, that a natural thing inwardly brings forth of its own power: and to holding this they were moved by divers reasons. For certain men speaking in the law of the Moors, as the Rabbi Moses tells, said that all natural forms of this sort were accidents: and since an accident cannot pass to another subject, they held it impossible for a natural thing by its own form in some way to induce a similar form in that subject: whence they said that fire does not warm, but God creates heat in the warmed thing. But if it were objected against them that, by applying fire to the warmable thing, a warming always follows, except accidentally there should be an impediment to the fire, which shows that fire is the cause of heat, of itself: they said that God had so ordered it that that course should be kept in things, that he would never cause heat unless when fire was applied; not that the applied fire contributed anything to the warming.

But this position is clearly repugnant to the manner of the senses: for since sense does not feel, except through what it suffers from the thing, that appeals to sense (which, although in seeing is doubtful for there are those who say that sight has a subjective element, in touch and in the other senses is manifest), it follows that man does not feel the heat of fire, if through fire acting there is not the likeness of the fire's heat in the organ of sense. For if those signs of heat should happen in the organ from some other agent, touch, although it felt the heat, still would not feel the heat of fire, nor would it feel that fire is warm; but since sense makes this judgment, its judgment in its proper sense object does not go astray. It is repugnant also to reason, by which it is shown that in natural things nothing is worked in vain. But

unless natural things did achieve something, to no purpose would they possess forms, and the natural virtues conferred upon them; just as if a knife did not cut, in vain would it possess sharpness. To no purpose also would be the application of fire to wood, if God burn the wood without fire.

It is inconsistent also with the divine goodness, which is communicative of itself: from which it falls out that things are like to God not only in being, but also in acting. But the reason they bring forward on their own behalf is altogether frivolous. For when it is said that accident does not pass from one subject to another, it is understood of the same accident as to number, not that a similar accident may be induced in another subject in virtue of the accident that in a certain natural subject inheres. And it is necessary for this to happen in every natural action. It is false, also, what they suppose, that all forms are accidents: for so there would be no substantial being in things, the principle of which cannot be an accidental form, but a substantial only. Generation and corruption also would perish, and many other difficulties would follow.

Now it must be known that one thing can be called the cause of the action of another in many ways. Firstly, because it grants to the other thing the power to work; as it is said in the eighth book of the "Physics" that the generator moves the heavy and light, inasmuch as it gives the power by which they achieve such motion: and in this way God works all the actions of nature: since he gives to natural things the powers by which they can act, not only as the generating thing grants power to the heavy and light, and does not preserve them further, but as continually preserving their power in being: since he is the cause of the power conferred upon them, not only as to its becoming, as one who generates, but also as to its being: that so it may be said that God is the cause of an action in so far as he causes and preserves the natural power in being. For in another fashion also, he that preserves the power is said to

perform the action, as it is said that drugs which preserve sight make to see. But since nothing moves or acts of itself, unless it be the mover that is not moved, in a third way one thing is said to be the cause of another's act, in so far as it moves it to act: in which is not meant a conferring or a preserving of active power, but the application of the power to the action; as man is the cause of the blade's incision because he applies the sharpness of the blade by moving it to cut. And, because lower natural agents do not act unless they are moved, since such lower bodies change and are changed—the heavens, however, change and are not changed, and yet do not move unless they are moved, and this does not cease until we come to God—it follows of necessity that God is the cause of the action of every natural thing as moving and applying its power to act.

But, further, we find that the order of effects follows the order of causes: which is necessary from the likeness of effect and cause. Nor can the second cause produce the effect of the first by its own power, although it is the instrument of the first cause with respect to that effect. For the instrument is the cause in a certain fashion of the effect of the principal cause not by its form, or by its own power, but in so far as it shares something of the power of the principal cause through its motion; as an axe is not the cause of the contrived thing by its form, or by its own power, but through the power of the craftsman, by whom it is moved, and this it shares in a sense. Whence in a fourth sense one thing is the cause of another's action, as the principal agent is the cause of the action of the instrument: and in this way also it is necessary to say that God is the cause of every action of a natural thing. For the higher the cause, the more universal and efficacious it is; and the more efficacious, the more profoundly does it enter into the effect, and from a more remote power reduce it to act.

And, therefore, it may be said that God works in everything, in so far as everything has need of his power that it

may act. So, then, God is the cause of every action in so far as he gives the power to act, preserves it, and applies it to the action, and in so far as by his power every other power acts. And when we have added to this that God is his power and that he is within everything, not as a part of its essence but as holding the thing in being, it follows that he immediately works in every agent, not excluding the operation of the will, and of nature.

To the first objection it must be said that the active and passive power of a natural thing are sufficient to act in their own order; yet the divine power is required for the reason given above.

To the ninth, although nature and the will are, as to their being, dissimilar, yet in acting there is a certain order in them. For just as the action of nature precedes the action of our will, in virtue of which reason, in works of art, which are from the will, the operation of nature is needed; so the will of God, which is the origin of all natural motion, precedes the operation of nature: whence also his operation is required in every operation of nature.

To the twelfth, God is not said to have left man in the hand of his own counsel, so that he does not work in the will; but because he gave to man's will the dominion over its act, so that it should not be under necessity to either side of a contradiction: and he did not give this dominion to nature, since by its form it is determined to one.


To the thirteenth, the will is said to have dominion over its act not to the exclusion of the first cause, but because the first cause does not act in the will in such a manner as to determine it of necessity to one, as he determines nature: and hence the determination of the act is left in the power of the reason and the will.

To the fourteenth, not every cause excludes liberty, but only a constraining cause: but God is not the cause of our operation in this way.

To the fifteenth, since the first cause bears upon the effect

more than the second, it follows that whatever of perfection there is in the effect is reducible principally to the first cause; but whatever of defect is to be reduced to the second cause, which does not work as efficaciously as the first cause. (*On the Power of God*, Q. 3—Art. 7.)

GENERAL PLAN OF THE TREATISE



ON GRACE (I-2—109 to 114 inclusive).

Whether man can know any truth without the help of grace.
— will and work any good —
— love God above all things —
— fulfil the law's commands —
— merit eternal life —
— prepare himself to receive grace —
— rise again from sin —
— keep himself free from sinning —
— having grace, can work good and avoid sin —
—, in a state of grace, needs the help of grace to persevere.

Whether grace causes something in the soul.
— is a quality of the soul.
— is the same as virtue.
— resides in the essence or in a faculty of the soul.

Whether it is convenient to divide grace into unitive and apostolic grace.
— operating and co-operating grace.
— preventing and subsequent grace.
— St. Paul conveniently enumerates the gifts of apostolic grace.
— grace apostolic is of greater worth than unitive grace.

Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace.
— grace requires a preparatory disposition on the part of man.
— is necessarily given to one preparing himself and doing what in him lies.
— is greater in one than in another.
— man can know if he possesses grace.

Whether the justification of the sinner is the remission of his sin.
— the infusion of grace is requisite for the remission of sin.
— justification needs the motion of the free will.
— presupposes faith.
— requires that the free will should hate sin.
— remission of sin is among the things requisite for justification.
— the justification of the sinner is instantaneous or by degrees.
— infusion of grace is first, in the order of nature, of the requisites for justification.
— the justification of the sinner is the greatest work of God.
— a miraculous work.

Whether man can merit anything from God.
— eternal life without grace.
— in a state of grace, can merit eternal life in strict justice.
— grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than other virtues.
— man can merit for himself the first grace.
— for another —
— for himself restoration to grace after a fall into sin.
— increase of grace or charity.
— perseverance.
— temporal goods can be merited.

QUESTION 109

*Whether Man, without the Help of Grace, can know
any Truth*

It must be said that to know truth is a certain use or act of intellectual light; because according to the Apostle, "*Whatever is made manifest is light.*" But every use implies motion, taking motion in a broad sense according to which understanding and willing are termed motions, as is clear from the philosopher. We saw, however, in corporeal things that for motion is required not only the form which is the principle of the motion or action, but also the motion of the first mover. But it is plain that just as all corporeal motion is attributable to the first corporeal mover, so all motion, both corporeal and spiritual, is reducible to the absolute first mover which is God. And hence, however perfect a nature is, be it corporeal or spiritual, it cannot perform its own act unless it is moved by God; which motion, indeed, is according to the determination of his providence, and not nature's necessity. But not only is every motion from God as the first mover, but, also, as the first act, all perfection of form is from him. So, therefore, the act of the intellect and of all created being has a dependency on God for two things, firstly, inasmuch as it draws its perfection or form from him, through which it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved to act by him. But every form impressed upon things created has efficacy from God with regard to a certain determined act which is in its power by its nature; but beyond this its power does not extend except by a super-added form; as water cannot become warm, unless it is warmed by fire.

In the same way the human intellect has a form, namely, the very light of the intellect, which is, of itself, sufficient for the knowledge of certain knowable things, those, namely,

at the knowledge of which we arrive through sensible things. But the higher knowable things the human intellect cannot yet know, unless it is fortified by a stronger light, as by the light of faith or prophecy, which is called the light of grace, forasmuch as it is superadded to nature. Hence it must be said that for the knowledge of any truth man has need of the divine help, in order that the intellect may be moved to its act by God. He does not, however, need for the knowledge of truth in all things a new light superadded to his natural power: but in certain things which exceed the natural knowing; and moreover when God miraculously by his grace instructs men concerning those things which by nature they can know, and as when miraculously he performs certain things which nature can contrive. (Art. 1—0.)

"All truth by whomsoever it is declared is from the Holy Spirit," inasmuch as he infuses the natural light, and moves to the understanding and announcing of truth, but not as dwelling within us by unitive grace, or as bestowing an habitual gift superadded to nature. This is only given for the knowing and declaring of certain truths, and especially for those which belong to faith, of which the Apostle speaks. (1m.)

*Whether Man can Will and Work Good
without Grace*

The nature of man can be taken in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was before the fall; and, secondly, as corrupted in us, from the sin of our first parents. But in both states human nature needed the divine help, as first mover, to work or will any good, as has been said. In the state of nature's integrity, however, as far as the sufficiency of operative virtue goes, man could by his natural powers will and perform such good as is proportioned to his nature, such as is the good of acquired virtue; but not goodness exceeding

this, as that of infused virtue. But in the state of fallen nature man fails to perform even that which is in his power according to his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil the whole of that goodness by his natural gifts. Since, however, human nature is not corrupted by sin wholly, so that it lacks all the good of nature, man can, even in the state of fallen nature, in virtue of his nature perform certain particular good works, such as building houses, planting vines, and such things; but not all the good which is to the full measure of his nature, so that he should fall short of nothing; just as a sick man of himself has a measure of activity, but is not perfectly capable of the activity of the healthy, unless he is healed by the help of medicine. And hence, man in nature's integrity has need of gratuitous virtue superadded to his natural virtue for one thing, namely, to work and will supernatural good; but in fallen nature for two things, namely, that he may be healed, and further that he should perform the work of supernatural virtue, which is worthy of merit. Further, however, in both states man needs divine help that by it he may be moved to good works. (Art. 2.0.)

Man is lord of his own acts both to will and not to will, because of the deliberation of reason which may be bent to one or other side. But that he should deliberate or not deliberate, although he is master even of this, it is necessary that this should depend on a preceding deliberation; and since it cannot thus be referred back forever, it is necessary that finally we should arrive at this, that the free will of man is moved by some exterior principle, which is beyond the human mind, namely by God—whence the mind of man even when unweakened has not the dominion over his act in such a way as to render it unnecessary for him to be moved by God; much less the free will of man weakened by sin through which he is prevented from good by the corruption of his nature. (1m.)

To sin is nothing else than to fall short of that good which is to the measure of man's nature. But everything created

as it has its being from another, and considered in itself is nothing, so it needs to be preserved in that measure of goodness which agrees with its nature; for it tends by itself to fall short of good, as it tends of itself to fall away into non-existence, unless it is divinely preserved. (2m.)

Man cannot even know truth without divine help—and yet human nature is more corrupted by sin with regard to the desire of goodness, than with regard to the knowledge of truth. (3m.)

Whether Man can Love God above all Things by his Natural Powers alone, without Grace

It must be said that man could perform, by virtue of his nature, the good which is the measure of his nature, without the addition over and above of an unmerited gift, although not without the aid of God moving him. But to love God above all things is a thing natural to man, and even to every creature not only rational but irrational and even lifeless, according to the measure of love of which each creature is capable. And the reason of this is that it is natural to everything to desire and love something according as nature has fashioned it; for everything acts in that manner for which by nature it has an aptitude, as is said in the second book of "Physics." But it is manifest that the excellence of the part is for the benefit of the whole; whence by natural desire or love every particular thing loves its own excellence for the sake of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Whence Denis says that "*God turns all things to the love of himself.*" And so man in nature's integrity referred the love of himself to the love of God as to its end, and similarly the love of all other things; whence he loved God more than himself and beyond all things. But man in the state of fallen nature fails in this by the desire of his rational will which because of the corruption of nature pursues its

private good unless it be healed by God's grace. And therefore it must be said that man in the state of nature's integrity did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments in order to love God naturally above all things, although he required the help of God moving him to it; but in the state of impaired nature man needs also to this end the help of grace healing his nature. (Art. 3.o.)

Charity loves God above all things in a far higher way than nature. For nature loves God beyond all for as much as he is the beginning and end of natural goodness; but charity as the object of bliss, and according as man has a certain spiritual fellowship with God. Charity adds also beyond the natural love of God a certain ready responsiveness and delight, in the same manner as the habit of every virtue makes this addition over and beyond the good act, that flows from the natural reason of man who has not the habit of virtue. (1m.)

When it is said that no nature can rise above itself, it is not to be understood that it cannot reach any object that is above itself; for it is manifest that our intellect by its natural power can know certain things which are above itself, as is shown in the natural knowledge of God. But it is to be taken in this way, that nature cannot achieve an act which exceeds the measure of its power. But to love God above all things is not an act of this sort; for it is natural to every created nature, as has been said. (2m.)

Whether Man without Grace by his Natural Powers can fulfil the Law's Precepts

The law's precepts may be fulfilled in two ways: firstly, as far as the substance of the works commanded, as a man, for instance, performs just and arduous and other works of virtue; and in this sense man in the state of nature's integrity could fulfil all the precepts of the law; otherwise man

in that state would not have been able not to sin; since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the divine commands; but in the state of impaired nature man cannot fulfil all the divine commands unless he be healed by grace. Secondly, the law's precepts may be fulfilled not only as to the substance of the work, but also as regards the manner of performing them, that, namely, they should be performed through love; and, in this way, neither in nature's integrity nor in impaired nature can man fulfil the commands of the law without grace. Whence Augustine when he had said that men do no good without grace adds: "*Not only that, by its light, they may know what must be done, but also that, by its help, they may perform with love according to their knowledge.*" They need, moreover, in each state the help of God moving them to fulfil the commands, as has been said. (Art. 4.o.)

To the objection that Jerome (the Pelagian) curses those "*who say God laid upon man an impossibility,*" that is, what man could not of himself fulfil, it must be said that what we can achieve with the divine help is not altogether impossible for us, according to the philosopher: "*What we can achieve through friends we can ourselves perform to some extent.*" Whence Jerome (the Pelagian) in the same place confesses: "*In such fashion is our will free, that we may say we are ever in need of the help of God.*" (2m.)

*Whether Man can merit Eternal Life
without Grace*

It must be said that acts directed to an end ought to be proportioned to that end. But no act exceeds the measure of the active principle, and therefore we see in natural things that nothing can by its own operation perfectly bring about an effect which exceeds its active power, but only an effect commensurate to its power. Eternal life, however, is an end

transcending the proportions of human nature—and hence man by his natural endowments cannot produce works of such worth as to be proportioned to eternal life; but for this a higher gift is needed, which is the gift of grace. And therefore man cannot without grace merit eternal life; although he can perform works commensurate to his nature; for instance, toiling in the fields, drinking, eating, and having friends and such like as Augustine (another author) says. (Art. 5.0.)

Man by his own will performs works which are worthy of eternal life; but, as Augustine says, for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared by God through grace. (1m.)

As the gloss on "*The grace of God is life eternal*" says: "*It is certain that eternal life is given as a reward for good works; but those works for which it is granted belong to the grace of God,*" just as, also, it was said above, that to fulfil the commands of the law, by which their fulfilment is meritorious, grace is required. (2m.)

Whether Man can of Himself prepare Himself for the Gift of Grace without the Help of Grace

It must be said that the human will may be prepared to receive a gift in two ways, first as it is prepared to work virtuously and to enjoy God; and such a preparation cannot be made without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious work. In a second way the preparation of the human will may be understood as disposing it for the attainment of the gift of habitual grace. But in order that man should prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose another habitual gift in the soul, for in this manner we might go on to infinity; but it is necessary to presuppose a certain unmerited help of God, interiorly moving the soul or inspiring the good resolve.

For in both these ways we need the divine help. That we should need the help of God moving us to this is clear. For it is necessary that every cause should direct its effects to its end, since every acting thing acts for an end; and therefore, since in things acting and moving their ends have an order among them, it is necessary that man be directed to his ultimate end by the motion of the first mover, but to his proximate end by the motion of some lower order of movers; as the spirit of a soldier is directed to seek victory by the instance of the general of the army, but to follow the banner of a certain company by the direction of his captain. So therefore as God is the first mover absolutely, it is by his motion that all things are directed to him with regard to the general working for good, through which everything tends to be assimilated to God after its own fashion. Whence Denis says: "*God turns all things to himself.*" But he directs just men to himself as to a special end, towards whom they look, and to whom they desire to cleave as to their own peculiar good according to that of Psalm (lxxii. 27):¹ "*It is my good to cleave to God;*" and therefore man could not be directed to God unless God so turned him. But to prepare oneself for the gift of grace is a directing to God; as he who has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun prepares himself to receive the sun's light by turning his eyes thither. Whence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by an unmerited help of God interiorly moving him. (Art. 6.o.)

The turning of man to God comes about indeed through free will, and according to this man is commanded to turn himself to God. But the free will cannot be directed to God except by God turning it to himself according to that of Jeremias (xxxi. 18):² "*Turn me and I shall be turned; for thou art my Lord God;*" and Lamentations: "*Turn us, O Lord, to thee and we shall be turned.*" (lm.)

Man can do nothing unless he be moved by God according to that of St. John (xv. 5):³ "*Without me you can do*

nothing." And hence when it is said that man does all that is in his power, it is meant that this (preparation for grace) is in the power of man, when he is moved by God. (2m.)

It is the duty of man to prepare his soul, because this he does by his free will; yet nevertheless he does not achieve it without the help of God moving and drawing him to himself. (4m.)

*Whether Man can rise from Sin without the
Help of Grace*

It must be said that in no way can man rise from sin of himself without the help of grace. For since the guilt of sin remains when the act has passed, to rise from sin is not the same thing as to cease from the act of sin; for to rise from sin is to be renewed as to those things which man lost in sinning. Now man incurs a triple detriment by sinning—namely, the stain, the impairing of his natural goodness, and a debt of punishment. He contracts a stain inasmuch as he is deprived of the beauty of grace by the deformity of sin. The goodness of his nature is impaired because the nature of man is thrown out of order, the will of man not being subject to God; for when this order is taken away it follows that the whole nature of the sinner remains disordered. The debt of punishment is that by which man in sinning mortally merits eternal damnation. But it is manifest that each of these three cannot be remedied except by God. For since the refulgence of grace comes from the shining of the divine light, this beauty cannot be replaced in the soul unless by God lightening it anew, whence is required an habitual gift which is the light of grace. Similarly the order of nature cannot be regained, that, namely, the will of man should be subject to God, except by God drawing man's will to himself as was said (preceding article). In the same way also the

debt of eternal punishment cannot be remitted except by God against whom the offence was committed, who is the judge of men. And therefore the help of grace is required that man should rise from sin both as regards an habitual gift and the interior motion of God. (Art. 7.o.)

Man cannot be repaired by himself, but it is necessary that the light of grace should be infused into him anew, just as to raise a dead body it is necessary to infuse into it anew the soul. (2m.)

When nature was whole it could repair itself in those things natural and proportioned to it; but in things exceeding its measure it could not be repaired except by an external help. So therefore, human nature fallen by the act of sin, since it remains no longer whole, but impaired, cannot of itself be restored even to the goodness which is suited to its nature, much less to the supernatural goodness of justice. (3m.)

Whether Man without Grace can avoid sinning

We may speak of man in two ways, first, as he was in nature's integrity, and, secondly, as he is with an impaired nature. As far as the state of nature's integrity goes man could even without habitual grace keep from sin both mortal and venial; since to sin is nothing else than to depart from that which one is by nature, which man could avoid in the state of nature's integrity; yet he could not do this without the help of God preserving him in goodness, which help being taken away even his very nature would fall into nothingness. But in the state of impaired nature man needs habitual grace to heal his nature to the end that he may altogether refrain from sin. And this healing in the present life firstly regards the mind, as the fleshly desire is not yet wholly repaired. Whence the Apostle (Rom. vii. 25),¹ speaking as one restored, says: "*I myself obey the law of God in my mind, but in my flesh the law of sin.*" But in this state man can

keep from mortal sin which is grounded in the reason; yet he cannot avoid all venial sin because of the disorder of the lower sensual desire, the movements of which the reason can indeed severally repress, and in this lies the reason of their sinfulness and freedom; but he cannot suppress all, for whilst he strives to repress one perchance another rises; and also because the reason cannot always be on the watch to shun such motions. Similarly, even before man's reason, in which lies mortal sin, is repaired through justifying grace, he can avoid single mortal sins and for a certain time, since it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But that he should remain for a long time without mortal sin cannot be. Whence also Gregory says that "*Sin which is not immediately blotted out, by its own weight leads to others.*" And the reason of this is that just as the lower desire ought to be subject to reason, so also the reason should be subject to God, and find in him the end of its desire. But all human acts should be regulated by the end, just as the motions of the lower desire by the judgment of reason. Since therefore, because the lower desire is not totally subject to reason, it is impossible that disorderly motions should not arise in the sense desire; so also because man's reason is not wholly subject to God, it follows that there must be many disorders in the acts of reason. For since the heart of man is not firmly turned to God so that for the hope of nothing he could desire, and for the fear of no evil he would consent to be separated from him, there arise many things which to attain or avoid man will depart from God contemning his precepts; and so he sins mortally, especially because "*in sudden decisions a man works for a preconceived end, and according to the inclination of habit,*" as the philosopher says, although, from deliberate reason, a man can perform an act outside the order of the preconceived end, and beyond the inclination of habit. But since man cannot always be so deliberate, it is not possible that he should remain without acting in a manner agreeable to a will which lacks its subjection to God,

unless it is speedily restored to a right order by grace. (Art. 8.o.)

Man can avoid single acts of sin, yet not all, unless through grace. And yet since it is on account of his defect that man does not prepare himself to receive grace, he is not excused from sin, because without grace he cannot avoid sin. (1m.)

Now indeed whatever a man wishes is given him, but his choosing the good comes from the help of grace. (3m.)

Whether He who already possesses Grace can of Himself perform Good and shun Evil without the Help of Grace

As has been said, to live aright man needs the help of God in two ways: firstly, with regard to an habitual gift, by which impaired nature is restored and, thus healed, is raised so that it may bring forth works worthy of eternal life which exceed the power of nature; and, secondly, man requires the help of grace that he may be moved by God to act. As far as the first kind of help is concerned man living in grace does not need the help of grace in the form of another infused habit. But he needs the help of grace after another fashion that, namely, he may be moved by God to do right, and this for two reasons: firstly, for a general reason, for as much as . . . no created thing can proceed to any act except in virtue of the divine movement. And, secondly, for a special reason, on account of the state of human nature; which, indeed, even when it is healed by grace as to the mind, is still impaired and imperfect in the flesh, through which "*it obeys the law of sin*" as is said (Rom. vii. 25).¹ There remains also the darkness of ignorance in the intellect, owing to which as is also said (Rom. viii. 26):² "*We know not what we should pray for as we ought;*" for on account of the various contingencies of life, and because we do not fully know ourselves, we cannot know to the full what is ex-

pedient for us according to that of Wisdom (ix. 14):¹ “ *For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain.*” And therefore it is necessary for us that God should direct and protect us, whose knowledge and power reach to all things. And for this reason also it is fitting that those re-born to the sonship of God by grace should say: “ *And lead us not into temptation,*” and “ *Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven,*” and the other petitions bearing on this, which are contained in the Lord’s Prayer. (Art. 9.0.)

The gift of habitual grace is not given to us in order that by it we may have no further need of the divine help; for every creature needs that God should preserve it in that goodness which it received from him, and hence if after grace has been received man still needs the divine help, we must not conclude that the grace is given in vain or that it is imperfect; for even in the state of glory, when grace will be wholly perfect, man will require the divine help. Here, however, grace is in a certain sense imperfect, inasmuch as it does not fully heal man. (1m.)

The operation of the Holy Spirit, which moves and protects us, is not limited by the effects of an habitual gift which it causes in us; but besides this effect he moves and protects us together with the Father and Son. (2m.)

*Whether Man, in a State of Grace, needs the Help of Grace
to Persevere*

Perseverance may be taken in three ways. Sometimes it means a habit of mind, by which a man stands firm against being moved, by disturbing sorrows, from what is virtuous; so that perseverance bears the same relation to sorrow as does continence to lust and delight, as the philosopher says. Again it denotes a certain habit by which man has the resolve to persevere in good even to the end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused with grace, like continence

and the other virtues. In another way we speak of perseverance as the continuous performance of good to the end of life. And to have such perseverance man in a state of grace does not, indeed, need another habitual grace, but the divine help directing him and protecting him against the attacks of temptation, as appears from the preceding question. And hence, after a man is justified by grace, it is necessary for him to seek of God the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that, namely, he may be guarded from evil to the end of his days. For to many is given grace to whom it is not given to persevere in grace. (Art. 10.0.)

As Augustine says: "*Man in his original state received a gift by means of which he can persevere, but he did not receive that he should persevere,*" but now by the grace of Christ many receive both the gift of grace by which they can persevere, and further it is given them that they shall persevere, and so the gift of Christ is greater than the deficiency of Adam. And yet man by the gift of grace could persevere more easily in a state of innocence in which there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit than we can now when the healing of Christ's grace, although it is commenced in the mind, nevertheless is not yet consummated in the flesh, which will be in heaven, where man will not only be able to persevere, but will not be able to sin. (3m.)

QUESTION 110

Whether Grace causes Something in the Soul

It must be said that according to the common usage grace may be taken in three ways: firstly, as the love of any one, as we are accustomed to say that such a soldier has the favour (*gratiam*) of the king, which means that the king holds him pleasing (*gratum*); secondly, it may be taken to

describe a gift that is freely (*gratis*) given, as we are accustomed to say, "*I do you this grace*"; thirdly, it may be used to denote the acknowledgment of a gift that was given freely, and in this way we say that we give thanks (*gratias*) for benefits received. And of these three the second depends upon the first, for it is on account of the love which makes any one pleasing that a gift is given him freely; and on the second the third depends, since out of favours freely bestowed rises the act of thanksgiving. As far then as the two last are concerned it is manifest that grace implies something in him who receives the favour: firstly, the gift that is freely bestowed; secondly, the recognition of this gift. But with regard to the first it must be borne in mind that there is a difference between the graciousness of man and the grace of God; for since the gifts bestowed on a creature come from the divine will, therefore a favour is conferred on the creature by the love of God, through which he wills good to it. But the will of man is moved by the goodness which already exists in things, and hence it is that the love of man does not wholly cause the goodness of the thing, but presupposes it either in part or in its entirety. It is clear, therefore, that all God's love corresponds to a certain excellence caused some time in the creature, but not co-eternal with the love which is from eternity. And the differences which exist in this excellence suggest the different kinds of love which God bears to creatures; one that is general, with which he loves "*all things that are*" (Wisdom xi.)¹ and by which he bestows being on all natural created things; and the other that is of a special kind, by which he draws the rational creature, beyond its natural condition, to be a sharer of his divine goodness; and with this manner of love he is said simply to love any one, since in this loving God wishes simply to the creature eternal goodness which is his very self. So therefore, when it is said that a man has God's grace, a certain supernatural thing in man is meant, which comes from God. But sometimes God's eternal love

is called the grace of God, in the same way as we speak of the grace of predestination, inasmuch as God freely, and not because of merit, predestined or chose certain men. For it is said (Eph. i. 5):¹ “*He predestined us for the adoption of sons . . . to the praise of the glory of his grace.*” (Art. 1.)

Even when it is said that any one has the favour (*gratiam*) of a man, it is implied that there is in him something that is pleasing (*gratus*) to the man, just as when it is said that any one has the grace of God; but in different fashion. For that which is pleasing to a man in his fellow is presupposed for his love; but what makes a man pleasing to God is caused by the divine love. (1m.)

To the objection that God gives life to the soul as the soul to the body—and this latter is without any intermediate thing—it must be said that God is the life of the soul as efficient cause, but the soul of the body as formal cause. But between matter and its form there is no medium, since the form of itself gives form to the matter or subject; but an agent gives form to the subject, not by its own substance, but by the form which it causes in the matter. (2m.)

Whether Grace is a Quality of the Soul

As has been pointed out in the preceding article, when it is said that any one has the grace of God it means that there are in him certain effects of the free will of God. But it was said that man is helped by the free will of God in two ways: first, in as far as the soul of man is moved by God to know, will, or do anything; and in this way that effect in man is not a quality, but a certain motion of the soul, “*For the act of the mover upon the moved thing is a motion,*” as the philosopher says. In another way man is helped by the free will of God in so far as a certain habitual gift is infused in the soul by God; and this because it is not fitting that God should

provide less for those whom he loves to such an extent that he destines them to achieve a supernatural goodness, than for creatures which he destines for a natural goodness. But he provides for natural creatures so as not only to move them to their natural acts, but also to bestow upon them forms and powers which are the principles of actions, in order that of themselves they may be inclined to such motions; and so the motions by which they are moved by God become easy and natural to creatures according to that of Wisdom (viii. 1):¹ "*And he disposes all things sweetly.*" Much more, therefore, in those whom he moves to pursue the eternal supernatural goodness he infuses forms or supernatural qualities, by which sweetly and easily they may be moved by him to pursue it; and so the gift of grace is a kind of quality. (Art. 2.o.)

Every substance is either the nature of the thing of which it is the substance, or it is a part of the nature according to the manner in which matter or form is called substance. And since grace is above human nature, it is impossible that it should be substance or a substantial form; but it is an accidental form of the soul. For that which exists substantially in God is accidentally in the soul which shares the divine goodness, as is clear of knowledge. In this way, therefore, since the soul imperfectly shares the divine goodness, that sharing of the divine goodness which is grace has a less perfect existence in the soul than the soul's own manner of existence; but it is nobler than the soul's nature, inasmuch as it is the pouring out or sharing of the divine goodness, but not as to its mode of being. (2m.)

Whether Grace is the same as Virtue

Some have maintained that grace is the same as virtue in essence, but that it may be differentiated by reason, as grace takes its name from the fact that it makes man pleasing

(*gratum*) to God, or that it is freely (*gratis*) given; but virtue from the fact that it perfectly disposes a man to work well, and this the Master¹ seems to have thought. But if the nature of virtue is rightly considered this cannot be held; for as the philosopher says: "*Virtue is a disposition of the perfect; but I call perfect that which is set in order according to its nature.*" From which it is clear that virtue in everything is not properly so called except in relation to a certain pre-existing nature, when, namely, a thing is disposed in the manner which is congruous to its nature. Now it is manifest that virtues acquired by human acts are dispositions by which a man is conveniently ordered with regard to the nature by which he is man. Infused virtues, however, regulate a man in a higher way and to a higher end, whence it follows also with respect to a higher nature, that is with respect to the divine nature which is shared and which is called the light of grace, with regard to which it is said: "*The greatest and most precious promises he has given us, that through these we may be made partakers of the divine nature*" (2 Pet. xi.).¹ And according to the receiving of this nature we are said to be re-born to the sonship of God. And so, just as the natural light of reason is something beyond the acquired virtues, which are derived from that light, and which are named with respect to it; so also the light of grace, which is a sharing of the divine nature, is something beyond the infused virtues which are derived from it and are regulated with regard to it; whence the Apostle says: "*For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk as children of the light*" (Eph. v. 8).² For just as the acquired virtues perfectly prepare a man to walk in a way congruous to the natural light of reason, so the infused virtues prepare a man perfectly to walk in the way which the light of grace points out. (Art. 3.o.)

Grace belongs to the first species of quality; yet it is not the same as virtue, but a kind of habitual aptitude, which

¹ Peter Lombard, author of the *Book of Sentences*. (See Appendix.)

the infused virtues presuppose as their principle and root.
(3m.)

*Whether Grace is in the Essence of the Soul, or in
one of its Faculties*

This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is the same as virtue, it is necessarily in a faculty of the soul as its subject; for the faculties of the soul are the special subject of virtue. But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a faculty of the soul is the subject of grace; for every perfection of a power of the soul is of the nature of a virtue. . . . Whence it remains that grace, just as it exists prior to virtue, in the same way it has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, that is to say, it is in the essence of the soul. For just as, by his intellectual faculty, man is a sharer of the divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and by his faculty of desire of the divine love through the virtue of charity; so also by the nature of the soul he shares, after a similitude, the divine nature through a certain re-birth or new creation. (Art. 4.o.)

Just as from the essence of the soul flow its faculties which are the principles of its operations, so also from grace flow virtues upon the powers of the soul through which the faculties are moved to acts. And in this manner grace stands to the will as the mover to the thing moved, as the rider to his horse, but not as an accident to its subject. (1m.)

The soul is the subject of grace as belonging to the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not constituted in a species by any faculty, since the faculties are natural properties of the soul, which flow from the species. And hence it differs essentially from other animated things, for instance, brute animals and plants. And for this reason it does not follow that if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace that every kind of soul can be subject of

grace, for this is congruous to the essence of the rational soul, inasmuch as it belongs to that species. (3m.)

QUESTION III

Whether Grace may be divided into Unitive¹ and Apostolic Grace

As the Apostle says (Rom. xiii. 1):¹ “*Those things that come from God are ordered.*” Now the order consists in this that some things are led to God through others, as Denis thought. Since therefore grace is contrived for this that man should be led to God, it acts in a given order, namely, in such wise that some men find God through others. In this way grace is twofold: firstly, that by which the man himself is joined to God, which is called *grace making man pleasing* to God (unitive grace); secondly, that by which a man is the means of leading another to God; and gifts of this latter sort are called *grace given beyond any desert* (apostolic grace), because they are granted to a man beyond the natural faculty and personal merit. But since this is not given that man may be justified by it, but rather that he may be of help in the justification of others, it is not called unitive grace. And concerning this the Apostle says: “*To every one is given the manifestation of the spirit unto profit,*” namely of others (1 Cor. xii. 7).² (Art. 1.0.)

Grace is not said to make a man pleasing to God by causing this efficiently but as causing a form in him, since by this a man is justified and made worthy to be called pleasing to God, as is said: “*He has made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the Saints in light*” (Col. i. 12).³ (1m.)

Grace for as much as it is given freely is not of the nature

¹ The terms *gratia gratum faciens* and *gratia gratis data* are here translated not literally, but according to the functions of the things signified.

of a debt. But we may understand debt in two ways: firstly, that which depends on merit, which belongs to him who performs meritorious works, according to that: "*To him that worketh the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt*" (Rom. iv. 4);¹ secondly, a debt may depend upon the condition of nature; just as we may say that it is owing to man that he should have reason and all other endowments of human nature. Now in neither manner can we call it a debt that God is bound to a creature; but rather it may be called a debt in so far as the creature owes subjection to God, that in it the divine will may be fulfilled: which is that such a nature should have such conditions or properties, and that the performance of certain acts should be followed by certain effects. Natural gifts, therefore, are not of the first kind of debt, but they are of the second. But supernatural gifts belong to neither class; and therefore in a more especial way they deserve the name grace. (2m.)

*Whether Grace may be divided into Operating and
Co-operating Grace*

As has been said before, grace may be taken in two ways: firstly, as a divine help which moves us to willing and working virtuously; and, secondly, as an habitual gift divinely impressed upon us. But in both ways it is agreeable to the nature of grace to divide it into grace operating and co-operating. For an effect is attributed not to the movable thing but to that which moves. Hence of that effect in which our mind is the moved and not the mover, God being the mover, the operation is attributed to God: and in this sense it is called operating grace. But in that effect in which mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God, but also to the soul; and for this reason it is called co-operating grace. But there is in us a double act;

first the interior act of the will, and as far as this is concerned the will is as the moved thing, but God as the mover; and this is especially the case when the will begins to will the good which formerly had willed evil. And hence in as much as God moves the human mind to this act, the grace is called operating grace. But the other act is exterior, and, since it is commanded by the will, the operation with regard to this act is consequently attributed to the will. Further, since God helps us in this act, both strengthening the will from within that it may arrive at the act, and supplying without the power to work, grace is called co-operating grace with respect to acts of this character. Whence to the words: "*He who brought thee forth without any help of thine, will not justify thee without thyself,*" Augustine adds, in the same place: "*But that we may will he works; and when we will, that we may bring it to perfection, he co-operates with us.*" And hence if grace is taken as the unmerited motion of God, by which he moves us to the good that is worthy of merit, grace is divided agreeably to its nature into operating and co-operating grace. But if it be taken as an habitual gift in this way it has a double effect just as every other form, of which the first is its being, and the second its operation; just as the operation of heat is the making warm, and, exteriorly, the warming of other things. And hence habitual grace, as healing or justifying the soul, or making it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but as far as it is the principle of meritorious works, which flow from the free will, it is called co-operating grace. (Art. 2.)

God does not justify us without ourselves; since by free will while we are being justified we consent to God's justice. But this motion is the effect and not the cause of grace; whence the entire operation belongs to grace. (2m.)

Operating and co-operating grace is the same grace, but is divided according to its diverse aspects. (4m.)

*Whether Grace may be divided into Preventing and
Subsequent Grace*

Just as grace is divided into operating and co-operating grace according to its diverse effects, so also it is divided into preventing and subsequent grace however it may be taken. For there are five effects of grace in us: firstly, to heal the soul; secondly, to help it to will goodness; thirdly, to bring about that the good which it wills it may effectually carry out; fourthly, to help it to persevere in good; fifthly, to help it to arrive at glory. And hence grace, as causing in us the first effect, is called preventing with respect to the second effect; and as causing the second in us it is called subsequent with regard to the first effect. And as one effect is posterior to one effect and prior to another, so grace may be called preventing and subsequent according to the same effect in different aspects; and this is what Augustine says: "*He comes before to heal us, he follows after that healed we may be fruitful: he comes before to call us, he follows to give us glory.*" (Art. 3.)

God's love describes an eternal thing, and therefore it can never be called subsequent. But grace means a temporal effect, which may precede or follow anything, and therefore grace can be called preventing and subsequent. (1m.)

Grace is not divided into preventing and subsequent as to its essence, but only according to effects; as it was said of operating and co-operating grace; for because subsequent grace refers to the state of glory it is not therefore a numerically different kind of grace from the preventing grace by which we are justified now. For just as the charity which we possess in our pilgrimage will not fail but be made perfect in heaven, so also the same must be said of the light of grace, since neither, in its notion, implies any imperfection. (3m.)

*Whether Apostolic Grace is divided by the Apostle
agreeably to its Nature*

Apostolic grace is ordained for this that a man should co-operate with another to lead him to God. But man cannot work to this end by moving him from within (for this is God's office alone), but only by exteriorly teaching or exhorting him. And therefore apostolic grace comprises those gifts which a man needs in order to instruct another in divine things which are above reason. For this, however, three things are required: firstly, that a man should possess the fulness of knowledge of divine things, that by this he may enlighten others; secondly, that he should be able to confirm or prove the things which he says, otherwise his teaching would not be efficacious; thirdly, that he may readily convey what he thinks to his hearers. With regard to the first, three things are necessary, as appears in human teaching. For it is necessary for him who must instruct another in any science, firstly, that the principles of that science should be to him most certain; and for this is given faith which is the certainty of things invisible, which are presumed as principles in Catholic teaching. Secondly, it is necessary that the teacher should think aright on the chief conclusions of the science, and so there is given the word of wisdom which is the knowledge of divine things. Thirdly, it is necessary that he should abound in examples and in the knowledge of effects, through which it is necessary to disclose causes; and for this is given the gift of science, which is the knowledge of human things: "*For the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made*" (Rom. i. 20).¹

Confirmation, however, in those things which are within the scope of reason comes by way of argument; but in the things that are divinely revealed above reason confirmation comes from those means which belong to divine power alone, and this in two ways: the first is that the instructor in divine teaching should perform what God alone can do by miracu-

lous works, whether with regard to the health of the body, and for this is given the gift of healing, or as designed only to show forth the divine power, as that the sun should stand still, or darkness fall, or the sea be divided; and to this end is given the working of miracles. The second means of confirming his teaching is that the instructor should be able to manifest those things which God alone can know, and these are future contingencies, and for this is the gift of prophecy given; and also the heart's secrets, and for this is given the discerning of spirits. Now the faculty of announcing the truth may be considered with regard to the tongue in which it is possible to understand any one, and as to this the gift of tongues is given; or with regard to the sense of those things which are announced, and for this is given the interpretation of speeches. (Art. 4.o.)

Faith is not here set among the apostolic graces as a virtue justifying a man in himself, but as implying a certain pre-eminent certitude of faith, by which a man becomes of use for instructing others about those things which belong to faith. But hope and charity pertain to the desiring faculty, in so far as by them a man is directed to God. (2m.)

Wisdom and science are not reckoned among the apostolic graces for the same reason that they are enumerated among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for as much as the mind of man is readily responsive through the Holy Spirit to those things which belong to wisdom and science; since in this way they are gifts of the Holy Spirit. But they are reckoned among the apostolic graces as implying a certain abundance of science and wisdom, so that a man not only may have in himself a right taste in divine things, but also that he may instruct and confound his adversaries. And hence among the apostolic graces are reckoned significantly wisdom and science, since as Augustine says: "*It is one thing to know only what a man must believe to attain a life among the blessed; and another to know how this may bring help to the pious, and be defended against the impious.*" (4m.)

Whether Apostolic Grace is nobler than Unitive Grace

It must be said that a thing is more excellent in so far as it is directed to a higher end. But the end is always higher than the means to it. Now unitive grace prepares man immediately for union with his last end, but apostolic grace prepares man for certain things which look to the last end, as prophecy and miracles and other gifts of this kind lead men on the way to be united to their last end. And therefore unitive grace is a thing far higher than apostolic grace. (Art. 5.0.)

If apostolic grace could produce in another what unitive grace brings about in a man, it would follow that apostolic grace is nobler, as the effulgence of the sun giving light is more excellent than that of a body illuminated by it. But by apostolic grace man does not cause union of another with God, which he himself possesses by unitive grace; but he causes certain dispositions towards it. And therefore it is not necessary that apostolic grace should be more excellent; just as in fire the heat that is a sign of its species, by which it gives warmth to other things, is not nobler than its substantial form. (2m.)

QUESTION 112

Whether God alone causes Grace

It must be said that nothing can operate beyond the limits of its specific nature, for it is always necessary that the cause should be of greater power than its effect. Now the gift of grace exceeds every power of created nature, since it is nothing else than a sharing of the divine nature, which is beyond every other nature. And therefore it is impossible that a creature should cause grace. For it is necessary that God alone should deify men, by communicating a sharing of the divine nature, after a similitude, as it is impossible that anything should communicate fire except fire. (Art. 1.0.)

The humanity of Christ acts like "*a certain organ of his Divinity*," as Damascene says. But an instrument does not perform the acts of the principal mover by its own power, but by the power of the principal mover. And hence the humanity of Christ does not cause grace of its own power but in that of the Divinity joined to it through which the actions of Christ's humanity are salutary. (1m.)

Whether there is required any Preparation or Disposition on the part of Man for Grace

As has been said, grace is twofold: an habitual gift of God, and, again, the help of God moving the soul towards goodness. Now taking grace in the first sense a certain preparation is necessary for it, since no form can reside in matter which is not already disposed to receive it. But taking grace in the second way no preparation on man's part is requisite as coming before the divine help; but rather whatever preparation can exist in man comes from the help of God moving the soul towards goodness. And in this way the good motion of the free will, by which any one prepares himself to receive the gift of grace, is an act of the free will moved by God. And as far as this is concerned man is said to prepare himself, and it is principally through God moving the free will. And according to this consideration the will of man is said to be prepared by God, and his steps directed by the Lord. (Art. 2.0.)

The preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and such an operation is meritorious, not of grace, however, which is already possessed, but of glory, which it has not at present. But there is another imperfect preparation for grace which at times precedes the gift of unitive grace, which is, however, from God as mover. But this does not win merit, as man is not yet justified by grace; since nothing can be meritorious without grace, as will be shown later. (Q. 114—2—1m.)

Since man cannot prepare himself for grace unless by God preventing and moving him towards goodness, it does not matter whether suddenly or by degrees a man reaches a state of perfect preparation. For it is said: "*For it is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make a poor man rich*" (Eccles. xi. 23).¹ But at times it happens that God moves a man towards good, not yet perfect; and such preparation precedes grace. And at other times he, in an instant, perfectly moves him towards good, and suddenly man receives grace according to that: "*Every man that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to me*" (John vi. 45).² And so it befell Paul, who suddenly while in the way of sin had his heart moved by God, by hearing, learning, and coming; and hence on a sudden he received grace. (2m.)

An agent of infinite power does not require matter or the disposition of matter as a thing presupposed from the action of another cause; but it is necessary that, according to the condition of the thing to be caused, he should cause in that thing both the matter and the due disposition for the form; and, similarly, in order that God should infuse grace into the soul no preparation is necessary which he does not himself bring about. (3m.)

Whether Grace is necessarily given to One preparing Himself for Grace or doing what in Him lies

As has been said, the preparation of man for grace comes from God as mover, but from the free will as from the thing moved. Preparation may therefore be taken in two ways: firstly, in as far as it comes from free will, and according to this there is no necessity that grace should follow, since the gift of grace is beyond the preparation of any human power. Secondly, it may be considered as far as it is from God as mover, and according to this it is necessary that that should follow for which it was designed to prepare, not however necessary as a compulsion, but as an infallible consequent,

since the intent of God cannot fail. . . . Whence if God intends that a man whose heart he moves should obtain grace, infallibly he does obtain it, according to that: "*Every one who has heard of the Father, and has learned, cometh to me*" (John vi. 45).¹ (Art. 3.o.)

Whether Grace is greater in One than in Another

As has been said (pp. 282-4), a habit can have a double greatness: firstly, from its end or object, according to which one virtue is said to be nobler than another in as far as it is directed to a greater good; secondly, from its subject, which possesses the inhering habit to a greater or less degree. As to the first kind of greatness, unitive grace cannot be greater or less; since grace of its very nature joins man to the highest good which is God. But on the side of the subject grace can be greater or less in as far as one is more perfectly enlightened by its light than another. The cause of such diversity, indeed, is to a certain extent on the part of him preparing himself for grace, for he who more perfectly prepares himself for grace receives grace more fully. But the first reason of this diversity cannot be found in this consideration, since the preparation for grace does not pertain to man except in so far as his free will is prepared by God. Whence the first cause of the diversity must be sought on the part of God himself, who dispenses the gifts of his grace in divers fashions, that from the differing degrees of perfection the beauty and perfection of the Church may be established; just as he founded the various orders of things that the universe might be perfect. Whence the Apostle after he had said: "*To every one is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ,*" having set forth the different graces adds: "*for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying of the body of Christ*" (Eph. iv. 12).² (Art. 4.o.)

The divine care may be interpreted in two ways; firstly, with regard to that divine act, which is simple and uniform;

and as far as this, the divine care rests equally over all, since, namely, with one simple act he dispenses both great things and small. Secondly, it may be considered from the standpoint of those things which are bestowed upon creatures by the divine care, and in this way there arises inequality, inasmuch as God by his care dispenses to some great gifts and to others small. (1m.)

Natural life belongs to the substance of man and hence it cannot be greater or less; but the life of grace man shares as an accident and therefore he can have it to a greater or less degree. (3m.)

Whether Man can know if He possesses Grace

A man can know a thing in three ways; firstly, by revelation, and in this way a man can know if he has grace, for God at times reveals this to certain men as a special privilege that the joy of security may be born in them even in this life, and that with a greater trust and a greater courage they may perform glorious works, and bear the evils of this life, as it was said to Paul: "*My grace is sufficient for thee*" (2 Cor. xii. 9).¹ Secondly, a man knows a thing by his own power and this with certainty, and in this manner can no one know that he has grace. For the certainty of a thing depends upon our being able to judge it by its own principle. For in such a way we have the certainty of demonstrated conclusions through universal, undemonstrable principles. But no one can know that he has the knowledge of a certain conclusion if he is ignorant of the principle on which it is founded. The principle and object of grace is, however, God, who, because he excels all, is not known by us, according to that: "*Behold God is great exceeding our knowledge*" (Job xxxvi. 26).² And hence whether he is present within us or far from us cannot be known with certainty, according to that of Job: "*If he shall come to me I shall see him not; and if he leave me I shall not understand* (ix. 2).³ And therefore a man cannot certainly judge whether he has grace, as

it is said: "*But neither do I judge myself . . . he who judges me is the Lord*" (1 Cor. iv. 3).¹ Thirdly, one can know things as a conjecture by certain signs, and in this manner a man can know that he possesses grace, inasmuch as he perceives that he finds a delight in God, and that he contemns worldly things, and in as far as he is not conscious of any mortal sin. And in this manner can be understood that of the Apocalypse: "*To him that conquereth I shall give a hidden manna . . . which none can know except him who receiveth it*" (ii. 17);² since, namely, he who receives it knows by a certain savour of sweetness, which he who has it not does not experience. But this knowledge is imperfect, whence the Apostle says: "*For I am conscious to myself of nothing, yet am I not hereby justified*" (1 Cor. iv. 3);³ since as it is said: "*Who understandeth sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, and from those of others spare thy servant*" (Ps. xviii. 13).⁴ (Art. 5.0.)

Those things which are by their essence in the soul are known by experimental knowledge, in as much as man has experience of intrinsic faculties by their acts; just as we perceive the will in willing, and life in living operations. (1m.)

It is the nature of science that a man should have certitude about those things which are included in the science; and similarly it is of the nature of faith that man should be certain of those things in which he has faith; and the reason of this is that certainty belongs to the perfection of the understanding, in which these gifts dwell. And hence whoever possesses science or faith is certain that he has them. But the same cannot be said of grace and charity and such like, which are the perfection of the desiring faculty. (2m.)

QUESTION 113

Whether the Remission of Sins is Justification

Justification taken on its passive side implies a motion towards justice, just as warming a motion toward heat.

But since justice essentially carries with it the idea of a certain rightness of order, it may be taken in two ways: firstly, as implying a right order in the act itself of man, and taken in this way justice is said to be a virtue, whether it be particular justice which directs the act of a man rightly with regard to another man, or legal justice which implies a right order in the acts of a man relative to the common good of the many. . . . In another sense, justice may be taken as a certain rightness of order in the interior disposition of a man, in so far as a man's highest is made subject to God, and the lower powers of the soul are made subject to his highest, which is reason; and this disposition the philosopher calls "*justice metaphorically so called.*" But this justice in man may be produced in two ways, firstly, by simple generation, which comes from the privation of form, and in this manner he could have justification who was not in sin, by receiving this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received original justice. In another way this justice may be produced in man by the motion of reason which is from one thing to its opposite; and considered in this light justification implies a certain changing from the state of injustice to that of the aforesaid justice. And in this way we speak here of the justification of the sinner, according to that of the Apostle: "*And to him who worketh not, yet believeth in him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God*" (Rom. iv. 5).¹ Moreover, since a motion takes its name rather from that to which it is destined than from whence it sets forth, it follows that this changing by which any one is turned from the state of injustice to that of justice by the remission of sin has its name from the end to which it is destined and is called the justification of the sinner. (Art. 1.0.)

Every sin as implying a disorder of the mind not subjected to God can be called injustice, the opposite of that justice just described, according to that of John: "*Whosoever committeth sin committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity*"

(1 John iii. 4);¹ and in this way the removal of sin is called justification. (1m.)

*Whether, for the Remission of Sin which is Justification,
Infusion of Grace is Necessary*

It must be said that in sinning man offends against God. . . . But an offence is not forgiven any one unless the soul of him offended is established in peace with him who offends. And hence in this way sin is said to be remitted us when God is at peace with us; which peace, indeed, consists in the love with which God regards us. But the love of God from the standpoint of the divine act is eternal and without change; but with regard to the effect which it produces in us it is at times interrupted when, that is to say, we stray from him, and when once again we return. But the effect of divine love in us which is removed by sin is grace, by which a man becomes worthy of everlasting life, from which he is cut off by mortal sin. And hence remission of sin is impossible without the infusion of grace. (Art. 2.o.)

It is a greater thing to forgive to him who sins against us his offence than simply to regard without hatred him who has committed no offence. For it can happen that one can look on another neither in love nor hatred. But if he is offended by him, to forgive the injury requires special good will. Now God's goodwill towards man is said to be renewed by the gift of grace; and hence, although man before he sins can be without grace and faultless, yet after he has sinned he cannot be without fault unless he has grace. (1m.)

To the objection that the remission of sin consists in God's reputing it to us, while the infusion of grace means something existing within us, it must be said that, as the love of God comprises not only the act of the divine will, but also implies a certain effect of grace, as is said above, so also that God should not impute sin to a man implies a certain effect in him to whom sin is not imputed; for that God

should not impute sin to any one comes from his divine love. (2m.)

As Augustine says: "*If to desist from sin were not to have sin, it would be sufficient for Scripture to warn us, 'Son, thou hast sinned, do so no more.' However, this is not sufficient, it adds, 'And pray that thy former sins be forgiven thee.'*" For when the act of sin has passed its guilt remains. (3m.)

Whether for the Justification of the Sinner an Act of Free Will is Requisite

The justification of the sinner is brought about by God moving man to justice. For it is he that justifieth the ungodly, as is said (Rom. iii.). Now God moves all things according to their several natures; as in natural things we see that in one way he moves heavy things and in another light, on account of their different natures. And hence also he moves man to justice after the manner of human nature. But man by his own special nature possesses free will, whence in him who has the use of free will the motion of God towards justice does not take place without the movement of the free will; but God so infuses the gift of justifying grace, that at the same time with this he moves the free will to accept the gift of grace in those creatures which are capable of such movement. (Art. 3.o.)

Whether an Operation of Faith is required in the Justification of the Sinner

A motion of the free will is required for the justification of the sinner in as much as the mind of man is moved by God. But God moves the soul of man by turning it to himself, as is said: "*Thou wilt turn, O God, and bring us to life*" (Ps. lxxxiv. 7).¹ And hence in the justification of the sinner there is requisite a motion of the mind by which it is turned to God. But the first turning to God is through faith,

according to that: "*For he that cometh to God must believe that he is*" (Heb. xi. 6).¹ And therefore an operation of grace is requisite in the justification of a sinner. (Art. 4.o.)

It may be objected that as man is justified by faith, so also by certain other things, namely, by fear, of which it is said: "*The fear of the Lord driveth out sin; for he that is without fear cannot be justified*" (Eccles. i. 27);² and also by charity according to that: "*Many sins are forgiven her, for she hath loved much*" (Luke vii. 47);³ and again by humility as James (iv. 6)⁴ has it: "*God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble*"; and also by mercy according to that of Proverbs: "*By mercy and faith sins are purged away*" (xv. 27).⁵ And therefore faith is not more required for the justification of the sinner than the aforesaid virtues.

I reply that it must be said that the operation of faith is not perfect unless it springs from charity; whence in the justification of the sinner a movement of charity is simultaneous with the motion of faith. Now the free will is moved towards God to the end that it should subject itself to him; whence also there is an act of filial fear and of humility at the same time. For it is possible that one and the same act of free will may spring from different virtues, for as much as one commands and the others are commanded, since an act may be directed to diverse ends. But an act of mercy may be performed as satisfaction for sin when it follows justification or as preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and so it may also precede justification, or at the same time concur with the above mentioned according as mercy is included in the love of our neighbour. (1m.)

*Whether in the Justification of the Sinner there is required
a turning of the Free Will against Sin*

As it was said above, the justification of the sinner is a motion by which the human mind is moved by God from a

state of sin to a state of justice. It is necessary, therefore, that the human mind should regard the two extremes of motion as a motion of the free will, in the same way that a body which is moved locally regards the two bounds of motion. Now it is clear that in the local movement of bodies the body moved goes from that terminus whence it sets out and it approaches that terminus to which it is destined. And hence it is necessary that the human mind, when it is justified by an act of free will, should depart from sin and draw near to justice. Now the departing and approaching of the free will are known as detestation and desire. For Augustine says, expounding: “ ‘ *But the hireling fleeth ;* ’ our affections are motions of the soul ; joy is the pouring forth of the soul ; fear is the flight of the soul ; you proceed in spirit when you desire ; you flee in spirit when you fear.” It is necessary, therefore, that in the justification of the sinner there should be a twofold act of the will ; one by which it inclines to God by desire, and another by which it detests sin. (Art. 5.0.)

It belongs to the same virtue to pursue one of two opposites and shun the other ; and hence just as the love of God is part of charity, so also is the detestation of sins by which the soul is separated from God. (1m.)

*Whether Justification of the Sinner takes Place in an
Instant or by Degrees*

The whole justification of the sinner fundamentally consists in the infusion of grace. For, by it, both the free will is moved and sin is remitted. But grace is infused in an instant and without any succession. And the reason for this is that when a certain form is not given at once to a subject, this is because the subject is not prepared, and the agent needs some time to prepare it. And so we see that in that moment when the matter is prepared by a preceding change the substantial form comes to the matter ; and by the same

reason because a transparent thing is by its nature disposed to receive light, on an instant it is made luminous by the body which is light-giving actually. Now it is said above that God in infusing grace needs no other preparation than that which he himself produces. But he brings about this sufficient preparation for the receiving of grace at one time suddenly, at another in successive degrees as is said above. For the fact that a natural agent cannot sufficiently prepare matter is due to this, that there is some proportion of it which offers resistance to the power of the agent; and for this reason we see that in proportion as the power of the active agent is strong it more quickly prepares the matter. Since, therefore, the divine power is infinite, it can in an instant prepare any created matter whatsoever for a form, and much more man's free will, the motion of which of its nature can be instantaneous. And hence the justification of a sinner is caused by God in an instant. (Art. 7.0.)

It is objected that if grace is infused in the soul it is necessary that there should be a certain instant in which it first takes possession of the soul; and if sin is remitted it is necessary that there should be a last instant when man is under sin's dominion; but this cannot be the same instant, because then opposites would reside in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, it is necessary that there should be two succeeding moments, between which, according to the philosopher, there must be an intervening time. And, accordingly, justification does not take place all at once, but successively.

To this it must be said that the succession of two opposites in the same subject must be taken in one way for such things as are in time, and in another for those things which are beyond it. For in those things which are in time a last instant cannot be given in which the prior form is in the subject; but a last time can be given, and a first instant in which the subsequent form is in the matter or subject. And the reason for this is because in time there cannot be given

before one instant another immediately preceding it, since instants are not consecutive in time, just as points are not consecutive in a line, as is proved in the "Physics;" but time is terminated at an instant. And hence in the whole preceding time in which a thing is moved to one form, it is under the opposite form; and in the final instant of that time which is the first instant of the time following, it has a form at which its motion terminates. But in those things which are beyond time the case is altered. For if there be any succession of affections or intellectual concepts (as say in angels) such succession is not measured in continuous time but in discrete time, just as the things which are measured are not continuous. Whence in such things a last instant can be given, in which the first exists, and a first instant in which that which follows. Nor is it necessary that there should be an intervening time, since there is not any continuity of time which requires this. Now the human mind which is justified, taken essentially, is indeed beyond time, but is, as an accident, subject to time, in as far as it understands continuously and in time by means of images of the imagination, in which it finds the intelligible forms. And therefore its change, in this light, must be judged as motion in time, so that we may say that a final instant cannot be given in which sin is in the mind, but a final time; but there can be found a first instant in which grace is in it, but in the whole preceding time there was in it sin. (5m.)

Whether the Infusion of Grace is first by Order of Nature among those Things which are required for the Justification of the Sinner

The receding from one thing and the approach to another may be considered in two ways: firstly, on the part of the movable thing; and in 'this way' the receding from one terminus naturally precedes the approach to another, for in

the movable object the opposing thing which is cast aside is prior to that which, by motion, the movable thing attains. But on the side of the agent the opposite is the case; for the agent, by the form, which pre-exists in it, acts to remove the contrary; just as the sun operates by its light to remove the darkness; and therefore on the sun's part illumination is prior to the removing of darkness; but on the part of the air to be illuminated, the putting to flight of darkness is prior by nature to the possession of light, although both are simultaneous in time. And because the infusion of grace and the remission of sin are attributable to God who justifies, therefore, by nature, the infusion of grace is prior to the remission of sin. But taken from the side of man who is justified the converse is true, for by nature deliverance from sin is prior to the possession of justifying grace, or it may be said that the terminus of justification is sin as the term from which one moves, and justice as that towards which one moves; but grace is the cause of the remission of sin and the attaining of justice. (1m.)

*Whether the Justification of the Sinner is the greatest
Work of God*

In a two-fold manner a work can be called great: firstly, because of the manner of its accomplishment, and in this way the greatest work is that of creation in which from nothing something is made; secondly, a work is called great by reason of the greatness of that which is produced; and according to this the justification of the sinner, the end of which is the eternal good of sharing the divine, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth, the end of which is the excellence of a changing nature. And hence Augustine, after saying: "*It is a greater thing that from a sinner a just man should be produced, than the creation of heaven and earth,*" adds: "*For heaven and earth shall pass away, but the salvation and justification of the predestined shall remain.*" But it

must be observed that a great thing is measured in two ways: firstly, according to an absolute standard; and in this sense the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace which justifies the sinner, from which it follows that the glorifying of the just is a greater work than the justification of the sinner. Secondly, the greatness of a thing is measured by some relative standard as a mountain is called small and a millet seed great; and in this way the gift of grace justifying the sinner is greater than the gift of glory making the just blessed; since the gift of grace exceeds the worth of the sinner who deserved punishment by more than the gift of glory the worth of the just man, who, because he is justified, deserves glory. And hence Augustine says in the same place: "*Let him judge who can, whether it is greater to create angels in justice, than to justify the sinner. For it is certain that if both are of equal power, this latter comes from a greater mercy.*" (Art. 7.o.)

Whether the Justification of the Sinner is a miraculous Work

In miraculous works three things are usually to be observed, of which one regards the power of the agent since they can be produced by the divine power alone, and hence they are wonderful strictly so called as coming from a hidden cause; and in this light both the justification of the sinner and the creation of the world, and generally every work which can be produced by God alone, may be called miraculous. Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form induced is beyond the natural power of the matter in which it is found, as in the raising of the dead, life is beyond the natural power of such a body; and as far as this is concerned the justification of the sinner is not miraculous since the soul is by nature capable of grace; for from the fact that it is created to the image of God it is able to receive God by grace, as Augustine says. Thirdly, in miraculous works there is to be observed something beyond

the usual and customary fashion of causing the effect; as when any one sick achieves perfect health suddenly, and in a manner surpassing the usual course of healing which comes from nature or art; and considered in the light of this the justification of a sinner is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not so. For the ordinary and common way of justification is that, God inwardly moving the soul, man is converted to God, at first indeed in an imperfect fashion, but later he may come to the perfect; since charity in its beginnings deserves to be increased, as being increased it deserves to be brought to perfection, as Augustine says. But sometimes God so vehemently moves the soul that immediately it achieves a certain perfection of justice; as it happened in the conversion of Paul when there was also an exterior miraculous prostration, and hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous. (Art. 10.0.)

QUESTION 114

Whether Man can deserve Anything from God

Merit and reward are attributable to the same thing. For that is called reward which is given to any one as a recompense for his work or labour, as the price of it; whence in the same way to render a just price for a thing received from any one is an act of justice, so it is also to give a reward in recompense for work or labour. But justice implies a sort of equality, as is clear from the philosopher, and hence there can only be justice strictly so called where there is strict equality; and where this is not there cannot be strict justice, but a kind of justice there can be as, for instance, that which is called a father's justice or a master's, as the philosopher says. And by reason of this, where strict justice exists, there also is the notion of merit or reward, properly so called, fulfilled; but where only a qualified justice exists, there is only a qualified merit depending upon how far the

notion of justice remains; for in the latter sense a child deserves something from his father, and a servant from his master. Now it is clear that between God and man is the greatest inequality, for infinity divides them, and the whole of man's excellence is from God. Whence there cannot be justice between man and God according to absolute equality, but according to a certain proportion, in as far, namely, as each works after his own fashion. But the manner and measure of the human virtue of man is from God. And hence the merit of man with God cannot exist except by the divine fore-ordination that man should obtain that from God by his work, as a reward, for which God gave him the power to work; and as natural things by their particular motions and operations attain to that for which God has destined them but in a different manner, since the rational creature moves itself to its operation by free will, whence its action has a sort of merit which does not exist in other natures. (Art. 1.0.)

Whether any one without Grace can deserve Eternal Life

Man, without grace, can be considered in two states, as is said above: first, indeed, in that of the integrity of nature in which state Adam was before he sinned; secondly, in the state of impaired nature, which exists in us before grace has restored us. If, therefore, we speak of man in the first state, man cannot deserve eternal life simply by his natural endowments, for this reason, that the merit of man comes from God's pre-ordaining it. Now the act of anything is not divinely directed to something exceeding the measure of the power which is the principle of the act; for God has so provided that nothing should act beyond its power. But eternal life is a good beyond the measure of created nature, and even beyond its knowledge and desire according to that of 1 Cor.: "*Neither has the eye seen, nor the ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man*" (ii. 9).¹ And hence it is that

no created nature is the principle of an act sufficient to deserve eternal life, unless there be added to it a certain supernatural gift, which is called grace. But if we speak of man dwelling in sin there is added a second reason because of the hindrance of sin. For since sin is an offence against God cutting the sinner off from eternal life, no one dwelling in sin can deserve eternal life except he be first reconciled to God by putting aside his sin, and this comes from grace. For there is due to the sinner not life but death, according to that of Romans: "*The wages of sin is death*" (vi. 23).¹ (Art. 2.o.)

According to the first reason given, merit is different with God and with men, for man derives all his power of well-doing from God and not from man; and hence man cannot deserve anything of God except by his gift; which the Apostle expresses when he says: "*Who first gave to him and recompense shall be made him.*" Now one can deserve something from men before he has received anything from them on account of that which God has bestowed upon him. But according to the second reason taken from the hindrance of sin, it is the same with men as with God; since a man cannot deserve anything of another whom he has first offended, unless he is reconciled to him by making satisfaction. (3m.)

*Whether Man in a State of Grace can merit Eternal Life
as wholly deserving it*

The meritorious work of a man may be taken in two ways: first, as coming from the free will; secondly, as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If it is taken according to the substance of the work and as proceeding from the free will there cannot be in it a full desert, because of so great an inequality; but there is a fittingness by reason of a certain relative proportion. For it seems fitting that when man is working according to his own power God should make recompense to him to the measure of the excellence of his power. But if we speak of meritorious work as proceeding

from the grace of the Holy Spirit, in this way it is meritorious of eternal life as wholly deserving it. For the effectiveness of merit depends upon the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life, according to that: "*It shall become in him a fount of water springing up to eternal life*" (John iv. 14).¹ And the reward of a work depends upon the worth of grace, by which man made a sharer in the divine nature is adopted as a son of God, and he is heir by virtue of his adoption, according to that: "*And if sons, heirs also*" (Rom. viii. 17).² (Art. 3.o.)

Whether Grace is the Principle of Merit rather by Means of Charity than by other Virtues

As may be inferred from what has been said (p. 109), a human act is meritorious from two things: firstly, and chiefly, from the divine ordination, owing to which an act is said to be meritorious of that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, from the free will, in as much as man beyond all other creatures has the power of acting as a voluntary agent. And with regard to both, the principle of merit rests with charity: for it must be remembered, firstly, that eternal life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the motion of the human mind towards the enjoyment of the divine goodness is the special peculiar act of charity, by which all the acts of the other virtues are directed to this end, for as much as the other virtues are commanded by charity. And hence the deserving of eternal life primarily pertains to charity, and to the other virtues in a secondary sense, in so far as their acts are commanded by charity. Similarly, also, it is manifest that what we do for love's sake, we do in a specially voluntary manner. And so also because the nature of merit requires that an act should be free, merit is chiefly attributable to charity. (Art. 4.o.)

Charity, inasmuch as it has for its object the ultimate end, moves the other virtues to their acts. For the habit which

looks to the end always directs the habits which regard the means to that end. . . . (1m.)

A work may be laborious and difficult in two ways: firstly, from the greatness of the work, and in this way the greatness of the work helps to increase merit; whence charity does not lessen labour, rather it stimulates us to undertake the greatest works; "*for if it exist it works great things*," as Gregory says, in a certain homily. In another way a thing may be laborious from the defect of the agent; for to every one that which is not done by a ready will is most laborious and difficult; and such labour lessens merit, and is taken away by charity. (2m.)

Whether a Man can win for Himself, by Merit, the First Grace

The gift of grace can be considered in two ways: firstly, as having the nature of a free gift, and in this sense grace excludes the idea of merit, since as the Apostle says: "*But if from grace, then not by works*" (Rom. ii. 9).¹ In another way it may be taken according to the nature of the thing which is given; and so, also, it cannot be deserved by him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the measure of nature, and also because man, in a state of sin before grace, has within him an impediment to earning grace, namely, sin itself. Now after a man already possesses grace, the grace already held cannot fall under merit, for reward is the terminus of a work, but grace is the beginning of every good work in us, as is said above (pp. 68-81). But if any one should merit another free gift in virtue of preceding grace, this is already not the first grace. Whence it is clear that no one can win for himself, by merit, the first grace. (Art. 5.o.)

Whether a Man can merit for Another the First Grace

From what has been said above (pp. 109, 111), it is clear that our work may lay claim to merit from two reasons: firstly, in virtue of the divine motion, whence one may merit as

wholly deserving; secondly, a work may be meritorious as proceeding from free will, in so far as we voluntarily perform anything, and from this is the merit of the fitting, since it is fitting that, when man makes a good use of his own power, God, in the measure of his far-excelling power, should operate more excellently. And from this it follows that, as wholly deserving, no one can win for another the first grace, save only Christ: since every one of us is moved by God, through the gift of grace, in order that he may reach eternal life; and hence wholly deserving merit does not extend beyond this motion. But the soul of Christ is moved by God through grace, not only that he should attain the glory of eternal life, but also that he should lead others to it; inasmuch as he is the head of the Church, and the author of human salvation, according to that: "*Who had brought many children to glory, the author of salvation*" (Heb. ii. 10).¹ But a man can win for another that it should be fitting that he should receive the first grace: for since man in a state of grace fulfils the will of God, it is fitting that, according to the demand of friendship, God should fulfil the will of man in the salvation of another, although at times there may be an impediment on the part of him whose justification the saint craves. (Art. 6.o.)

*Whether a Man can deserve that he should be
restored after a Fall*

It must be said that no one can deserve for himself that God should restore him when he shall have fallen in the future, either as wholly deserving it, or even as a fitting thing. He cannot merit as wholly deserving it, since this belongs entirely to the motion of divine grace, which motion is interrupted by sin: whence all the benefits which a man obtains from God after sin, by which he is restored, do not belong to merit, since the action of his former grace does not extend to this. Even the merit of the fitting, by which any

one deserves that another should receive the first grace, is hindered so that it cannot attain its effect on account of the impediment of sin in him for whom the grace has been won. Much more therefore is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the hindrance which exists both in him who deserves and him for whom it is deserved, for here both are the same person. And hence in no way can any one deserve for himself to be restored after sin. (Art. 7.0.)

A man can fittingly deserve that another should receive the first grace, since there is not any impediment, at least not on the part of him who deserves, which is found, however, when any one after deserving grace falls away from justice. (2m.)

It has been said that no one can absolutely deserve eternal life unless by the act of final grace, but only conditionally on his persevering. But this is an irrational opinion, since, at times, the act of the final grace is not more but rather less meritorious than preceding acts, by reason of the oppression of sickness. Whence it must be said that every act of charity absolutely deserves eternal life, but when sin follows it raises an impediment to the preceding merit, so that it fails of its effect; just as also natural causes fail of their effects when an impediment intervenes. (3m.)

Whether a Man can deserve Increase of Grace or Charity

As it has been said above (p. 113), that alone can fall under wholly deserving merit to which the motion of grace extends. But the motion of any mover does not only extend to the terminus of motion, but also to the whole progress of the motion. Now the terminus of the motion of grace is eternal life. And progress in this motion is according to the increase of charity or grace, according to that: "*The path of the just as a shining light goeth forwards, and grows even to the perfect day*" (Prov. iv. 18),¹ which is the day of glory. And therefore increase of grace is merited as wholly deserved. (Art. 8.0.)

By every meritorious act man deserves increase of grace, as he deserves the consummation of grace, which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is not granted on the instant, but in due season, so neither is grace increased on the instant, but in its own time, when, namely, a man is sufficiently prepared for the increase of grace. (3m.)

Whether Man can deserve the Grace of Perseverance

It must be said that as man possesses a will which can turn either towards good or evil, in two ways he may obtain perseverance in good from God: firstly, from having his will determined towards good by the consummation of grace, which will obtain in glory; secondly, from the divine motion, which inclines man towards good even to the end. Now, as is clear from what has been said (pp. 113, 114), that falls under human merit which stands to the free will, directed by God's motion, as the terminus, but not what bears to that motion the relation of beginning or principle. Whence it is clear that the perseverance of glory which is the terminus of this motion belongs to merit; but the perseverance of this life cannot be merited, since it depends solely on the divine motion which is the principle of all merit. But to whomsoever the gift of perseverance is given God gives it freely. (Art. 9.0.)

We obtain even those things that we do not deserve by prayer, for the ear of God is open to the cry of sinners seeking the forgiveness of their sins, which they do not deserve. . . . And, similarly, any one who seeks obtains the gift of perseverance from God either for himself or for another, although not as merited. (1m.)

Whether temporal Goods may be merited

That which can be deserved is a prize or reward, which has the nature of a certain goodness. Now the good of man

is twofold, his absolute or his relative good. The absolute good of man is his last end, according to that: "*But for me it is good to cleave to God*" (Ps. lxxii. 27),¹ and, consequently, all things which are directed to this end, and such things as these, may be merited directly. But the relative good of man is what is good for him now, or what is only a qualified good for him; and things of this sort do not fall under merit directly, but only indirectly. And, according to this, it must be said that if temporal goods are considered as being a help to works of virtue, by which we are brought to eternal life, in this light directly and absolutely they fall under merit, just as the increase of grace, and all other things by which man is assisted in his journey towards bliss, after the first grace. For God so portions out to the just temporal things good and evil as far as is expedient to bring them to eternal life; and in so far as these temporal things good. Whence it is said: "*But those who fear the Lord shall not lack any good*" (Ps. xxxiii. 2),² and again: "*I saw not the just forsaken*" (Ps. xxxvi. 25).³ But if these temporal goods are considered as they are in themselves they are not absolutely the good of man but only relatively; and in this way they do not pertain to merit directly but only indirectly, in as far as men are moved by God to perform certain temporal things, in which they accomplish his purpose according to his pleasure. So that just as eternal life is absolutely the prize of works of justice in reference to the divine motion (pp. 110, 113), so temporal goods considered in themselves may have the nature of reward in respect to the divine motion by which the wills of men are moved to pursue these things, although at times in so pursuing they have not a right intention. (Art. 10.0.)

All things equally fall upon the good and evil as far as the substance itself of temporal good or evil, but not with regard to the end; since by means of these things the good are led to eternal life, but not the evil. (4m.)

CHARITY AND FRIENDSHIP

1. It seems that charity is not friendship, since nothing is so essential to friendship as to dwell with the friend, as the philosopher says. But charity is man's duty towards God and the angels, "*whose dwelling is not with men*" (Dan. xi. 11).¹

2. Besides there is no friendship which is not mutual as it is said in the "Ethics." But charity goes out even to one's enemies, according to that of St. Matthew (v. 44):² "*Love your enemies.*" Therefore charity is not friendship.

But, on the other hand, St. John (xv. 15) says:³ "*I shall not now call you servants . . . but my friends.*" But this was not said to them except as a pledge of charity. Therefore charity is friendship.

I reply that, after the philosopher, it must be said that not all love is of the nature of friendship, but only that love which bears goodwill with it, as, for instance, when we so love any one as to wish him good. But if we do not wish good to the things loved, but would take their good to ourselves, as we are said to love wine, or a horse, or such things, this is not the love of friendship, but of desire. For it is ridiculous to say that any one has friendship with wine or a horse.

Yet neither does goodwill wholly suffice for friendship, but there is required a certain mutual love, since a man is a friend to his friend. But this mutual goodwill is based upon a certain fusion.

Since, therefore, there is a fusion of man with God, inasmuch as he endows us with his blessedness, it is natural there should be friendship grounded in this communion, concerning which it is said (1 Cor. i. 9):⁴ "*God is faithful, by whom you are called to his son's fellowship.*" But the love founded

upon this fusion is charity. Whence it is manifest that charity is a friendship of man with God.

To the first argument it must be replied that man's life is twofold. One indeed is his exterior life of the bodily senses, and with respect to this there is no communion or dwelling with God and the angels. But other is man's spiritual life according to his mind, and with respect to this man may walk both with God and the angels: in his present state, indeed, imperfectly, whence it is said (Phil. iii. 20):¹ "*Our dwelling is in heaven*;" but that intercourse will be made perfect in our fatherland when "*his servants shall wait upon God, and they shall see his face*" (Apoc. ult. iii.).² And hence here we may have charity only imperfectly, but it will be made full in heaven.

To the second it must be said that friendship goes out to another in two ways. One manner is for the person's own sake, and in this way there is no friendship except to our friend. But in another manner friendship may bind us to a person for the sake of some one else, as when we are friends with a man for his sake we love all those in any way belonging to him, whether children, or servants, or however they may be connected with him; and so great can be our love of a friend that for his sake we may love his connections, even though they do us hurt or hate us; and in this way the friendship of charity goes out even to our enemies, whom our charity towards God makes us love, to whom the friendship of charity is firstly borne. (2-2—23—1.)

THE LOVE OF GOD IN THIS LIFE

It seems that, in this life, God cannot be loved immediately, since "*unknown things cannot be loved*," as Augustine says. But we cannot know God without any medium in our present life, for "*now we see through a glass darkly*" (1 Cor. xiii. 12).³ Hence neither can we love him immediately.

2. Besides, he who cannot do what is less cannot achieve

the greater. But it is greater to love God than to know him, for "*who adheres to God*" by love "*is one spirit with him*" (1 Cor. vi. 17).¹ And man cannot know God immediately, much less then love him.

On the other hand, the knowledge of God which is achieved by means of other things is called dark, and will pass away in heaven (1 Cor. xiii.).² But the charity of our present state will not cease, as the same text teaches. Therefore the charity of this life cleaves to God immediately.

I reply that it must be said, as has been shown before, the act of understanding tends to perfect itself by drawing the known thing within the one knowing; but the act of desire is made perfect in so far as the desire goes out to the thing. And therefore it is necessary that the movement of desire should go out towards things according to the condition of the things themselves; but the act of understanding is coloured by the state of the receiving mind.

But the order of things taken in itself is such that God is in himself both an object of knowledge and lovable, inasmuch as he is the very truth essentially existing, and goodness itself, through which other things are known and loved. But, taken from our standpoint, since our knowledge comes by way of our senses, those things are more readily known which more easily appeal to the senses, and the last outpost of knowledge is in that which is most removed from sense perception.

In this way we must say that love, which is the act of desire, even while we are yet in the way, goes out to God firstly and from him overflows on others; and so charity loves God immediately, but others through him. In knowledge, however, the position is reversed; since we know God through other things, as we see a cause by its effects, or knowing him much higher or as lacking all defects.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that although unknown things cannot be loved, yet it is not necessary that our knowledge should be of exactly the same

order as our love: for love is the terminus of knowledge: and therefore where knowledge comes to rest, namely, in the thing itself, which is known through another, there, at once, love may begin.

To the second, it must be replied that because it is a greater thing to love than to know God, especially in our present state, therefore the lesser is presupposed; and since knowledge rests not in things created but reaches by them towards the higher, in this love commences and through it recoils on other things as by a kind of circulation; while knowledge beginning in creatures bids for God, and love rising from God, as from its last end, is thrown back upon created things. (2-2—27—4.)

WHETHER ANY ONE CAN HATE GOD

Hatred is a motion of the faculty of desire which is caused by some kind of knowledge. But God may be known by man in two ways: firstly, as he is in himself, when his very essence is apprehended; and, secondly, through his effects, when, for instance, "*the invisible things of God are made known by those things which are created.*" But God, in his essence, is goodness itself, which no one can hate, since it is the nature of goodness to be loved, and therefore it is impossible that any one seeing the essence of God should hate him.

But certain of his works are such that in no manner can they be undesirable to the will of man, since *being, life, and understanding* are desirable and lovable to all, and these are some of the things he causes. Whence if God is looked upon as the author of these he cannot be hated. But there are some works of God which are disagreeable to the disordered will, as the infliction of punishment and the restraint which the divine law imposes upon sinners . . . and, in so far as such things are considered, God can be hated by some as forbidding sin and inflicting punishment. (2-2—34—I—0.)

RELIGION AND HOLINESS

THE word sanctity seems to imply two things. First, purity, and the Greek name suggests this meaning, for it is called *ἅγιος*, that is, without earth. Secondly, it implies firmness, whence those things were called *holy* of old which were fortified by the laws, so that they should not be defiled. Whence also a thing is said to be sanctioned, because it is strengthened by law. The word *sanctity*, even according to the Latin usage, can have the meaning of purity, as by sanctity may be understood tinged with blood (*sanguine tinctus*), for as much as, of old, "*those who wished to be purified were touched with the blood of a sacrifice*," as Isidore says.

And in both senses sanctity is fittingly applied to things which are used for divine worship, so that not only men, but also temples and vessels and such things, are said to be sanctified from the fact of being used for divine worship. For purity is necessary in order that the mind may be applied to God: since the human mind is soiled from being occupied with lower things, in the same way that certain things suffer depreciation from being mixed with something of lower value, as silver from the admixture of lead. But it is necessary to withdraw the mind from lower things if it is to be joined to the highest. And therefore the mind cannot be knit to God without purity. Whence to the Hebrews (xii. 14)¹ it is said: "*Follow peace with all men and holiness; without which no man shall see God.*" Firmness also is needed, for the mind seeks God as its first beginning and last end: but it is necessary that these should be especially immovable. Whence the Apostle said to the Romans (viii. 38):² "*I am*

certain that neither death, nor life, will separate me from the love of God."

So therefore holiness is that through which the mind of man applies itself and its acts to God. Whence it does not differ in essence from religion, but only by a distinction of reason. For that is called religion which pays to God due service in those things that specially belong to divine worship, as in sacrifices, oblations, and such like; but holiness is that through which man refers not only these but also the works of other virtues to God, or is that by which man disposes himself by certain good works to the divine worship. (2-2—81—8—0.)

THE SERVICE OF GOD

THREE things are requisite for man to attain salvation, namely, the science of what things are to be believed, of what are to be desired, and of what are to be done. The first is taught in the creed, where is given the science of the articles of faith; the second in the Lord's Prayer; and the third in the law. Now, however, we come to treat of the science of what is to be done, in the treatment of which a fourfold law is found. The first is called the law of nature, and this is nothing else than the light of understanding impressed upon us by God, through which we know what is to be done and what avoided. This light and this law God gave man in creation, but many believe they are excused, if they do not observe this law, through ignorance; but against them speaks the Prophet in Psalm iv. 6: ¹ "*Many say: who sheweth us good things?*" as though they knew not what is to be done. But he replies in the same place: "*The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us,*" the light, namely, of understanding, through which what is our duty is known to us: for no one does not know that what he is unwilling to suffer himself he should not do to another, and other things of this kind. But although God in creation gave man this law, namely, of nature, the devil has sowed subsequently another law, namely, that of desire. For while in the first man his soul was subject to God, keeping the divine commands, the flesh also was in all things subject to the soul and to reason. But after the devil by his suggestion had lured man away from the observance of the divine precepts, so also the flesh became disobedient to reason, and thence it comes about that although a man should will good by his reason, yet from lust he is inclined to the contrary: and this

is what the Apostle says: "*But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind*" (Rom. vii. 23);¹ and thence it is that frequently the law of lust corrupts the law of nature and the order of reason; and therefore the Apostle adds: "*Captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members.*"

Because then the law of nature had been destroyed by the law of lust, it was necessary that man should be recalled to works of virtue and restrained from vices: for which was requisite the law of scripture. But it must be recognised that man is restrained from evil and led to good by two things. Firstly, by fear; for the first thing on account of which a man especially begins to shun sin is the consideration of the pain of hell and of the last judgment: and hence it is said: "*The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom*" (Ecclesiasticus i. 16);² and "*The fear of the Lord casteth out sin*" (v. 27).³ For although he who from fear does not sin is not just, yet that is the beginning of justification. In this way, therefore, man is restrained from evil and directed towards good through the law of Moses, which some disregarding were punished by death. "*A man making void the law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses*" (Heb. x. 28).⁴ But for as much as that rule is insufficient, and the law, which was given by Moses, in this way, namely, by fear, restraining from sins, was insufficient—for although it constrained the hand it did not constrain the soul—hence another way of restraining from sin and directing towards good, the way, namely, of love; and in this manner was given the law of Christ, namely, the law of the gospel, which is love's law.

But it must be remarked that between the law of fear and that of love a triple difference exists: and firstly, that the law of fear makes slaves of its observers, but love's law maketh free: for who works solely from fear works after the manner of a slave, but he who from love works as the free or as a son. Whence the Apostle: "*Where the spirit of the Lord is there is*

liberty " (2 Cor. iii. 17),¹ since, namely, such work from love as sons. The second difference is that observers of the first law are led to temporal goods: "*If you be willing and will hearken to me you shall eat the good things of the land*" (Isaia*s* i. 19);² but they that keep the second law are led to heavenly goods: "*If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments*" (Matt. xix. 17);³ and in the same place: "*Do penance for the kingdom of heaven is at hand*" (iii. 2).⁴ The third difference is that the first is heavy: "*Why tempt you God to put a yoke upon our necks, that neither we nor our fathers have been able to bear?*" (Acts xv. 10).⁵ But the second light: "*For my yoke is sweet and my burden light*" (Matt. xi. 30);⁶ "*For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons*" (Rom. viii. 15).⁷

As then it has already been said, a fourfold law is found: and the first indeed is the natural law which God infused in man in creation; the second is the law of desire; the third is the law of scripture; the fourth is the law of charity and grace, which is the law of Christ. But it is manifest that not all can labour at science; and hence a brief law was given by Christ that may be known by all, and no one, because of ignorance, may be excused from its observance: and this is the law of divine love. As the Apostle says: "*A short word shall the Lord make upon the earth*" (Rom. ix. 28).⁸

But it must be recognised that this law ought to be the rule of all human actions. For just as we see in artificial things that a work is said to be good and right when it approximates to rule, so also every human work is right and virtuous when it harmonises with the rule of divine love; but when it is not in accord with this rule it is not good, nor right, nor perfect. But to this end that human acts be made good, it is requisite that they conform to the rule of divine love.

Now it is to be observed that this law, namely, of divine

love, causes in man four things very desirable. Firstly, it causes in him the spiritual life. For it is clear that naturally the loved one is in the lover; and hence who loves God possesses him in himself: "*He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him*" (1 John iv. 16).¹ For it is love's nature to transform the lover into the loved one: whence if we love low and perishable things, low and unstable we become: "*They became abominable as those things were which they loved*" (Osee ix. 10).² But if we love God, we are made divine; since, as is said: "*He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit*" (1 Cor. vi. 17).³ Now, as Augustine says: "*As the soul is the life of the body, so is God the soul's life,*" and this is manifest. For we say that the body by the soul lives when it has the operations peculiar to life, and when it operates and is moved; but when the soul goes the body neither works nor is moved. Moreover, the soul then works virtuously and perfectly when it works through charity, by which God dwells in it; but lacking charity it does not work: "*He that loveth not abideth in death*" (1 John iii. 14).⁴ Now it must be remembered that if any one have all the gifts of the Holy Spirit without charity, he has not life. For neither the gift of tongues, nor of faith, nor anything else, without charity, gives life. For if a dead body be clothed in gold and precious stones, nevertheless it remains dead. This then is the first effect of charity.

The second thing which charity causes is the keeping of the divine commands. Witness Gregory: "*The love of God is never idle: if it exists it works great things; but if it refuse the toil, it is not love.*" Whence a clear sign of the existence of charity is the promptitude in fulfilling the divine commands. For we see the lover for the sake of the loved one undertaking great things and difficult: "*If any one love me he will keep my word*" (John xiv. 23).⁵ But observe, he that keepeth the command and the law of divine love fulfils the whole of the law. But there is a twofold manner of divine commands. For some are affirmative, and these indeed

charity fulfils, because the fulness of the law which consists in the commands is love, by which the commands are obeyed. But others are prohibitive: these also charity fulfils, since it "*dealeth not perversely*," as says the Apostle (1 Cor. xiii. 4).¹

The third effect of charity is that it is a guard against adversity, for no hurt can injure him that has charity, but it is turned into good: "*To them that love God all things work together unto good*" (Rom. viii. 28).² Further, even contrary and difficult things are sweet to the lover, as is each one's manifest experience.

The fourth effect is that it leads to bliss, for to those who have charity alone eternal bliss is promised; for without charity all things have no sufficiency: "*As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me in that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming*" (2 Tim. iv. 8).³ And notice that bliss differs solely according to the difference of charity, and not according to any other virtue. For many fasted more than the Apostles, but the latter are above all others in bliss by reason of their exceeding charity: for it was they who had the first fruits of the spirit, as says the Apostle (Rom. viii.), whence the difference in bliss is from difference in charity. And so the four effects which charity works in us are clear.

But besides these it causes other effects which must not be omitted. Firstly, it causes the remission of sins, and manifestly we know this from ourselves. For if any one should give offence to another, and he should afterwards love him deeply, for the sake of his love the offended one forgets the offence to himself: and so God also forgives sins to them that love him. "*Charity covereth a multitude of sins*" (1 Pet. iv. 8).⁴ And he wisely says *covers* because God does not see them to punish. But although he says it covers a multitude, Solomon, however, says that: "*Charity covereth all sins*" (Prov. x. 12),⁵ and this the incident of Magdalene

makes clear: "*Many sins are forgiven her*" (Luke vii. 47),¹ and the cause is added: "*because she hath loved much.*"

But perhaps some one may say: charity, then, is sufficient to blot out sin, and penance is not necessary. But it must be remembered that no one truly loves who does not truly repent. For it is manifest that according to the degree of our love for any one so much the more do we grieve if we offend him, and this is one effect of charity.

Moreover, it causes illumination of heart, for as Job says: "*We are all wrapped up in darkness*" (xxxvii. 19).² For frequently we know not what to do or desire; but charity teaches all things necessary to salvation: hence it is said: "*His unction teaches you of all things*" (1 John ii. 27).³ And this follows because where is charity there is the Holy Spirit, who knows all things, who leads us in the right way, as is said in Psalm cxlii.⁴ Hence it is said: "*Ye that fear the Lord love him, and your hearts shall be enlightened*" (Ecclesiasticus ii. 10),⁵ namely, to know what is necessary for salvation. Moreover, it establishes in man perfect joy, for no one truly has joy but he that dwells in charity. For every one who desires anything does not rejoice, nor is he glad, nor at rest, until he has gained his desire. And it comes about in temporal things that what is not had is desired, and the possessed is despised and breeds weariness; but it is not so in spiritual things; moreover, he that loves God possesses him, and hence the soul of the lover and desirer is at rest in him. "*He that abideth in charity abides in God, and God in him,*" as is said (1 John iv. 16).⁶

Another effect is perfect peace. For it happens with passing things that they are frequently desired; but when obtained still the spirit of the desirer is not at rest; moreover, when one thing is attained it desires another. "*The heart of the wicked is like the raging sea, that cannot rest*" (Isaias lvii. 20);⁷ again, in the same place: "*There is no peace for the wicked*" (v. 21),⁸ saith the Lord. But this does not happen in charity with regard to God, for he who loves

God has perfect peace. "*Much peace have they that love thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block*" (Ps. cxviii. 165).¹ And the reason of this is that God alone is sufficient to fulfil our desire: for God is greater than our heart, as the Apostle says: and hence Augustine says in the first book of his *Confessions*: "*Thou hast made us for thyself, O Lord, and our heart is not at rest, until it rest in thee.*" "*Who satisfieth thy desire with good things*" (Ps. cii. 5).² Moreover, charity clothes a man with a high dignity. For all creatures serve the divine majesty (all things by him were made) as artificial things are obedient to their maker; but charity makes of a slave a free man and a friend: whence the Lord says to the Apostles: "*I will not now call you servants . . . but friends*" (John xv. 15).³

But was not Paul a slave, and also the other Apostles, who in their writings called themselves servants? It must be recognised that service is of two kinds. The first is that of fear; and this is a pain and is without merit: for if any one abstains from sinning solely through fear of punishment he does not win merit from this but is still a slave. The second is that of love: for if any one works not from fear of justice, but from divine love, he does not work as a slave but as one free because he works voluntarily: and hence he says: "*I do not now call you servants.*" And why? To this the Apostle replies in Romans: "*You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons*" (viii. 15).⁴ For fear is not in charity, as is said (1 John iv.),⁵ for it has pain, but charity makes men not only free, but also sons, that is so that we may be called and be sons of God (1 John iii.).⁶ For one is made the adopted son of another when he obtains the right of heritage from him; and so charity obtains the right to the heritage of God, which is life eternal: since, as is said: "*The spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God. And if sons, heirs also: heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs*

with Christ” (Rom. viii. 16).¹ “*Behold how they are numbered among the sons of God*” (Wisdom v. 5).²

The uses of charity are clear from what has already been said. Since, therefore, it is so useful, one must labour earnestly to acquire and retain it. But it must be known that no one can have charity from himself; moreover, it is the gift of God alone: whence John says: “*Not as though we had loved God, but because he hath first loved us*” (1 John iv. 10);³ since, that is to say, he does not love us because we first loved him, but that we love him is caused in us from his loving us. It is to be remembered also that, although all gifts are from the Father of lights, yet that gift, namely charity, excels all other gifts: for all the others without charity and the Holy Spirit are possessed, but the Holy Spirit is possessed with charity of necessity. “*The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us*” (Rom. v. 5).⁴ For whether it is the gift of tongues, or of science, or of prophecy, they are possessed without grace and the Holy Spirit. But although charity is a divine gift, for the possession of it a disposition on our part is requisite. And hence it must be remembered that two things are specially necessary for the acquiring of charity and two for its increase when acquired. Hence for the obtaining of charity the first is a diligent hearing of the divine word, and this is sufficiently clear from the custom which obtains among us. For those who hear good reports of any one are stimulated to love him; and so those that hear the words of God are enkindled in his love. “*Thy word is exceedingly refined, and thy servant hath loved it*” (Ps. cxviii. 140).⁵ Also: “*The word of the Lord inflamed him*” (Ps. civ. 20).⁶ And for this reason those two disciples, inflamed with divine love, said: “*Was not our heart burning within us, whilst he spoke in the way, and opened to us the Scriptures*” (Luke xxiv. 32).⁷ Whence also it is read in the Acts (x.) that when Peter was preaching the Holy Spirit fell upon the hearers of the divine word. And this frequently

happens in sermons, that the hard of heart, by reason of the preaching, are enkindled with divine love. Second, is the continued dwelling on good things. "*My heart grew hot within me*" (Ps. xxxviii. 4).¹ If, therefore, you would attain to divine love, meditate on the good. For very hard would be he who, thinking on the benefits that he has received, the perils from which he has been saved, and the bliss promised to him by God, would not be set on fire with divine love! Whence Augustine: "*Hard is the spirit of man.*"

And generally, just as evil thoughts destroy charity, so good ones obtain, nourish, and preserve it: whence we are ordered: "*Take away the evil of your thoughts from my eyes*" (Isaias i. 16).² "*Perverse thoughts separate from God*" (Wisdom i. 3).³ And there are two things which increase charity when possessed. The first is the weaning of the heart from earthly things. For the heart cannot be perfectly occupied with diverse things—whence no one is able to love God and the world—and hence as far as our spirit is more distant from the love of earthly things, in that degree it is more established in divine love. Whence Augustine says: "*The poison of charity is the hope of gaining or retaining passing things; its nourishment the weakening of desire; its perfection, no desire: since desire is the root of all evils.*" Whoever, therefore, wishes to nourish charity, let him attend to diminishing his desires. Now desire is the love of gaining or obtaining passing things. The beginning of the diminishing this is to fear God, who alone cannot be feared without love. And on account of this were religious orders constituted, in which and through which the soul is drawn from worldly and corruptible things and raised to divine: which is meant by 2 Maccabees i. 22,⁴ where it is said: "*The sun shone out, which before was in a cloud.*" The sun, that is human understanding, is in a cloud, when it is given over to earthly things; but it shines out when it stands afar off and is withdrawn from the love of earthly things. For then it is resplendent, and then divine love grows in it. The second

is firm patience in adversity. For it is manifest that when we bear heavy things for him whom we love, love itself is not destroyed, but even grows. "*Many waters* (that is many tribulations) *cannot quench charity*" (Cantic of Canticles viii. 7).¹ And hence holy men who bear trials for God's sake are more firmly established in the love of him; as the craftsman has more love for that work which has cost him greater labour. And thence it is that the faithful are more elevated in the love of God in proportion as they bear more afflictions for him. "*The waters increased* (that is to say, the tribulations) *and lifted up the ark on high*" (Gen. vii. 17),² (that is to say, the Church, or the soul of a just man.) (*Prologue to the Exposition on the two commands of Charity.*)

PURITY

"Free from all uncleanness, perfect and altogether without spot."

DENIS, *On the Divine Names*, Ch. xii. Lect. 1.

IN these words three degrees of cleanness are described which are requisite for sanctity. And the first is the freedom from all uncleanness. Now freedom is the opposite of slavery. But the slave of uncleanness is he who is completely conquered by uncleanness and subject to it. The first grade of purity then is that one should be delivered from the slavery of impurity. Now the second degree is that the purity should be perfect, for the perfect is that to which nothing is lacking. It happens at times that one is not subject to uncleanness, but there is wanting to him something of purity, in so far as he is troubled by passions of uncleanness; and when these are taken away there is perfect purity. The third degree of purity is that one should be altogether without spot. For that is said to be spotted which is not stained by anything intrinsic, but by something extrinsic. One will, then, be altogether without stain when not only in himself he has purity, but also there is nothing without that can draw him to impurity. And in these three degrees the perfect measure of holiness consists.

THE SAINTS

Now the saints are called clouds, firstly, by reason of the sublimity of their conversation: "*Who are these that fly as clouds?*" (Isa. lx. 8).¹ Secondly, because of the fruitfulness of their teaching: "*He bindeth up the waters in his clouds, so that they break not out and fall down together*" (Job xxvi. 8),² and likewise (xxxvi. 27):³ "*He poureth out the showers like floods that flow from the clouds.*" Thirdly, by reason of the utility of spiritual consolation: for just as the clouds furnish refreshment so also the examples of saints: "*And as a cloud of dew in the day of harvest*" (Isa. xviii. 4).⁴ We have therefore this cloud of witnesses given us, since from the lives of the saints to some extent the necessity of imitating them is brought home to us. "*Take, my brethren, for an example of suffering evil, of labour and patience, the prophets*" (James v. 10).⁵ "*As the Holy Spirit speaks in the Scripture, so also in the deeds of the Saints, which are form and precept of life to us*" (Augustine). (*Epis. to Hebr. chap. xii. lect. 1.*)

THE INCARNATION

THE NECESSITY OF THE INCARNATION

A THING may be said to be necessary to any end in two ways. Firstly, when without it the end could not be attained at all, as food is necessary to preserve human life; secondly, when it ministers to the more convenient and better attaining of the end, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not necessary for God to become incarnate in order to repair human nature. For God, by His almighty power, could repair human nature in many other ways. In the second way, however, the repairing of human nature did require that God should become incarnate. Whence Augustine says: "*But we may also show that no other possible way was wanting to God, to whose power all things are equally subject, but yet for the healing of our misery there was no more convenient way.*" And this may be considered with regard to the advancing of man towards goodness. Firstly, as to faith, which is made more certain from the fact that man believes God's very self speaking; whence Augustine says: "*So that man might more confidently walk towards the truth, truth itself, the Son of God, by assuming human nature, established faith and made it firm.*" Secondly, as to hope, which, through this, is in a special manner raised; and hence Augustine says: "*Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, as that it might be shown us how much God loves us. But what could be a clearer showing of this than that the Son of God should vouchsafe to undertake fellowship with our nature?*" Thirdly, as to charity, which is very greatly stimulated by this; for which reason Augustine says: "*What cause of the Lord's coming is there greater than this—that God might show His love for us,*"

and after he adds: "*If you are slow to love, at least be not reluctant to return love.*" Fourthly, as to acting aright in which he has set us example; whence Augustine says: "*Man whom men could see was not to be imitated, but God whom they could not see. And hence so that One might be shown to men whom they could see, and whom they ought to follow, God was made man.*" Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man, and the end of human life; and this is conferred upon us by the humanity of Christ; for Augustine says: "*God was made man, that man might become God.*" Similarly the Incarnation was of use to remove evil. Firstly, because, by this, man is taught not to prefer the devil to himself, and not to hold him in veneration, who is the author of sin; whence Augustine says: "*Seeing that it was possible to join human nature to God in such a way that there should be only one person, let the proud evil spirits not dare to set themselves before man, since they have not flesh.*" Secondly, by this he learns how great is the dignity of human nature, and that he should not soil it by sinning; whence Augustine says: "*God has shown us how high a place human nature holds among creatures, by this that among men he appeared as a true man.*" And Pope Leo says: "*Recognise, O Christian, thy dignity, and, made a sharer of the divine nature, do not by unworthily living return to thy former vileness.*" Thirdly, since "*to remove man's presumption the grace of God is entrusted to us without any preceding merit on our part, in the man Christ,*" as Augustine says. Fourthly, since "*the pride of man, which is an especial impediment preventing him adhering to God, by God's exceeding humility is confounded and healed,*" as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, to deliver man from the servitude of sin; which indeed, in Augustine's words, "*ought to be brought about in this manner, that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ,*" which happens in Christ satisfying for us. But a man that was man alone could not satisfy for the whole human race, and it was not right that God should,

whence it behoved Jesus Christ to be God and man. Whence also Pope Leo says: "*Weakness is taken by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity ; in order that what was fitting for our remedy, one and the same mediator of God and men, both could die by the one, and rise again by the other. For if he were not God he could not afford a remedy ; and if he were not true man, he could not give example.*" But there are also many other advantages obtained that are beyond the human intelligence to understand. (3a—1—2.)

THE PERSONALITY OF CHRIST

Personality is a thing other than nature. For nature signifies the essence of a species by its very definition. And if to those things that belong to the notion of a species there could be found joined nothing else, there would be no necessity to distinguish nature from the *suppositum* of nature, which is the individual subsisting in that nature, since, then, every individual subsisting in a certain nature would be altogether one with that nature. But it happens that in certain things that subsist something can be found that does not belong to the notion of species, namely, accidents and individuating principles ; as especially appears in those things which are made up of matter and form. And hence in such things nature differs from suppositum even as to the thing ; not as being a thing completely separate, but because in the suppositum the nature itself of a species is included, and there are added also certain other things which are outside the notion of the species : whence a suppositum is a kind of whole, with the nature as the formal and perfective part of it ; and for this reason, in things that are made up of matter and form, the nature is not attributed to the suppositum ; for we do not say that this man is his humanity. But if there is anything in which there is nothing of any sort beyond the notion of its species or nature, as in God, in that, as to the thing, suppositum does not differ from nature, but only

as to the mind's distinction; since nature has its name inasmuch as it is a certain essence, but the same thing is called a suppositum according as it subsists. And what is said of suppositum is to be understood of personality in a rational or intellectual creature; for personality is nothing else than "*the individual substance of rational nature*," according to Boetius. Everything, therefore, that inheres in a certain personality, whether it belongs to its nature or not, is united to it in the personality. And so, if human nature is not united to the Word of God in its personality, it cannot be united to it in any sense: and so faith in the Incarnation is completely taken away, which is to uproot the whole Christian faith. Since, therefore, the Word has human nature united to it, but not belonging to its divine nature, it follows that the union is accomplished in the personality of the Word and not in his nature. (3—2—2.0.)

Although in God nature and personality are identical, yet they differ in what they describe, as is said above; for personality refers to subsistence. And, for as much as human nature is united to the Word in such fashion that the Word subsists in it, but not that anything is added to it in its nature, or that its nature is changed into something else; hence the union of the human nature to the Word of God is accomplished in the personality and not in the nature. (1m.)

Personality belongs to the dignity and perfection of anything to that extent in which it belongs to the dignity and perfection of the thing to exist of itself; which is understood by the name person. But it is a higher perfection for anything that it should exist in a thing nobler than itself than that it should exist of itself. And hence from this fact human nature is nobler in Christ than in us, because in us it has its own personality as a thing existing of itself, but in Christ it exists in the person of the Word; just as, also, to be the completion of a species belongs to the dignity of a form, but the sensitive part is nobler in man on account of the

union with a nobler form that completes the species than it is in an animal, in which it is the completive form. (3m.)

Certain men, not understanding the relation of hypostasis to personality, although they agreed that in Christ there was only one person, yet insisted that the hypostasis of God was not the same as that of man, and if the union was accomplished in the personality it was not in the hypostasis. And this is shown to be erroneous in three ways. Firstly, for this reason that personality adds nothing above hypostasis except a determinate, namely, a rational nature, as Boetius says that "*personality is the individual substance of rational nature ;*" and therefore it is the same thing to attribute its own hypostasis to the human nature in Christ as to attribute its own personality. And bearing this in mind, the holy fathers, in the fifth council, celebrated at Constantinople, condemned both, saying: "*If any one should attempt to introduce into the mystery of Christ two substances, or two persons, let him be anathema. Neither did the Holy Trinity receive the addition of personality or subsistence by the incarnation of one person of the Holy Trinity, God the Word.*" But subsistence is the same thing as the thing subsisting, which is peculiar to the hypostasis, as is clear from Boetius. Secondly, since, if it be granted that personality adds anything above hypostasis, in which the union can take place, this is nothing else than a property belonging to dignity; as it is said by some that personality is hypostasis distinguished by a property belonging to its dignity. If, therefore, the union is accomplished in the personality, and not in the hypostasis, it follows that there is no union except according to a certain dignity. And this, with the approval of the synod of Ephesus, was condemned by Cyril in these words: "*If any one in the one Christ should divide the subsistences after the union, connecting them by a union which is only according to a certain dignity or authority or power, and not rather by a coming together according to a natural union, let him be anathema.*" Thirdly, because it is the hypostasis only to

which are attributed the operations and properties of a nature, and those things that belong to nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is subject to laughter, and is a rational animal. And for this reason this man is said to be a suppositum, because, namely, he is supposed in those things that belong to man, of whom they are predicated. If, therefore, there should be another hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that of some other thing rather than of the Word would be true those things that pertain to man, for instance, being born of a virgin, suffering, being crucified and buried. And this also was condemned, with the approval of the council of Ephesus, in these words: "*If any one shall divide the words that are in the evangelical and apostolical Scriptures into two personalities or subsistences; or that were said of Christ by the saints, or of himself by himself, and should apply certain as to man apart from the Word from a special understanding of God, and certain others, as applicable to God, to the Word of God the Father alone, let him be anathema.*" And hence it is clearly a heresy long ago condemned by the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union was not accomplished in the hypostasis or suppositum. Whence in the same synod it is read: "*If any one shall not confess that the Word of God the Father was united according to subsistence to the flesh, and that both were Christ with his flesh, the same, namely, God and man, let him be anathema.*" (3—2—3.0.)

Two heresies have arisen about the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. One that confused the natures, that of Eutyches and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one was constituted, so that they confessed that Christ was from two natures, as distinct before the union, but not in two natures, as if the distinction of the natures ceased after the union. The second was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, which made a distinction between the personalities. For they held that the

personality of the Son of God was one thing, and another that of the son of man, which they said were united, firstly, indeed by an indwelling, in as far as the Word of God dwelt in that man as in a temple; secondly, as to affective union, inasmuch as the will of that man was ever conformed to the will of the Word of God; thirdly, with regard to operation, in such a manner that man was the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, as to rank of honour, since all honour that is shown to the son of God is equally paid to the son of man because of the union with the son of God; fifthly, according to name, that is to say, the communication of names, as, namely, we call that man God and the Son of God. But it is clear that all these modes imply an accidental union.

Now certain later doctors, thinking to avoid these heresies, fell into them by their ignorance. For some of them granted that there was one personality in Christ, but insisted on two hypostases or supposita, saying that a certain man composed of body and soul, from the moment of his conception, was assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion that the Master¹ mentions. Others, again, wishing to preserve the unity of personality, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but these two, separated from one another, were united to the Word accidentally, that in this way the number of personalities might not be increased. And this is the third opinion that the Master mentions in the same place. But both of these opinions are reducible to the heresy of Nestorius. The first, indeed, because to hold two hypostases or supposita in Christ is the same thing as holding two personalities, as has been said above (pp. 139-40). And if the force lies in the name of personality, it must be remembered that even Nestorius held the unity of personality, by reason of the unity of dignity and honour. Whence also the fifth synod anathematised him that said: "*There was one personality according to dignity and honour and adoration; as Theodore and Nestorius insanely held.*" The other opinion

¹ The Lombard.

falls, however, into the error of Nestorius since it held an accidental union. For to say that the Word of God is united to the man Christ by an indwelling as in his temple (as Nestorius said) is the same as saying that the Word of God was united to man as a clothing, like a garment, as the third opinion holds: which bears even a worse suggestion than the tenets of Nestorius, namely, that the soul and body were not united.

Now the catholic faith holding the mean between the before-mentioned positions does not say that the union of God and man was accomplished according to essence or nature, nor yet accidentally, but in a middle way according to subsistence or hypostasis. Whence in the fifth synod it is said: "*Since in divers ways a unity can be understood, those who follow the impiety of Apollinarius and Eutyches, worshipping a slaying of what are united, that is to say, slaying both natures, hold a union in confusion; but disciples of Theodore and Nestorius, rejoicing in division, introduce an affectual union. Now the Holy Church of God rejecting the treachery of both, confesses the union of the Word of God to the flesh as a coming together to make one, which is according to subsistence.*" And, hence, it is clear that the second of the three opinions which the Master lays down, which asserts one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be looked on as an opinion, but the sentence of the catholic faith. Similarly also the first opinion, which holds two hypostases, and the third, which holds an accidental union, are not to be called opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in its councils. (3—2—6.o.)

CHRIST AND THE STOCK OF ADAM

As Augustine says: "*God was able to be made man in other fashion than of the stock of Adam, who by his sin made the human race guilty; but he judged it better to be made man of that race that had been conquered, by whom he would overcome the enemy of the human race.*" And this for three reasons.

Firstly, since this seemed to belong to justice, that he who had sinned should make the satisfaction. And hence from that nature, impaired by sin, it was fitting that he should assume that by which satisfaction was to be completed for the whole of nature. Secondly, since this belonged to the greater dignity of man, that from that race which had been overcome by the devil should arise the devil's conqueror. Thirdly, because by this, also, the power of God is better manifested, that from nature impaired and weak he should assume that which is raised to such power and dignity. (3—4—6.o.)

THE SOUL OF CHRIST

As Augustine says, the opinion first of Arius, and then of Apollinarius, was that the Son of God took flesh only, without a soul, holding that the Word stood to the flesh in place of the soul. From which it followed that in Christ there were not two natures but one only; for from the soul and the flesh human nature is constituted. But this position cannot be maintained for three reasons. Firstly, because it is repugnant to the authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of his own soul: "*My soul is sorrowful unto death*" (Matt. xxvi. 38),¹ and "*I have the power to lay down my soul*" (John x. 18).² But to this Apollinarius replied that in these words "the soul" is used metaphorically, in which sense the soul of God is mentioned in the Old Testament: "*My soul hateth your new moons, and your solemnities*" (Isaias i. 14).³ But, as Augustine says, the Evangelists, in the gospel story, tell how Jesus wondered, and was angry, was sad, and felt desire. And these, just as much, show that he had a true soul, as his eating, and sleeping, and wearying show that he had a true human body; otherwise if these things are all to be taken as metaphorical, because similar things are read in the Old Testament of God, faith in the gospel narrative would perish. For what is prophetically announced in figures is not the same as what is historically written of the

nature of things by the Evangelists. Secondly, the afore-said error takes away from the utility of the Incarnation, which is the setting free of man. For, as Augustine argues, "*if having assumed the flesh the Son of God did not take the soul, this must have been either because, knowing it to be harmless, he believed it not to need any healing; or thinking it something alien from himself he did not confer upon it the benefit of redemption; or looking upon it as completely incapable of being healed he could not trouble about it; or as vile and seemingly useless he cast it aside. Two of these are blasphemous. For how could God be called almighty if he was unable to care for the hopeless? Or how the God of all if it were not he that made the soul? But as to the two others, in one the cause of the soul is not known, in the other merit is not held. Is he to be held to understand the cause of the soul who strives to separate it, when instructed to receive law by the habit of interior reason, from the sin of voluntary transgression? Or how does he know its generosity who says it is contemptible by the vice of ignobility? If you look to its origin, more precious is the substance of the soul; if you look to the fault of transgression, on account of intelligence, it is worse than the flesh. But I confess and know Christ to be the perfect wisdom, and do not doubt him to be the most sweet: by the first of which he did not despise him that is better and capable of prudence; and by the second attribute, he received that which had been wounded more.*" Thirdly, this position is contrary to the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man take their species from the soul. Whence, if the soul be taken away, bone and flesh are only so called equivocally, as is clear from the philosopher. (3—5—3.0.)

THE INTELLECT OF CHRIST

As Augustine says, Apollinarists do not agree with the catholic Church on the soul of Christ, as they say, like the Arians, Christ who is God assumed flesh only, without the

soul; yet conquered by the witness of the gospels on this question, they said the mind was wanting in the soul of Christ, but in its stead was the Word itself.

But this position is vanquished by the same reasons as the previous. Firstly, indeed, it is against the gospel story which records the fact that he wondered (Matt. viii.).¹ But wonder cannot exist without reason, because it implies a comparing of cause and effect when any one sees an effect, of whose cause he is ignorant, and seeks it, as the philosopher says. Secondly, it is repugnant to the utility of the Incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is capable neither of sin nor of justifying grace except by the mind. Whence it is especially necessary that the human mind should be assumed. And hence Damascene says: "*The Word of God assumed the body and an intellectual and rational soul,*" and he adds afterwards: "*The whole was united to the whole, in order that on the whole of me salvation might be conferred: for what was not assumed was not capable of being cured.*" Thirdly, this does not agree with the truth of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the soul, as the matter to its own form, that is not truly human flesh which is not perfected by a human, that is a rational, soul. And therefore if Christ had had a soul without a mind, he would not have had true human flesh, but that of an animal, since by the mind alone our soul differs from the animal soul. Whence Augustine says that according to this error it would follow that the Son of God "*took to himself some beast with the figure of a human body;*" which again is out of harmony with divine truth, which suffers the falsity of no feigning. (3—5—4.o.)

THE GRACE OF CHRIST

By the full possession of anything we mean the perfect and total possession of it. Now totality and perfection may be considered in two ways: in one way, as to quantity, we may

regard its intensity; for instance, if I say that any one has whiteness fully, when he has it to the full of his nature; secondly, according to power, as if I say any one has life fully, because he has it as to all the effects or operations of life, and in this way man has life fully but not animals or plants. Now, in both ways, Christ had the fulness of grace. Firstly, indeed, because he had it in the highest degree, after the most perfect manner in which it may be possessed. And this is evident from the nearness of the soul of Christ to the source of grace. For it has already been laid down that the more intimately anything receptive is connected with an inflowing cause the more abundantly does it receive of it. And hence the soul of Christ, which of all rational creatures is most intimately joined to God, receives the greatest in-pouring of his grace. Secondly, from a consideration of its effects. For the soul of Christ received grace in such a manner that from it, in a measure, grace overflowed upon others. And hence it was necessary that he should have the greatest grace; just as fire, which is the cause of heat in all warm things, is hot in the highest degree. Similarly, also, with regard to the power of grace, he fully possessed grace; since he had it in all the operations and effects of grace, and this because grace was bestowed upon him as upon the universal principle in the class of possessors of grace. But the power of the first principle of any class reaches universally to all the effects of that class; as the sun, the universal cause of generation, as Denis says, by its power reaches to all effects which are associated with generation. And so the fulness of grace appears in Christ, in as far as his grace extends to all the effects of grace, which are the virtues, and gifts, and such like. (3—7—9.0.)

THE INFINITUDE OF HIS GRACE

As it has already been said, we can consider two kinds of grace in Christ: firstly, that which is the grace of the union,

which, as has been stated, is the personal union itself to the Son of God, which is granted as a grace to human nature; and this grace is clearly infinite, in as much as the very personality of the Word is infinite. Secondly, there is habitual grace, and this may be taken in two ways: firstly, according as it is a certain entity, and in this way it is necessary that it should be a finite entity, for it is in the soul of Christ as in its subject; but the soul of Christ is a creature having a finite capacity, whence the being of grace, since it could not exceed its subject, cannot be infinite. Secondly, as to the special nature of grace, and in this way the grace of Christ may be called infinite as not being limited, because it possesses whatever can pertain to the nature of grace, and because what belongs to the nature of grace was not given to him according to any certain measure; since, according to the purpose of God, to whom it belongs to measure grace, grace was bestowed upon the soul of Christ as upon the universal principle of grace in human nature, according to that: "*He hath graced us in his beloved Son*" (Eph. i. 6);¹ as we may say that the light of the sun is infinite, not indeed according to its being, but according to the nature of light, since it has whatever belongs to the nature of light. (3—7—11.0.)

CHRIST THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH

Granting the supposition that Christ would not have been incarnate if man had not sinned, Christ before sin would have been the head of the Church according to his divine nature only; but after sin it was necessary that he should become the head of the Church even according to his human nature. For by sin human nature was wounded and given over to things of sense, so that it was not sufficiently fitted for the invisible government of the Word. Whence it was necessary to bring healing to the wound through the humanity of Christ, in which Christ satisfied; and it was necessary that he should assume a visible nature, that through a visible

governance man might be recalled to invisible things. (*On Truth*—29—4—3.)

CHRIST A MEMBER OF THE CHURCH

Christ is expressly called, by the Apostle, a member of the Church: "*You are the body of Christ and members one of another*" (1 Cor. xiii. 27).¹ Now he is said to be a member by reason of the distinction from other members of the Church; but he is distinguished from other members in virtue of his perfection, because Christ is full of grace, and not any other; just as the head of the natural body is distinguished from other members. (*On Truth*—29—4—6m.)

CHRIST'S GRACE AS HEAD OF THE CHURCH

It must be said that since everything acts only in so far as it is actually an entity, it is necessary that the actuality by which anything actually is should be the same as that by which it acts; just as the heat by which a fire is hot is the same as that by which it maketh hot. But not every actuality by which a thing actually is suffices for this, that it should be the principle of acting upon others. For since that which is agent excels that which is patient, as Augustine says, and the philosopher, it is necessary that that which acts upon others should have actuality according to a certain eminence. But it was said above that in the soul of Christ grace was received according to the highest eminence; and hence from that eminence of grace which he received he was competent to pour that grace upon others, which pertains to the nature of a head. And, therefore, the personal grace by which the soul of Christ was justified is essentially the same as the grace by which he is the head of the Church justifying others; but it differs as to its function. (3—8—5.o.)

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

As is clear from what has already been said (pp. 143-5) the Son of God assumed human nature in its entirety; that is to say, not only a body, but also a soul, the rational as well as the sensitive. And, therefore, it was fitting that he should have created knowledge, on account of three things. Firstly, indeed, on account of the perfection of his soul. For the soul, considered as to its nature, is a power of knowing intelligible things; for it is, as it were, a scroll on which no writing is, and yet it can be written upon by reason of the possible intellect, through which it is capable of becoming all things, as the philosopher says. But what is a power is imperfect unless it proceeds to action. Now it was not fitting that the Son of God should assume an imperfect human nature, but a perfect, that by means of it the whole human race might be led back to the perfect. And, therefore, it was fitting that the soul of Christ should be made perfect by some knowledge, which would be its own proper perfection. Hence it was fitting that in Christ there should be some knowledge besides the divine; for otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of other men. Secondly, since everything exists on account of its function, as the philosopher says, Christ would have had an intellectual soul in vain if it had not been used for understanding, which pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some knowledge belongs to the nature of the human soul, namely, that by which it naturally knows first principles, for we take knowledge here broadly to mean any kind of knowing of the human intellect. But no natural gift was wanting to Christ, because he assumed a complete human nature, as has been said already. And therefore in the sixth synod the position of those who deny two knowledges or two wisdoms to Christ was condemned. (3—9—I.O.)

CHRIST'S ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE

As is clear from what has been said before (p. 149), none of those things that God fashioned in our nature was lacking to the human nature assumed by God the Word. Now it is manifest that in human nature God fashioned not only a possible intellect but also an active intellect. Whence it is necessary to say that in the soul of Christ there was not only a possible but also an active intellect. But if in other things God and nature contrive nothing in vain, as the philosopher says, much less in the soul of Christ was anything to no purpose. But that is to no purpose which is not fruitful in the operation for which it is destined, since everything exists for its own operation, as the philosopher says. Now the special operation of the active intellect is to make the species of understanding actually, by drawing them forth from phantasms; whence it is said that the active intellect is that "*by which it is capable of doing all things.*" And, hence, it is necessary to say that in Christ there were some species of understanding by the action of the active intellect received in the possible intellect; and this is to have acquired knowledge, which some call experimental. And, hence, although I may have written otherwise in another place, it must be said that in Christ there was acquired knowledge, which is strictly knowledge according to the manner of human beings, not only on the part of the subject receiving, but also on the part of the cause acting. For such knowledge is resident in Christ according to the light of the active intellect, which is a thing natural to human nature. For infused knowledge is attributed to the human soul according to the light that comes from above, which is a way of knowing proportioned to the angelic nature. But the blissful knowledge, by which the very essence of God is seen, is a thing proper and natural to God alone. (3—9—4.0.)

WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST COMPREHENDED THE WORD
OR THE DIVINE ESSENCE

As is clear from what has been said above (p. 141-2), the union of natures in the personality of Christ is so accomplished that the property of each nature remains unconfused; in such a way, namely, that "*the uncreated remains uncreated, and the created remains within the limits of a creature,*" as Damascene expresses it. But it is impossible that any creature should comprehend the divine essence, inasmuch as the infinite is not comprehended by the finite. And, therefore, it must be said that the soul of Christ in no way comprehended the divine essence. (3-10-1.0.)

THE SOUL OF CHRIST KNEW ALL THINGS

When it is inquired whether the soul of Christ knew all things in the Word, "*all*" may be taken in two ways: firstly, speaking strictly, understanding all things existing in whatever manner, or that will be, or that were, either deeds or words or thoughts of any one, at any time. And, in this way, it must be said that the soul of Christ in the Word knew all things. For every created intellect knows in the Word, not indeed all things absolutely, but so much the more as it more perfectly sees the Word. For to no blessed intellect is there lacking to know in the Word all things which have regard to it. Now to Christ and to his dignity all things have regard in some way, in as far as all things are subject to him. He also is established judge of all, "*because he is the son of man,*" as is said (John v. 27);¹ and hence the soul of Christ in the Word knows all things that exist, at any time, and even the thoughts of men, whose judge he is: so that what is said of him: "*For he knew what was in man*" (John ii. 25)² may be understood not only as to the divine knowledge, but also as to the knowledge of his soul, which it had in the Word. But "*all*" may be taken in another way,

more broadly, as including not only all things that actually exist at some time, but also all things which potentially exist, never to be reduced, or never reduced to actuality. But of these things certain are within the divine power alone: and not all of such things does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all things that God can do, which is to comprehend the divine power, and as a consequence the divine essence. For every power is known by the knowledge of the things which it can achieve. But certain things are not only within the divine power, but also in the power of the creature: and all such things the soul of Christ knows in the Word, for the essence of every creature it comprehends in the Word, and, consequently, the potentiality and power, and all things that are in the potentiality of the creature. (3—10—2.0.)

To the objection founded on the words of St. Mark (xiii. 32):¹ “*But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father,*” it must be said that Arius and Eunomius understood these words not of the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as is said above (p. 149), but as to the divine knowledge of the Son, whom they held to be less than the Father, as to his knowledge. But this cannot stand, since by the Word of God all things were made, as is said (John i.), and among other things made by him are all times. But he is not ignorant of anything that he has wrought. He is said, therefore, not to know the day and hour of judgment because he did not make it known: for when he was asked about this by the Apostles he was unwilling to reveal it to them; as on the other hand is read: “*Now I know that thou fearest God*” (Gen. xxii. 12),² that is to say, now I have made thee to know. But the Father is said to know, because the knowledge of this sort he has given to the Son. Whence in this very thing that is said, “*Except the Father,*” is given to be understood that the Son knows; and not only as to his divine, but also as to his human, nature, because,

as Chrysostom argues, if to the man Christ it is given to know how it behoves him to judge, which is greater, much more it is given him to know what is less, namely, the time of the judgment. Origen, however, explains this of Christ according to his body, which is the Church, which is ignorant of that time. Others, again, say it is to be understood of the adoptive son of God, and not of the natural son. (1m.)

THE ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOUL OF CHRIST

Acquired knowledge is placed in the soul of Christ as a due to the active intellect, that its act may not be without employment, which makes things actually intelligible; just as the infused knowledge is placed in the soul of Christ for the perfection of the possible intellect. But as the possible intellect is that by which it is capable of becoming all things, so the active intellect is that by which it is capable of doing all things, as the philosopher says. And, therefore, just as by its infused knowledge the soul of Christ knows all those things to which the possible intellect is in potentiality in whatever manner, so by acquired knowledge it knows all those things which can be known by the active intellect. (3—12—I.O.)

Increase in knowledge is of two kinds: one indeed according to essence, according as, namely, the habit of knowledge is increased; the other according to the effect, as any one with the same or an equal habit of knowledge firstly demonstrates to others lesser things and afterwards the higher and more subtle. Now in this second way it is manifest that Christ grew in knowledge and grace as in years; because, namely, with increase of years he did greater works, that is to say, works that demonstrated greater knowledge and grace. But as to the habit of knowledge, it is manifest that the habit of infused knowledge was not increased in him, since from the first he possessed fully infused knowledge of

all things, and much less could the knowledge of the blessed be increased in him; but of his divine knowledge, that suffers no increase, it has already been treated (p. 151). If therefore besides the habit of infused knowledge there were not in the soul of Christ a habit of acquired knowledge, as it seems to some, and at one time seemed to me . . . no kind of knowledge of Christ increased as to its essence, but only by experience, that is to say, by the turning of the infused species of understanding into phantasms. And according to this they say that the knowledge of Christ grew according to experience, by converting the infused species of understanding to those things which it received newly from the senses. But because it seems incongruous that any natural intellectual action should be lacking to Christ, since to extract the species of understanding from phantasms is a certain natural action of man according to the active intellect, it seems congruous to hold this action also to have been in Christ. And from this it follows that in the soul of Christ there was a certain habit of knowledge, which by the extracting of such species could be increased; from this, namely, that the active intellect after the first species of understanding had been extracted from the phantasms, could go on to extract others and others. (3—12—20.)

THE DEFECTS OF CHRIST

It was fitting that the body assumed by the Son of God should be subject to human infirmities and defects; and this especially for three reasons. Firstly, because for this reason did the Son of God, having assumed flesh, come into the world, that he might satisfy for the sin of the human race. Now one satisfies for the sin of another when he bears the penalty due to the other's sin in himself. But these corporal defects, namely, death, hunger, thirst, and such like, are the pains of sin, which came into the world by Adam, according to that: "*By one man sin entered into the world and by sin*

death” (Rom. v. 12).¹ Whence it was fitting that he should receive these penalties of our nature, in our place, according to that: “*Truly he hath borne our weaknesses*” (Isaias liii. 4).² Secondly, in order to spread the faith in the Incarnation. For since our nature is not otherwise known to man, except in so far as it is subject to these bodily defects; if without these defects the Son of God had taken human nature, he would have seemed not to be true man, and not to have had true flesh, but an apparent flesh, as the Manichæans held. And hence, as it is said: “*He emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man*” (Phil. ii. 7).³ Whence the Blessed Thomas was recalled to faith by the sight of the wounds, as is said (John xx.).⁴ Thirdly, because of the example of patience which he exhibits to us, by bravely bearing human defects and sufferings; and hence it is said: “*He endured opposition from sinners against himself; that you be not wearied fainting in your minds*” (Heb. xii. 3).⁵ (3—14—I.O.)

THE NECESSITY OF BEING SUBJECT TO THE DEFECTS WHICH CHRIST ASSUMED

Necessity is of two kinds: one, indeed, is that of constraint which comes from an outside agent, and this necessity is contrary both to nature and to the will, the principle of both of which is intrinsic. Another kind is natural necessity, which is dependent upon natural principles; for instance, on the form, as it is necessary for fire to heat; or the matter, as dissolution is a necessity for bodies made up of contrary elements. As to this necessity which is dependent upon the matter, the body of Christ was subject to the necessity of death and of other defects of this kind, since, as has been said: “*By the good purpose of the divine providence the flesh of Christ was permitted to suffer and to perform those things that were proper to it.*” But this necessity is caused by the prin-

ciples of human nature, as has been pointed out. But if we speak of the necessity of constraint, according, indeed, as it is repugnant to corporal nature, so again the body of Christ, by the fashion of his own nature, lay under necessity to the piercing nail and the cutting scourge. But according as such necessity was repugnant to his will, it is manifest that in Christ there was no necessity for these defects, neither with respect to the divine will nor with respect to the human will of Christ absolutely, in such wise, namely, as it follows deliberate reason; but only according to the natural motion of the will, in such fashion, namely, as it flies death, and also the body's hurt. (3—14—2.o.)

WHETHER CHRIST ASSUMED ALL THE CORPORAL DEFECTS OF MAN

It must be said, as has been observed (p. 155), that Christ assumed human defects to satisfy for the sin of human nature, for which it was requisite that he should have the perfection of knowledge and grace in his soul. It behoved Christ therefore to assume those defects, which are consequent upon the common sin of the whole nature, but are not incongruous with the perfection of knowledge and grace. So, therefore, it was not fitting that he should assume all human defects or weaknesses. For there are some defects which are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace; as ignorance, proneness to evil, and difficulty in the performance of good. But there are other defects, which do not usually follow the whole human nature on account of the sin of our first parents, but are caused in certain men from certain particular causes; as leprosy, and falling sickness, and such like, which defects indeed are caused at times by man's fault, as by disordered living, but at times from the defect of the formative power. Now neither of these could be attributed to Christ, since his flesh was conceived of the Holy Spirit, whose wisdom and power are infinitely incapable of error or

defect; and he performed no disordered thing in his life. But there is a third kind of defect which is commonly found in all men from the sin of our first parents, such as death, hunger, thirst, and such like, and all these defects Christ assumed, which Damascene calls "*natural and irreprehensible passions*;" natural, indeed, since the whole of human nature is commonly heir to them; irreprehensible, since they do not imply the defect of knowledge and grace. (3—14—4.0.)

THE SOUL OF CHRIST WAS CAPABLE OF SUFFERING

The soul established in the body may suffer in two ways: firstly, by a bodily suffering; secondly, by an animal suffering. It suffers by a bodily suffering through the body's hurt: for, since the soul is the form of the body, it follows that the being of the soul and body is one; and therefore when the body is disturbed by any corporeal suffering, it is necessary that the soul should be indirectly disturbed, namely, as to the being which it has in the body. Since, therefore, the body of Christ was capable of suffering and mortal, as has been said (p. 156), it is necessary that in this way his soul also should be capable of suffering. But the soul is said to suffer by an animal suffering as to its operation, which is either proper to the soul, or is of the soul rather than of the body; and although even in understanding and feeling the soul is said in this way to suffer something, yet the affections of the sensitive desire are more strictly called the passions of the soul, and these were in Christ as the rest of those things that belong to human nature. Whence Augustine says: "*He, the Lord, in the form of a servant, deigning to live a human life, took those things, where he judged they ought to be taken; for neither in that by which it was a true human body, nor in that by which it was a true human soul, was there any human affection feigned.*"

But it must be admitted that these passions were otherwise in Christ than in us, with regard to three things.

Firstly, as to their object: since in us, very often, these passions tend towards the unlawful, which was not the case in Christ. Secondly, as to their principle: since the passions, in us, frequently anticipate the judgment of reason; but in Christ all motions of the sensitive desire came forth according to the disposition of reason. Whence Augustine says that "*Christ received these motions into his human soul in virtue of the most certain dispensation as he willed, in the same way as, by his will, he was made man.*" Thirdly, as to the effect: since at times in us these motions do not rest in the sensitive desire, but betray the reason, which did not happen in Christ; because motions that naturally belong to human flesh remained, by his disposition, in the desire of sense, in such fashion that by them the reason was in no wise hindered from doing what is agreeable to it, of its nature. Whence Jerome says that "*our Lord, in order to prove the truth of the human nature he assumed, was indeed made truly sad: but lest passion should dominate his soul, it is said that he began to grow sorrowful and to be sad, by a propassion;*" so that perfect passion may be understood when the soul, that is to say the reason, is dominated; but a propassion, when it is inceptive in the sensitive desire, and, further than this, it does not extend. (3—15—4.0.)

CHRIST'S TRUE SENSIBLE PAIN

For true sensible suffering there is requisite the hurt of the body and the sense of injury. Now the body of Christ could be injured, because it was capable of suffering and mortal, as is laid down above (p. 156); nor did he lack the sense of being hurt, since his soul had perfectly all natural powers. Whence there can be no doubt that there was true suffering in Christ. (3—15—5.0.)

By the natural relation that exists between soul and body, from the glory of the soul, glory overflows into the body. But this natural relation in Christ was subject to the will of

his Divinity, from which it came about that bliss remained in his soul and was not poured forth into his body; but his flesh suffered what was fitting to suffering nature. . . . (3—14—1—2m.)

As is said above, in virtue of the ordering of the Divinity of Christ, the bliss was so contained in his soul that it was not poured forth into his body lest his capacity for suffering and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight of contemplation was so retained in his mind that it did not overflow upon his sensible powers, lest, by this, sensible pain should be excluded. (3—15—5—3m.)

CHRIST'S SORROW

As it is said above, the delight of divine contemplation was so held within the mind of Christ, by the ordering of the divine power, that it did not overflow upon the sensitive powers and so exclude the suffering of sense. But just as sensible suffering is in the sensitive desire, so also is sorrow. Yet there is a difference as to their motive or object: for the object and motive of pain is injury perceived by the sense of touch, as when any one is wounded; but the object and motive of sorrow is something hurtful, or evil interiorly apprehended either by reason or imagination . . . as when any one grieves over the loss of grace or money. But the soul of Christ could apprehend a thing as hurtful both as to himself, as his passion and death were, and also as to others, as the sin of the disciples or of the Jews putting him to death. And hence, just as in Christ there could be true pain, so there could be in him true sorrow, but in a manner other than in us, as to the three things enumerated above (p. 158), since we spoke there of the passions of the soul of Christ generally. (3—15—6.o.)

CHRIST'S FEAR

As sorrow arises from the apprehension of present evil, so fear is caused by the apprehension of future evil. Now the

apprehension of future evil, if it have all certainty, does not produce fear. Whence the philosopher says that fear does not exist except where there is some hope of escape. For when there is no hope of escape the evil is looked on as present and so causes sorrow rather than fear. And hence fear may be considered in two ways: firstly, in as far as the sensitive desire naturally flies the body's hurt, both by sorrow, if it be present, and by fear, if it be in prospect; and as to this manner fear was in Christ, just as was sorrow. Secondly, it can be considered as consequent on the uncertainty of future events, as in the night hours when any sound occurs, since we have no knowledge of what it is; and as to this, fear was not in Christ, as Damascene says. (3—15—7.0.)

CHRIST A POSSESSOR OF, AND AT THE SAME TIME A
PILGRIM TOWARDS, BLISS

A man is called a pilgrim from the fact that he is journeying towards bliss; but a possessor (*comprehensor*) in as much as he already possesses bliss, according to that: "*So run that you may obtain*" (*comprehendatis*) (1 Cor. ix. 24);¹ and "*But I follow after, if by any means I may obtain*" (*comprehendam*) (Phil. iii. 12).² But the perfect bliss of man consists in the soul and body. . . . In the soul, indeed, as to that which is proper to it, by which the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, however, for as much as the body will rise again spiritual, and in power, and in glory, and in incorruption, as is said in the text (1 Cor. xv.).³ Now Christ, before his passion, as to his mind, fully saw God; and hence he possessed bliss as far as what is proper to the soul; but as to other things bliss was lacking to him, since both his soul was capable of suffering, and his body was capable of suffering and mortal, as is clear from what has been said (p. 156). And hence he was at the same time a possessor, in as far as he possessed the bliss proper to his soul, and at the same

time a pilgrim, in as much as he was journeying towards bliss as to that which was lacking to him of bliss. (3—15—10.0.)

WHETHER IT IS TRUE TO SAY THAT GOD WAS MADE
MAN

A thing is said to be made that which may be newly predicated of it. To be man, however, is truly predicated of God . . . ; but in such wise that it did not beseem his nature to be man from eternity, but, at a time, by assuming human nature. And therefore this is true: *God was made man* ; but it is interpreted differently by different men, as this also: *God is man*. (3—16—6.0.)

CHRIST'S TWO WILLS

Some men held that in Christ there was only one will. But the reasons that moved them to this seem to have been not always the same. For Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but that the Word stood in the place of a soul, or in the place of an intellect. Whence since the will is in the reason, as the philosopher says, it follows that in Christ there was no human will; and therefore there was in him only one will. And similarly Eutyches, and all who held one composite nature in Christ, were forced to hold one will in him. Nestorius also, who held that the union of God and man was accomplished only as to affection and will, held one will in Christ. But afterwards Macarius, patriarch of Antioch, and Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople, and certain disciples of them, held that in Christ there was only one will, although they held that there were two natures in Christ, united according to the hypostasis; because they thought that the human nature in Christ never moved by its own motion, but only according as it was moved by the Divinity, as is clear from the synodic letter of Pope

Agatho. And hence in the sixth synod celebrated at Constantinople it is determined that it is necessary to say that in Christ there were two wills: where it is read: "*According to that which the prophets of old concerning Christ, and he himself hath taught us, and the symbol left us of the holy Fathers, we declare that there were two natural wills in him and two natural operations.*" And this it was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as is shown above (pp. 143-5). But a will is of the perfection of human nature, for it is a natural power, just as the understanding, as is clear from what has been said already. Whence it is necessary to say that the Son of God assumed with human nature a human will. But in taking upon him human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution in those things that belong to divine nature, which naturally had a will. . . . And hence it is necessary to say that in Christ there were two wills, namely, one divine and another human. (3—18—I.O.)

CHRIST'S SENSUAL WILL

As it is said above, the Son of God assumed a human nature with all the things that belong to the perfection of that human nature. Now in human nature is also included animal nature, as the genus is included in the species. Whence it behoved the Son of God to assume with human nature also those things that belong to the perfection of animal nature, among which is the sensitive desire, which is called sensual, and hence it is necessary to say that in Christ there was a sensual desire or sensuality. But it must be remembered that sensuality or the sensual desire, in as far as it is its nature to be obedient to reason, is called rational by participation, as is clear from the philosopher. And because the will is in reason, as is said above, with equal force it may be said that sensuality is will by participation. (3—18—2.O.)

THE CONFORMITY OF CHRIST'S HUMAN WILL WITH HIS
DIVINE

In Christ, then, as to his human nature, there must be held to be two wills, namely, the will of sensuality, which by participation is called will; and the will of reason, whether it is taken as to the manner of nature or as to the manner of reason. But it is said above (p. 156) that, by certain dispensation, the Son of God before his passion permitted his flesh to do and to suffer whatever is proper to it. Now it is manifest that the sensual will naturally flies sensible pains and the hurt of the body. Similarly also the will as a nature repudiates those things that are contrary to nature, and those things that are in themselves evils, as death and such like; yet these, at times, in the manner of reason, the will may choose because of a relation to the end; as also in some diseased man his sensuality and even his will, absolutely considered, refuses to be burnt, which, however, the will according to reason may choose for the sake of obtaining the end, health. Now the will of God was that Christ should suffer pains and passions and death, not that those things were willed by God in themselves, but in order to the end of human salvation. Whence it is clear that Christ by his sensual will, and by his rational will, which is considered as a nature, could will otherwise than God; but according to the will, which is as reason, he always wished the same as God; which is clear from what he said: "*Not what I will but what thou wilt*" (Mark xvi. 36).¹ For he willed by his reason that the divine will be fulfilled; although he should say that he willed otherwise according to some other will of his. (3—18—5.0.)

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS ANY CONFLICT OF WILLS

Contrariety cannot exist unless the opposition be found in the same thing, and in the same respect; but if according to diverse things and in diverse respects there should be a

diversity, this is not sufficient to constitute contrariety, just as it, similarly, does not constitute contradiction; for instance, if a man be beautiful or whole as to his hand and not as to his foot. For this, therefore, that there should be contrariety of wills in any one, it is requisite, first, that the diversity of wills should be as to the same. For if the will of one should regard the doing of something as to some universal reason, and the will of the other should be for it not to be done according to some particular reason, there is not altogether a contrariety of wills; for instance, if the king should will to hang a thief on account of the public good, and some relative of his should oppose his being hanged because of his private love, there would not be a contrariety of will, unless perhaps the will of the private person should extend as far as this, that he should will to impede the public good in order that the private good may be preserved; for then the repugnance of wills is as to the same thing. Secondly, for contrariety of will, it is requisite that there should be opposition as to the same will. For if a man wishes one thing as to his desire of reason, and another as to his sensitive desire, there is no contrariety here, unless the sensitive desire should prevail to such an extent that it should change or retard the desire of reason: for so already there would reach something of the contrary motion of the sensitive desire to the very will of reason.

So, therefore, it must be said that although the natural will and the sensual will in Christ should will something other than his divine and rational will, yet there was not any contrariety of wills. Firstly, indeed, because neither the natural nor the sensual will repudiated that reason, namely, by which the divine will and the will of human reason in Christ willed the passion. For, even absolutely, the will in Christ willed the salvation of the human race, but it did not belong to this to will it in order to something else; but the motion of his sensual will was not sufficient to extend to this. Secondly, because neither the divine will nor the

rational will in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or by the sensual desire. Similarly, also, on the contrary, neither did the divine will nor the rational will in Christ shrink from or retard the motion of the natural human will and the movement of sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, according to the divine will, and also according to the rational will, that his natural will and his sensual will should be moved after the order of their nature. Whence it is clear that in Christ there was no repugnance or contrariety of wills. (3—18—6.o.)

THE ADORATION OF THE DIVINITY AND HUMANITY OF CHRIST

In any one to whom honour is paid two things may be considered, namely, him to whom honour is shown and the cause of honour. Now, strictly, honour is shown to the whole thing that subsists. For we do not say that the hand of a man is honoured, but that a man is honoured; and if at times the hand or foot of any one is said to be honoured, this does not mean that these parts are honoured in themselves, but because in those parts the whole is honoured; in which manner also a man may be honoured in some exterior thing, say in his clothing, or in an image, or in his messenger. But the cause of honour is that by which he who is honoured has a certain excellence. . . . And, hence, if in one man there are many reasons for honour, for instance, prelacy, science, and virtue, there will be for that man but one honour considering him who is honoured, many, however, according to the reasons for honour; for it is the man who is honoured both for his science and for his virtue. Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one personality of the divine and human nature, and also one hypostasis and one suppositum, there is one adoring of him, and one honour on the part of him who is honoured; but as to the causes on account of which he is honoured, there may be said to be many adora-

tions, as, namely, by one honour he is honoured on account of his uncreated wisdom and by another for his created wisdom. But if in Christ one hold many personalities or hypostases, it would follow that absolutely there should be many adorations. And this is what is reprobated in the synods; for it is said in the chapters of Cyril: "*If any one should say that the assumed human nature ought to be equally adored with God the Word, as one in regard to another, and should not rather honour with one adoration Emmanuel, according as the Word was made flesh, let him be anathema.*" (3—25—I.O.)

. . . The honour of adoration is strictly due to the hypostasis subsisting; but the cause of honour may be something not having subsistence, on account of which a person is honoured in whom that dwells. The adoration therefore of the humanity of Christ may be taken in two ways: firstly, that it is his as the thing adored; and so to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the Word of God Incarnate, as to adore the robe of a king is nothing else than to adore the king robed. And as to this the adoration of the humanity of Christ is the adoration of latria. In another way the adoration of the humanity of Christ may be understood as due to the humanity of Christ as perfectly endowed with all graces, and as to this the adoration of the humanity of Christ is not the adoration of latria, but the adoration of dulia; for as much as, namely, one and the same personality of Christ is adored with the adoration of latria because of his divinity, and with the adoration of dulia for the perfection of his humanity. Nor is this unfitting, since to God the Father himself the honour of latria is due on account of his Godhead, and the honour of dulia on account of the dominion by which his governance is over the creature. Whence upon that: "*O Lord, my God, I have hoped in thee*" (Ps. vii.),¹ the Gloss says, "*The Lord of all, by his power, to whom dulia is due: the God of all, by creation, to whom is due latria.*" (3—25—2.O.)

CHRIST THE MEDIATOR

To the office of mediator it strictly belongs to join and unite those between whom he is the mediator: for extremes are united in the mean. But to unite men to God perfectly, indeed, belongs to Christ, through whom men are reconciled to God, according to that: "*God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself*" (2 Cor. v. 19).¹ And therefore Christ alone is the perfect mediator of God and men, in as far as, by his death, he reconciled the human race to God. Whence, when the Apostle had said: "*The mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ,*" he added: "*who gave himself to redeem all.*" But nothing stands in the way of certain others indirectly being called mediators between God and men, as, namely, co-operating in the union of men with God, by way of disposing them to it or ministering to it. (3—26—1.o.)

CHRIST OUR MEDIATOR AS MAN

In a mediator we may consider two things: firstly, the nature of a mean; secondly, the office of joining. Now it is of the nature of a mean that it should be distant from both of the extremes. But the mediator joins by this, that the things that are one's he brings to the other. Now neither of these belongs to Christ as God, but only as man. For as God he does not differ from the Father and Holy Spirit in nature and power of dominion. Nor even have the Father and Holy Spirit anything that the Son has not; that so he may bear that which belongs to the Father and Holy Spirit, as something belonging to others, to others. But both pertain to him, as man; since, as man, he is far from God in nature, and from men in dignity both of grace and glory. Inasmuch, also, as he is man, it belongs to him to join men to God, by showing the precepts and gifts of God to men and making satisfaction and intercession in men's behalf. And hence he is most truly called mediator as man. (3—26—2.o.)

ON FAITH

BUT as to this, firstly, I wish to warn you in disputes with infidels about the articles of faith not to strive to prove the faith by necessary reasons. For this takes from the sublimity of the faith, the truths of which are beyond not only human but angelic understanding. But they are believed by us as revealed by God himself. Now since what proceeds from the very Truth cannot be false, and it is of no use to impugn by necessary reason what is not false, our faith, just as it cannot be proved by necessary reasons, for it exceeds the human mind, in the same way it cannot be disproved by necessary reason on account of its truth. To this, then, should the intention of the Christian disputing look in articles of faith, not to prove but to defend the faith. Whence the blessed Peter does not say: "*Ready ever to prove,*" but "*to satisfy*" (Epis. 1, iii. 15),¹ namely, to make reasonably clear that not to be false which the catholic faith confesses. (Chap. ii. to *Cantor of Antioch.*)

THE TEACHINGS OF PHILOSOPHY AND FAITH

I HAVE endeavoured to reply, but with this protest at the outset, that many of these articles do not pertain to the teachings of the faith, but rather to the dogmata of the philosophers. But it works a great injury either to assert or deny as belonging to sacred doctrine such things as do not bear upon the doctrine of piety. For says Augustine: "*When I hear a certain Christian ignorant of those things (namely, what philosophers have said of the heavens, or the stars and the motion of the sun and moon) or misunderstanding them, I look with patience upon such a man : nor do I see any reason to hinder him, when of thee, Lord Creator of all things, he does not believe unworthy things, if perhaps he be ignorant of the structure and condition of corporeal creatures. But he is a hindrance if he thinks these things belong to the very doctrine of piety ; and, more pertinaciously, dare to affirm that of which he is ignorant.*" But that he may be the cause of injury Augustine shows. "*It is very disgraceful,*" he says, "*and pernicious, and especially to be avoided, that a Christian speaking of these things as though according to Christian letters should so rave that any infidel may hear ; so that, as it is said, seeing him altogether in the wrong, he may scarcely contain his mirth. And it is not so hurtful that one man should be seen to err, as that our writers are believed, by those who are without, to have held such opinions, and to the ruin of those whose salvation is our care, they are scorned and condemned as unlearned.*" Whence it seems safer to me that those things which philosophers have commonly held, and

are not repugnant to our faith, should neither be asserted as dogmas of faith, although at times they may be introduced under the names of the philosophers, nor so denied as contrary to the faith, as to give occasion to the wise of this world of condemning the teaching of the faith. (*Reply to Master John of Vercelli on forty-two articles*—Introduction.)

SUPERSTITION

RELIGION is a moral virtue, but every moral virtue consists in the mean, and therefore vice may be contrary to moral virtue in two ways: first, by excess; second, by falling short. But one can exceed the mean in which virtue consists not only in degree but also in other ways; whence in other virtues also as in magnanimity . . . vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not because it tends to something greater, but perchance to the less than virtue; yet it oversteps the mean of virtue in so far as it does something unfitting, or when it is not fit and so on . . .

So therefore superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess; not that it is more lavish in divine worship than true religion, but because it worships divinely either what or how it ought not. (2-2—92—1—0.)

A thing may be superfluous in two ways. Firstly, it may be superfluous with regard to its quantity, absolutely; and after this manner nothing can be superfluous in divine worship, for man can never achieve anything that is not less than is due to God.

But a thing can be superfluous according to its proportion, if it is not proportioned to the end for which it is destined. Now the end of divine worship is that man should give glory to God, and that to him he should bring into subjection both mind and body. And hence whatever man may do to the glory of God and to subject his mind to him, and also his body by the due restraining of his lusts, according to the divine and ecclesiastical ordination, and the custom of those with whom a man lives, this is not superfluous in divine worship. But if there be anything which

by its nature does not pertain to the glory of God, nor help to raise his mind to God, nor assist the restraining of his fleshly desires, or if it should be outside divine and ecclesiastical institution, or against common custom which according to St. Augustine is to be taken as law—all this must be reputed superfluous and superstitious, because, belonging only to the exterior, it does not pertain to the interior worship of God. Whence Augustine repeats what is said in Luke xvii. 12: ¹ “*The kingdom of God is within you,*” against the superstitious, who cleave more to the things of the exterior. (2-2—93—2—0.)

PAPAL POWER

THE VICAR OF CHRIST IS THE UNIVERSAL PRIMATE

THE error of those who say that the Vicar of Christ, the Bishop of the Roman Church, does not hold the primacy of the universal Church, is comparable to theirs who insist that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. For Christ himself, the Son of God, consecrates his Church, and seals it for himself with the Holy Spirit, as it were with his style and seal. And so, in like manner, the Vicar of Christ, by his primacy and foreseeing care, as a faithful servant preserves the universal Church subject to Christ. It is to be shown from the authorities of the Greek doctors that the Vicar of Christ possesses the fulness of power in the whole Church of Christ. For that the Roman Bishop, the successor of Peter and the Vicar of Christ, is the first and chiefest of all the bishops a canon of a council expressly shows, in these words: "*We venerate according to the Scriptures, and the definition of the canons the most holy Bishop of ancient Rome, as being the first and chiefest of all Bishops.*" Now this agrees with the authority of the sacred Scriptures, which among the Apostles attributed the first place to Peter, both in the Gospels and in the Acts of the Apostles. Whence Chrysostom says, with reference to that of Matthew: "*The disciples drew nigh to Jesus saying: 'Who is greater in the kingdom of heaven?' 'Because they had perceived a certain human scandal, which they could not yet hide in themselves, and they did not restrain the pride of their hearts, when they saw Peter preferred to themselves, and honoured beyond them.'*"

THE VICAR OF CHRIST HAS UNIVERSAL PRELACY

It is also shown that the aforesaid Vicar of Christ, in the whole Church of Christ, holds the universal prelacy. For it is read in the Council of Chalcedon that the whole synod cried to Pope Leo: "*May Leo, the most holy, apostolic, and œcumenical (that is universal) Patriarch, live for many years.*" And Chrysostom says upon Matthew: "*The Son hath given Peter the power of the Father and of the Son, over all the earth, and to a mortal man he hath given authority over all things that are in heaven, by giving him the keys, to this end—that he should extend the Church over all the earth ;*" and upon that of John: "*He circumscribes James locally in a place, but he ordains Peter the master and teacher of the whole world ;*" also upon the Acts of the Apostles: "*Peter received from the Son power over all who are sons, not as Moses in one nation, but in the whole world.*" This also is to be gathered from the authority of holy Scripture, for to Peter, without making any distinction, Christ committed his sheep, saying (John, last chapter, verse 17):¹ "*Feed my sheep,*" and (John x. 16)² "*there shall be one fold and one shepherd.*"

THE VICAR OF CHRIST HAS THE FULNESS OF POWER
IN THE CHURCH

One can gather from the authority of the aforesaid doctors that the Roman Bishop has the fulness of power in the Church. Cyril the Patriarch of Alexandria says: "*As Christ, the leader, received from the Father both the sceptre of the Church of the nations, stretching out from Israel above all sovereignty, and power, over everything that exists, so that to him all should be subject, the fullest power ; so also to Peter and his successors he fully committed it,*" and again: "*To none other than to Peter, what was his, Christ gave to the full.*" And below: "*The feet of Christ are humanity, namely that to which the whole of eternity gave the fullest power ; whom one of the three*

assumed in the unity of personality, and conducted to the Father above all principality, and power, that all the angels of God should adore him ; the whole of which by sacrament and power he left to Peter and his Church." And Chrysostom says to the inquiries of the Bulgarians, speaking in the person of Christ: "*Thrice I ask thee lovest thou, lovest thou, lovest thou, for thrice weak and timid thou didst deny me. But now, led back, lest the brethren should believe that thou hast lost the grace and authority of the keys, because thou lovest me, before them I now confirm to thee all that is mine.*" This also is to be gathered from the authority of Scripture, for the Lord said, universally, to Peter: "*Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be loosed in heaven*" (Matt. xvi. 19).¹

THE POPE INHERITS THE SAME POWER THAT CHRIST
GAVE TO PETER

It is shown also that Peter is the Vicar of Christ and the Roman Bishop successor of Peter in that same power that was conferred upon him by Christ. For a canon of the Council of Chalcedon says: "*If any bishop is defamed let him be free to appeal to the most blessed bishop of ancient Rome since we have Peter as the father of refuge, and his alone is the right, by free power, of judging of the infamy of an accused bishop, in the place of God, by the keys given him by the Lord ;*" and below: "*And all things defined by him are to be held as of the Vicar of the apostolic throne.*" Similarly, Cyril the Patriarch of Jerusalem says, speaking in the person of Christ: "*Thou with an end, and I without end, with all whom I may place in thy place, fully and perfectly, by sacrament and authority, shall be with them as I am with thee.*" And Cyril in the *Book of Treasures* says: "*The Apostles in the gospels and epistles affirmed in all their teaching that Peter was in the place of God, and his Church, giving place to him in every chapter and synagogue, in every election and declaration ;*" and below: "*To whom—namely to Peter—all bow the head by divine ordi-*

nance, and worldly rulers obey him as the Lord Jesus." And Chrysostom says, speaking in the person of the Son: "'Feed my sheep,' that is to say, 'Be thou above thy brethren in my stead.'"

HE IT IS WHO DETERMINES WHAT IS OF FAITH

It is shown also that, to the said bishop, it pertains to determine what is of faith. For Cyril says, in the *Book of Treasures*: "*That we may remain members in our head, the apostolic throne of the Roman Bishops, from whom it is our duty to seek what we ought to believe and to hold.*" Maximus, also, in his letter directed to the Easterns, says: "*All the ends of the earth which have sincerely received the Lord, and all the world confessing the true faith of a Catholic, look to the Church of the Romans as to the Son, and, from that, receive the light of Catholic and apostolic faith; nor unfittingly, for Peter is read first to have confessed the perfect faith by the Lord's revelation, when he said (Matt. xvi.): 'Thou art Christ, the Son of the Living God.'* Whence to him, also, the Lord says: '*I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith may not fail.*'" It is clear also that he is set above the patriarchs from this that Cyril says: "*That it belongs to it,*" namely, "*the apostolic throne of the Roman Bishops, to reprehend, correct, legislate, to loose and depose, and to bind in place of him who raised it.*" And Chrysostom, upon the Acts of the Apostles, says that "*Peter is the most holy vertex of the blessed apostolic throne, the good shepherd.*" Similarly, also, this is clear from the authority of the Lord when he says: "*Thou being converted confirm thy brethren*" (Luke xxii. 32).¹ It is shown, also, that to be subject to the Roman Bishop is necessary for salvation. For Cyril says, in the *Book of Treasures*: "*And so, brethren, let us imitate Christ in such manner, that, as his sheep, we may hear his voice, remaining in the Church of Peter; and let us not be inflated with pride lest perhaps the cunning serpent, because of our contention, cast us forth, as Eve heretofore from Paradise.*" And Maximus, in his letter directed to the

Easterns, says: "*We call that the universal Church, according to the definition of the Saviour, which is made one and founded upon the rock of the confession of Peter, in which it is necessary for the salvation of our souls to remain, and to obey it, keeping its faith and confession.*" (*Against the Errors of the Greeks—the end.*)

PAPAL POWER OF DISPENSATION

The Pope has the fulness of power in the Church in such wise that whatever things have been instituted by the Church or the prelates of the Church can be dispensed by the Pope. For these are what are said to be of human law, or positive law. But with regard to those things which are of divine law or natural law, he cannot dispense, because those have efficacy from the divine institution. Now divine law is that which pertains to the new law or the old. But this difference exists between the two laws, that the old law determined many things, both in the ceremonial precepts pertaining to the worship of God, and also in judicial precepts pertaining to the preservation of justice among men; but the new law, which is the law of liberty, has not such determinations, but it is contained in the moral precepts of the natural law and the articles of faith, and in the sacraments of grace; whence it is also called the law of faith, and the law of grace, by reason of the determination of the articles of faith and the efficacy of the sacraments. But other things, which belong to the determinations of human judgments, or to the determination of the divine worship, Christ who is the promulgator of the new law, freely committed to the prelates of the Church and to the chiefs of the Christian people to be determined; whence decisions of this sort belong to human law, in which the Pope can dispense. But in those things alone which are of the natural law, and in the articles of faith, and in the sacraments of the new law, he cannot dispense; for this would not be to have the power to work for truth but against it. (*Quodlib. 4—13—0.*)

THE VIRGIN MARY

THE SANCTIFICATION OF THE VIRGIN MARY

IN the degree in which a thing approaches the principle in any genus it shares more perfectly the effect of that principle. Whence Denis says that angels, who are nearer to God, share more of the divine gifts than men. But Christ is the principle of grace, by his Divinity as its author, but by his humanity, instrumentally. Whence also it is said: "*Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ*" (John i. 7).¹ Now the Blessed Virgin Mary was most near to Christ as to his humanity, since from her he drew human nature. And, therefore, above all others, it was due to her to obtain from Christ a greater fulness of grace. (3—27—5.0.)

A VIRGIN IN CONCEIVING

It must be confessed, without any qualification, that the mother of Christ conceived as a virgin. For the contrary belongs to the heresy of the Ebionites, and of Cerinth, who believed Christ to be pure man, and his birth to have been of both sexes. For that he should be conceived of a virgin is fitting for four reasons: firstly, to preserve the dignity of the Father that sent him. For since Christ is the true and natural Son of God, it was not fitting that he should have any other father besides God, lest the dignity of God the Father should be transferred to another. Secondly, this was fitting to the estate of the Son who is sent, who is indeed the Word of God. But the Word without any corruption of the heart is conceived: moreover the corruption of the heart does not allow the conception of the perfect Word. Since

therefore the flesh was so assumed by the Word that it might be the flesh of the Word of God, it was fitting also that it should be conceived without the corruption of his mother. Thirdly, it was fitting to the dignity of the humanity of Christ, in which it was necessary that sin should have no place, since by it the world's sin was taken away, according to that: "*Behold the lamb of God*" (John i. 29),¹ that is one who is innocent, "*that taketh away the sin of the world.*" But it was not possible that in a nature already corrupted by sexual intercourse flesh should be born without the infection of original sin. Whence Augustine says: "*But married sexual intercourse was not there, namely in the marriage of Mary and Joseph, because in the flesh of sin it could not happen without that shameful lust of the flesh, which comes from sin, without which, he who was to be in the future without sin, willed to be conceived.*" Fourthly, on account of the very end of the Incarnation, which was that men should be reborn as the sons of God, "*not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God,*" that is, of the very power of God, an exemplar of which thing it behoved to appear in the conception of Christ. Whence Augustine says: "*It was requisite that our head should be born according to the flesh, by an eminent miracle, of a virgin, by which it should typify the future birth of his members, according to the spirit of the virgin Church.*" (3—28—I.O.)

VIRGIN IN GIVING BIRTH

Without any doubt it must be held that the mother of Christ was a virgin in giving birth, for the prophet not only says: "*Lo, a virgin shall conceive,*" but he also adds: "*and bring forth a son*" (Isa. vii. 14).² And this was fitting for three reasons. Firstly, for this belonged to the estate of him who was born, who is the Word of God. For the Word is not only conceived in the heart without corruption, but, also, without corruption it goes forth from the heart. Whence in

order that it might be shown that that was the body of the very Word of God, it was fitting that from the incorrupt womb of a virgin it should be born. Whence in a certain sermon of the Council of Ephesus one reads: "*She who bears simple flesh, ceases from her virginity. But because the Word of God was born in flesh, he preserves virginity, showing himself by this to be the Word. For neither does our word when it is brought forth corrupt the mind: nor did God, the Word substantial, choosing to be born, destroy virginity.*" Secondly, this is fitting as to the effect of the incarnation of Christ. For to this end he came that he might take away our corruption. Whence Augustine (or some other author) says in a certain sermon on the Nativity of our Lord: "*It was not fitting that integrity should be violated by his coming, who had come to heal the corrupt.*" Thirdly, it was fitting lest he should dim the honour of his mother, who had commanded that parents are to be honoured. (3—28—20.)

A VIRGIN AFTER GIVING BIRTH

Without any doubt the error of Helvidius must be abhorred who dared to say that the mother of Christ, after giving birth, had sexual intercourse with Joseph and bore him other sons. For this, firstly, takes away from the perfection of Christ, who, as according to his divine nature, is the only begotten of the Father, as the perfect son of him through all things; so it was seemly that he should be the only begotten of his mother as her most perfect seed. Secondly, this error does injury to the Holy Spirit, whose shrine was the virgin womb, in which he formed the flesh of Christ. Whence it was not seemly that afterwards it should be violated by sexual intercourse. Thirdly, it takes from the dignity and holiness of the mother of God, who would seem most ungrateful if she had not been content with so great a Son, and if the virginity which in her had been miraculously preserved she freely willed to lose by fleshly intercourse. Fourthly,

also to Joseph himself this would be an imputation of the highest presumption, if he attempted to defile her whom, by the revelation of an angel, he knew to have conceived God of the Holy Spirit. And hence, without any qualification, it must be laid down that the mother of God, just as she conceived a virgin, and a virgin gave birth, so also after giving birth a virgin she remained for ever. (3—28—3.0.)

THE ADORATION OF THE MOTHER OF CHRIST

As the worship of latria is due to God alone (p. 166), to no creature can it be due, as far as we venerate the creature in itself. But although insensible creatures are not capable of veneration in themselves, yet the rational creature is capable of veneration in itself. And hence to no purely rational creature is owing the worship of latria. Since, then, the blessed Virgin is purely a rational creature, the adoration of latria is not due to her, but only the veneration of dulia, yet more eminently than to all other creatures, for as much as she is the mother of God; and therefore it is said that there is due to her not simply dulia but hyperdulia. (3—25—5.0.)

THE RELATIONS OF MATTER AND FORM

SOME things may be that are not, and some already are; that which can be and is not is said to be in potentiality; but that which already is, is said to be, actually. Now there are two kinds of being, namely, the essential or substantial being of a thing, as to be man; and this is simple being. But other than this there is accidental being, as for man to be white; and this is being, with a qualification. Yet to both kinds of being something is potential: for there is that which is potential to becoming man, as human seed; and that which is potentially white, as man. Moreover, that which is potential to accidental being can be called matter, as the seed is of man and man of whiteness. But in this they differ, because that which is potentially substantial being is called the matter *from which*; but what is potentially accidental being is called matter *in which*. Moreover, strictly speaking, that which is potentially substantial being is called primary matter, but what is potentially accidental being is called the subject; for the subject gives being to the accident, that is the power to exist, since an accident has not any being except through its subject: whence it is said accidents exist in the subject, but it is not said that the substantial form is in the subject. And in this way matter differs from subject, because the subject is that which does not receive its being from the addition of something to it, but that which has being of its nature, and has complete being, as man has not his being through whiteness.

But that is called matter which has its being from something that comes to it, for, of itself, it is incomplete; moreover it has no being, as says the commentator in the second

book *On the Soul*. Whence, speaking without qualification, the form gives being to matter; accident, however, does not give being to the subject, but the subject to the accident; although at times matter is used for subject, and conversely. But just as everything which has potentiality towards something can be called matter, so everything from which a thing has being, of whatever kind, substantial or accidental, may be called form; as man from being potentially white becomes through whiteness actually white; and seed which is man potentially becomes man actually through the soul. And because form gives actual being, hence it is said that form is act; but what makes actual substantial being is called the substantial form, and what makes actual accidental being is called accidental form. And for as much as generation is the motion towards form, to the twofold kind of form corresponds a twofold generation: to substantial form corresponds absolute generation; to accidental form relative generation. For when a substantial form is introduced a thing is said to become, simply, as we say man becomes, or man is generated; but when the accidental form is added, a thing is not simply said to become, but to become this; as when a man becomes white it is not said that man simply becomes or is generated, but that he becomes or is made white. (*On the Principles of Nature—beginning.*)

PRIMARY MATTER

PRIMARY matter cannot be known through itself, since everything which is known is known through its form; but primary matter is considered as subject to every form. But it is known *by analogy*, that is to say, relatively. For we know that wood is something beyond the form of a bench and a bed, because, at times, it has the one form and at times the other. Since, therefore, we may see that which we call air at some time becoming water, it is necessary to say that something existing under the form of air is at times under the form of water; and hence this is something beyond the forms of air and water as wood is beyond the forms of a bench and a bed. That which, therefore, bears a similar relation to natural substances themselves, to that of bronze to a statue, and wood to a bed, and every material and formless thing to a form, that we call primary matter. This then is called one principle of nature; but it is not one in the same sense as *this given thing*, that is to say, as this is demonstrated to be individual, so that it has form and oneness actually; but it is called entity and one inasmuch as it has the power of receiving a form. (*Com. Phys.* 1, lect. 13, § 9.)

Although matter loses likeness to God by its potentiality, yet inasmuch as it has being it retains a certain likeness to the divine being. (1-14-11-3m.)

FORM AND NATURE

JUST as that may be called art which belongs to a thing in as far as it is according to art and ingenious, so that is nature which belongs to a thing in as far as it is according to nature and natural. But we do not say that which is only in potentiality to becoming artificial has any art, because it has not yet the species of the selected. Hence in natural things that which is in potentiality flesh and bone has not the nature of flesh and bone before it has received its form, from which the definitive status of the thing is taken (through which, that is to say, we know what is flesh or bone); nor, moreover, is nature in it before it has a form. And so the nature of natural things which have in themselves the principle of motion in another manner is form; which although it is not separated from matter as to the thing, yet differs from it by reason. For just as bronze and moulded things, although one in subject, still differ by reason, so also matter and form. And Aristotle says this, for this reason, because unless form were something else than matter according to reason, there would not be any difference between the manner in which matter is called nature and that in which form is called nature. (*Com. Phys.* 2, lect. 2, § 3.)

§ 5. But, further, from the reason given, he proceeds to show that form is more nature than matter; since everything is named rather according to what it actually is than according to what it has the power to become. Whence form, according to which a thing is actually natural, is rather nature than matter, according to which a thing is potentially natural. (*Ibid.*)

The name nature was first given to signify the generation

of living things, which is called nativity. And for as much as this generation is from an intrinsic principle, the name is extended to embrace the intrinsic principle of any motion, and so nature is defined in the second book of "Physics." And since this principle is formal and material, both matter and form are commonly called nature. And, because, by the form, the essence of a thing is completed, it is usual to call the essence of anything, which its definition signifies, nature. And so nature is taken here. Whence Boethius says that nature is everything that adds a specific difference. For a specific difference is that which completes the definition, and is taken from the thing's own form. (1—29—1—4m.)

ON UNITY OF FORM

THE forms of things are like numbers and figures as to this, that one form adds a perfection above another, in the same way that one number and one figure adds a new perfection and virtually contains the first. A form that is more perfect virtually contains the less perfect form. Given, then, a more perfect form, it is superfluous to assume the less perfect. Since, therefore, in nature nothing is superfluous, nature does not permit that in the same composite thing there should be two forms, of which one is more perfect than the other. To make this quite clear, it must be remembered that substantial forms are not distinguished between themselves, as heat and taste are distinguished, which physically speaking are of diverse genera; but all material forms are distinguished like figures which belong to the same physical genus. The principal reason, therefore, may be put in this way. It is impossible that two forms of the same physical genus should, at the same time, perfect the same subject. But all substantial forms are of the same physical genus. Therefore, it is impossible that two substantial forms should at the same time perfect the same matter.

The second proposition of this proof must be declared firstly, as the declaring of it is useful to show the first. It is proved in three ways. Firstly, by the changing of forms between themselves. . . . For those forms are of the same physical genus, between which there is an essential transmutation; in such wise, namely, that one is the original state (*terminus a quo*) essentially, but not accidentally, that is to say, by a joining of itself to the original state; and the

other is the final state (*terminus ad quem*) essentially, not accidentally—from being joined to something else. For example, when white is changed into black, if this is also changed into sweet, it is the transmutation of white into sweet accidentally, but of white into black essentially: and this because white and black are in the same genus. Whence the philosopher says that those things that are of diverse genera have no way, that is to say, transmutation from one to another. Now between substantial forms there is essential transmutation. And this is manifest of forms that all grant to be specific. For, in such, it is clear, that one is cast aside when another comes; and this is not accidental to the production and loss of the others which are the termini of essential transmutation: as from water comes fire essentially, or the contrary; or rain from vapour. For the generation which is in substance is not essentially from an accident, as from whiteness; nor is what is essential terminated at an accident, say at blackness. It remains, therefore, that it is essential transmutation between two substantial forms, of which one is cast aside and the other is induced. . . . All substantial forms, therefore, are of the same genus.

But if forms are assumed that are not specific, as some said there is in man a form of the body other than the soul, still, it will be necessary, by that reason, to hold it to be of the same genus with the others that are specific, because between those forms and specific forms there is essential transmutation: for the body of man which after death putrifies is resolved into the elements, for it comes to be such a body from the seed, and the seed from the food, and food from the elements, for from the same we are nourished and are. Hence the form of the body is of the same genus as the forms of the elements. But the forms of the elements are of the same genus as other specific forms. And therefore the form of the body in an animal is of the same genus, universally, as other specific forms. Besides, that there is not any constancy in a material form, as to this, is shown by this,

that in substances the generation of one is the corruption of another, and conversely, as the philosopher says where he treats of generation and corruption in universal. Universally, therefore, between substantial forms there is transmutation, such that in inducing one the other is set aside, and conversely. But such inducing and casting aside cannot be accidental to the inducing and casting aside of the others which are essentially the termini of generation and corruption; since in the generation or corruption of substance nothing can be an essential terminus except the substantial form. There is, therefore, universally transmutation between these forms. Hence it is necessary to say, universally, that all are of the same genus: and this is the first proof of the proposition.

The second proof is founded upon the definition. For the philosopher says that those things are diverse, generically, which do not appeal to the same receptivity. Hence all acts which are received by the same power are of the same genus. This is manifest both as to accidents that pass, which are operations, and as to forms that remain, for the vision of white and the vision of red are acts of the same genus, since they appeal to the same proximate receptivity, namely, the faculty of sight; similarly, whiteness and redness are forms of the same genus, since they are in the same receptive, namely, in the superficies of a determinate body. And the reason of this is, that potentialities are distinguished by their acts, so that acts which belong to different genera have different potentialities. But the proximate receptivity of every act is the potentiality that is destined by nature to be perfected by that act. Whence it is necessary that all acts which appeal to the same proximate receptivity should be of the same genus. Now all substantial forms appeal to the same receptivity, since they are the perfections of the same potentiality. For matter is that which is a potentiality, related to all material forms as to its acts or perfections; and it is receptive of all material forms, just as

wood is receptive of all artificial forms, as is said in the first book of "Physics." Hence all material forms are of the same genus.

But to this proof may be opposed the case of the soul, which is the act of the physical organic body. For it does not seem to be the act of primary matter, as of a potentiality immediately or proximately, but only remotely. It seems, however, to be the act of the body in an immediate sense; whence the philosopher says that from the body and soul are made one, as from potentiality and act. And so it seems that its immediate receptive is other than the receptivity of other forms although they have the same remote receptivity. And from this seems to follow what has been said before—that the soul is not of the same genus as material forms, since those things are different generically which have not the same proximate receptive. For it is not necessary that those things which appeal to the same remote receptivity should be of the same genus, for so colour and taste would be of the same genus since they dwell in the same substance. But not every principle of an act is called a potentiality, but its immediate principle. Matter, therefore, although it be the potentiality or receptive of other forms, it does not follow that it is of the soul. It seems, therefore, to follow that the soul is of another genus than other forms.

To this it must be replied that it is necessary that the receptivity to which the soul and other forms appeal should be the same. For if we consider the body to be actuated by a form other than the soul, which body, according to some, remains after death, such a body is not able to be potential with respect to the soul: because, if this were so, it would be able to receive the soul after death; because as long as the potentiality remains, for so long can it naturally be led to its act, just as while in the eye the faculty of seeing remains it can be led to the act of seeing. Now a dead body by means of no natural agent can receive a soul, but only by a

supernatural agent, which is God, for that, being dead, life is not made from it naturally, except by its being resolved into primary matter. A dead body was never the same numerical potentiality with respect to the soul.

In the same way we may argue of whatever is received in a dead body, that it is composite: for nothing of this kind can be received that is able to be made alive without corruption, for the dead body is resolved into primary matter before a living thing is generated from it; and hence it remains that primary matter is the immediate potentiality with respect to the soul, if we take the soul according to its own proper notion, as it is the immediate potentiality with respect to other forms. (First part of the *Plurality of Forms*.)

It must be laid down that what I call *simply* may be taken in two ways. Firstly, taking *simply* to be identical with *absolutely*, as that is called simply which is spoken of *without anything added to it*. . . . And in this way the body of Christ dead and alive was the same in number simply, for a thing is said to be identical numerically because it is the same as to suppositum. But the body of Christ living and dead was the same as to its suppositum, because it had no other hypostasis, living and dead, besides the hypostasis of the Word of God. . . . In another way *simply* is the same as altogether or totally, and so the body of Christ dead and alive was not simply identical in number since it was not totally the same, because life is an essential of the living body. . . . (3—50—5—0.)

THE SOUL

OF all things there is nothing that more intimately and immediately belongs to things than being, as is said in the book *On Causes*, whence it is necessary, since matter actually has being through its form, that form giving being to matter be understood to come to matter before all things, and to inhere in it more immediately than the rest. . . . So, therefore, the soul, according as it is the form giving being, has nothing else as a medium between itself and primary matter. (*On the Soul*, art. 9.)

Above the lower forms, however, finally there are human souls, which bear a likeness to higher substances even in the sphere of knowledge, because by the understanding the soul can have knowledge of immaterial things. But in this it differs from them, that the understanding of the human soul by its nature acquires immaterial knowledge from the knowledge of material things, which is through the senses. And, hence, from the operation of the human soul the grade of its being may be known. Since, inasmuch as it has an operation that transcends material things, its being is elevated above the corporeal, not depending upon it; but, for as much as its nature is to acquire immaterial knowledge from the material, it is manifest that the complement of its species cannot be without the union of the body. For a thing is not specifically complete unless it has those things which are requisite to the special operation of that species. And hence if the human soul, in so far as it is united to the body as form, has a being elevated above the body, and independent of it, it is manifest that it is constituted on the confines of the corporeal and separated substances. (*On the Soul*, art. 1—end.)

ON GOD

THE SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE

GOD is altogether simple, and this is made clear by many reasons. Firstly, indeed, by what has already been said. For since in God there is composition neither of quantitative parts, because he is not a body; nor of form and matter; nor of nature and suppositum; nor of essence and existence; nor of genus and difference; nor of subject and accident; it is manifest that in him is not composition, but that he is altogether simple.

Secondly, because every composite is subsequent to its components and dependent on them, but God is the first entity.

Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things which are in themselves diverse do not come together to form a unity unless by means of some cause uniting them: but God has no cause.

Fourthly, since in every composite it is necessary there should be potentiality and act, which in God does not exist, since either one of the parts is act with respect to another, or at least all of the parts are in potentiality with respect to the whole.

Fifthly, since every composite is something which differs from its component parts. And in wholes made up of dissimilar parts this is clear, for no part of man is man, nor is any part of the foot the foot. In wholes, however, made up of similar parts, although something which is said of the whole may be said of a part, as a part of air is air and of water is water, yet something else is said of the whole which is not

applicable to a part; for if the whole of the water is two cubic feet, this cannot be said of any of its parts. So therefore in every composite there is something which is not itself. But although this may be said of whatever has form that, namely, it has something which is not itself, as in a white thing there is something which does not belong to the essence of whiteness, yet, in the form itself, there is nothing foreign. Whence, since God is form itself, or rather being itself, in no way can he be composite. And this reason Hilary approaches when he says: "*God, who is power, is not made up of weak things; nor is he who is light drawn from the obscure.*" (1—3—7—0.)

IN GOD ARE THE PERFECTIONS OF ALL THINGS

In God are the perfections of all things, whence he is called wholly perfect, since there is lacking to him no nobility that is to be found in any class of things, as the commentator says on the fifth book of "*Metaphysics.*" And this may be seen from two considerations.

Firstly, from this, that whatever perfection there is in an effect it is necessary should exist in the effective cause either in the same way, if it be an agent of the same nature, as man generates man; or in a higher manner if the agent be of a different nature, as in the sun is the likeness of those things that are generated by the power of the sun. For it is manifest that the effect pre-exists virtually in the active cause: but to pre-exist in the power of the active cause is not to pre-exist in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way; although to pre-exist in the power of a material cause is to pre-exist in a less perfect way, because matter, in this sense, is imperfect; but the agent, in the same sense, is perfect. Since, therefore, God is the first effective cause of things, it follows that the perfections of all things pre-exist in God in a more excellent way. And Denis approaches this position

when he says of God: "*He is not this or that, but he is all things, for he is the cause of all.*"

Secondly, however, from what has been shown above that God is being itself, of himself existing, from which it follows that he contains all perfection of being in himself. For it is clear that if anything warm has not the full perfection of warmth, this is because heat is not possessed according to the full measure; but if heat were an existent of itself there could not be lacking to it anything of the power of heat. Whence since God is being existing of itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to him. But the perfections of all things belong to the perfection of being, for by this are things perfect that they have being to some extent, whence it follows that the perfection of nothing is wanting to God. And this argument likewise Denis touches upon when he says: "*God does not exist in any restricted sense, but simply, and in an unlimited way he possesses beforehand all being in himself;*" and afterwards he adds that "*he is the being of things that subsist.*" (I—4—2—0.)

GOD IS HIGHEST GOOD

God is absolutely the highest good, and not only in a certain class or order of things. For goodness is attributed to God in so far as every desirable perfection flows from him as first cause; but it does not flow from him as from an agent of the same nature as the things he produces . . . but as from an agent which agrees with its effects neither specifically nor generically. Now the likeness of the effect exists in a cause of the same nature, after the same manner; but in a cause that is not of the same nature it is found in a higher way, as heat is in the sun in a more excellent way than in fire. And hence it is necessary that since good is in God as in the first cause of all, but not of the same nature, it should be in him in the most excellent way; and for this reason he is called the highest good. (I—6—2—0.)

GOD IS INFINITE

All ancient philosophers attribute infinity to the first principle, as is said in the third book of "Physics," and this with reason, considering that things flow from the first principle to infinity. But since many have erred as to the nature of the first principle, it followed that they erred as to its infinity; for since they held the first principle to be matter, consequently they attributed a material infinity to it, saying that a certain infinite body was the first principle of things.

It must be considered, therefore, that a thing is called infinite from not being finite: now matter, in a sense, is limited by its form, and form by matter. Matter, indeed, by its form, in so far as matter, before it receives a form, is in potentiality to many forms, but when it receives one it is terminated by it. But the form is limited by matter, in so far as form, taken in itself, is common to many, but by being received in matter it becomes determinately the form of this thing. Now matter is perfected by the form which limits it, and hence infinity, as attributed to matter, has the notion of **imperfection** attached to it, for it is like matter without form. But a form is not made perfect by matter, but rather, through it, it contracts its extent: whence infinity, according as it refers to form not determined by matter, has the notion of perfection.

But that which is most formal of all things is being itself. . . . Since, then, the divine being is not received in anything, but is its own independent existence . . . it is clear that God himself is infinite, and perfect. (1—7—1—0.)

GOD IS EVERYWHERE

God is said to be in anything in two ways: firstly, after the manner of an active cause, and in this sense he is in all things created by him; and, secondly, as the object of the work is in the worker, which is peculiar to operations of the

soul, according to which the known thing is in the knower, and the desired thing in him who desires. In this second way, therefore, God is especially in the rational creature, which knows and loves him in act or habit. And since the rational creature has this through grace . . . he is said to be, in this way, in the holy by grace.

In other things created by him, however, in whatever manner, analogy must be taken from what happens in human affairs. For a king is said to be in his whole kingdom, namely, by his power, although he is not everywhere present. But by its presence a thing is said to be in all which are in its sight; as all things which are in a given house are said to be present to any one, who is, however, not, as to his substance, in every part of the house. But as to its substance or essence, a thing is said to be in a place in which its substance rests.

There were, then, some, the Manichæans, who said all spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but visible and corporeal things, they said, were subject to a contrary principle. Against these, therefore, it is necessary to say that God is in all things by his power.

Others there were, again, who, although they believed all things subject to the divine power, yet thought the divine providence did not extend to these lower bodies, in the person of which Job speaks: "*He walketh about the poles of heaven, and he doth not consider our things*" (xxii. 14).¹ And against these it must be said that God is in everything by his presence.

There were still others who, although they said all things belonged to God's providence, yet held that all things were not immediately created by God, but that he immediately created the first creatures, and these created others.¹ And against these it must be held that God is in all things by his essence.

And hence he is in all things by his power, in so far as all things are subject to his power: by his presence, in as much

as all things are naked, and open to his eyes; and by his essence, in so far as he is present to all things as the cause of being. (1—8—3—0.)

GOD IS CHANGELESS

It is clear from what has been said that God is altogether changeless. Firstly, because, as was shown, there is a first entity, which we call God, and that it is necessary that this first entity should be pure actuality with no admixture of potentiality, since potentiality, absolutely, is posterior to actuality. But whatever is changed in any way is in some sense potential. And from this it is clearly impossible that God should be changed in any way.

Secondly, since everything that is moved as to something remains, and as to something else passes, as that which moves from whiteness to blackness remains as to its substance; and so in everything that is moved there is some sort of composition. Now as was shown above (p. 193), there is no composition in God, for he is absolutely simple. Whence it is clear that God cannot be moved.

Thirdly, everything which is moved by its moving acquires something, and arrives at that which before it had not attained. Now God, since he is infinite, comprehending in himself every fulness of the perfection of all being, cannot acquire anything, or extend himself to anything to which he had not attained before. Whence in no sense is motion compatible with his nature. And hence certain ancients, as though constrained by the very truth, held that the first principle is changeless. (1—9—1—0.)

GOD IS ETERNAL

The nature of eternity follows that of changelessness, as the essence of time follows motion. . . . Whence since God is especially changeless, it is especially congruous to his

nature to be eternal. Nor is he only eternal, but he is his eternity: yet no other thing is its duration, since it is not its being. But God is his being in every sense, whence, as he is his essence, so also is he his eternity. (1—10—2—0.)

Eternity is nothing else than God himself. Whence God is not said to be eternal, as though he were measured in some way; but the suggestion of measure arises only according to our apprehension. (3m.)

Words relating to different times are attributed to God, in as much as his eternity includes all times; not that he is changed by present, past, and future. (4m.)

§ GOD'S UNDERSTANDING AND SUBSTANCE

It is necessary to say that God's understanding is his substance. For if it were other than his substance it would follow necessarily, as the philosopher says, that act and perfection of the divine substance would be something else, to which the divine substance would be related as potentiality to act; which is wholly impossible. For to understand is the perfection and act of an intelligent being. But it must be considered how this is. For, as has been said, understanding is not an act passing to something extrinsic, but it remains in the agent as its act and perfection, just as being is the perfection of the thing that exists. For as being is attached to form, so to understand goes with intelligible species. But in God there is no form, that is other than his being, as has been shown (p. 194). Whence since his essence is also the species of understanding, as was said (pp. 193-4), it follows of necessity that his very understanding is his essence and his being.

And in this way it is clear from all premises that in God the intellect when understanding, and that which is understood, and the species of understanding, and the act of understanding itself are in every sense one and the same. Whence it is clear that when it is said that God understands no multiplicity is suggested in his substance. (1—14—4—0.)

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONTINGENCIES

Since God knows all things, not only which actually exist, but also those things which are in his power, or that of a creature, and of these certain are future contingencies to us, it follows that God knows future contingencies.

And to make this evident it must be remembered that a contingency may be taken in two ways. Firstly, in itself, according as it already actually exists; and in this sense it is not considered as future but as present, nor as contingent to one of two, but as determined to one; and for this reason it is able to be as infallibly subject to certain knowledge as a sight to sense, as when I see Socrates sitting. In a second way the contingent may be considered as it is in its cause; and in this sense it is taken as future, and as a contingency not yet determined to one thing, since a contingent cause is related to opposites, and in this way the contingent is not subject by certitude to any knowledge. Whence whosoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has only a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingencies, not only as they are in their causes, but also as each of them is actually in itself. And, although contingencies come about actually in succession, yet God does not successively know them, as they are in their being, as we do, but simultaneously, since his knowledge is measured by eternity, but eternity circumscribes the whole of time existing, wholly simultaneously, as has been said (p. 199). Whence all things that are in time are to God present from eternity, not only for that reason in virtue of which the essences of things are present to themselves, as some say, but because his eye is over all from eternity, as they are in his presence. Whence it is manifest that contingencies are infallibly known by God, in so far as they are under the divine regard according to his presence, and yet they are future contingencies, relatively to their causes. (1-14-13-0.)

GOD'S WILL IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS

It is necessary to say that the will of God is the cause of things, and that God acts through the will and not by necessity of nature, as some thought. And this is made clear by three reasons.

Firstly, indeed, from the very order of agents. For since intellect and nature act for some end, as is proved in the second book of "Physics," it is necessary that the end for the cause that acts through nature, and the means to the end, should be predetermined by some higher intellect; just as, for the arrow, the end and a definite motion are predetermined by the archer. Whence it is necessary that he who acts through intellect and will should be prior to the cause acting through nature. Whence since the first in the order of agents is God, it is necessary that he should act by intellect and will.

Secondly, from the meaning of a natural agent to which it belongs to produce one effect, since nature acts in one and the same manner, unless it is impeded; and the reason of this is, that according as it is such a thing, it acts: whence as long as it remains in this state it acts in the same way, for everything acting through nature has a determinate being. Since, therefore, the divine being is not determined, but comprises in itself the whole perfection of being, it is impossible that he should act through necessity of nature, unless perchance to cause something indeterminate and infinite in being, which is impossible. He does not then act by necessity of nature, but determined effects proceed from his infinite perfection according to the determination of his will and intellect.

Thirdly, from the relation of effect to cause. For by this effects proceed from the active cause, according as they pre-exist in it, since every agent works what is like to itself. Now the effects pre-exist in the cause according to the manner of the cause. Whence since the divine being is his

very understanding, effects pre-exist in it in an intelligible manner, and by an intelligible way proceed from it, and consequently they proceed by a voluntary manner. For the inclination to act which is conceived by the intellect belongs to the will. Hence God's will is the cause of things. (1—19—4—0.)

GOD LOVES THE BETTER BEST

It is necessary to maintain, according to what has been said, that God loves the better best. For it was said that for God to love anything more is nothing else than for him to will a greater good to it, for the will of God is the cause of goodness in things; and hence from this are some things better, that God wills them a greater good. Whence it follows he loves the better more. (1—20—4—0.)

GOD IS OMNIPOTENT

By common confession of all men God is said to be omnipotent. But it seems difficult to determine the measure of his omnipotence. For the doubt can arise as to what is comprehended under the scope when it is said God can do all things.

But if any one rightly considers (since potentiality is named with reference to the possible), when God is said to be capable of all things, nothing more is, correctly, understood than that he is capable of all possible things, and on this account is called omnipotent. Now the possible is twofold, according to the philosopher. Firstly, with respect to some potentiality; as what is subject to human potentiality is said to be possible to man. But it cannot be said that God is called omnipotent because he is capable of all that is possible to created nature, since the divine power extends over many things. But if it should be said that God is omnipotent because he is capable of all that are possible to his poten-

tiality, there will be a circle in the showing of his almightiness, for this is but to say that God is omnipotent because he can do all that he can do.

It remains, then, that God is called almighty because he can do all things that are absolutely possible, which is another manner of using possibility. Now a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely from the relation of the terms. The possible exists when there is no repugnance between predicate and subject, as for Socrates to sit; but the absolutely impossible, when the predicate is repugnant to the subject, as for man to be a donkey.

But it must be taken into account that, since every agent produces its like, to every active power there corresponds a possible as the peculiar object according to the nature of that act in which the active power has its foundation; as the warming power is referred, as to its own peculiar object, to warmable being. Now the divine being, on which the existence of the divine power has its foundation, is infinite being, not limited to any genus of entity, but possessing in itself the perfection of all being. Whence whatever can have the ratio of entity belongs to the absolutely possible, with respect to which God is called omnipotent.

Now nothing is opposed to the notion of entity except nonentity. This, then, is repugnant to the idea of the absolutely possible which is within the divine power, that which implies in itself being and non-being at the same time: for this is not subject to omnipotence, not because of the defect of the divine power, but because it cannot have the notion of what is workable or possible. Whatever, therefore, has not the implication of contradiction is ranked among those possible things with regard to which God is called almighty. But those things which imply a contradiction are not within the divine omnipotence since they cannot have the idea of the possible. Whence it is more fittingly said that those things cannot come to pass, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the words of the angel: "*No word*

shall be impossible with God ;” for that which implies a contradiction cannot be true, since no intellect can conceive it. (1—25—3—0.)

IN GOD IS ALL HAPPINESS

Whatever is desirable in any bliss either true or false exists in a higher fashion in the divine bliss. For as to contemplative happiness he has the continuous and most certain contemplation of himself, and of all other things; and as to the active he governs the whole universe. But as to earthly happiness, which consists in voluptuousness, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius, he has the joy in himself and all other things for his delight; for riches he has that complete sufficiency which riches promise; for power omnipotence; for dignity the ruling of all; and for fame the admiration of every creature. (1—26—4—0.)

CONTEMPLATION

BLISS consists rather in the operation of the speculative intellect than in that of the practical, which is evident from three reasons.

Firstly, if man's bliss is an operation, it is necessary that it should be man's highest operation. Now the highest operation of man is that which is of the highest faculty with regard to the highest object. Now his highest power is the intellect and its highest object is the divine good, and this is not an object of the practical but of the speculative intellect. Whence in such an operation, namely, in the contemplation of divine things, bliss chiefly consists. And since *every one seems to be that which is best* in him, as is said in the "Ethics," therefore this operation is in a special way proper to man, and delightful above all things.

Secondly, the same conclusion appears from this, that contemplation is especially sought for its own sake. Now the act of the practical intellect is not sought for itself, but for the sake of action, but these actions are directed to some end. Whence it is clear that the final end cannot be thought to be in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.

Thirdly, because in the contemplative life man holds communication with powers higher than himself, namely, with God and the angels, to whom, through bliss, he is assimilated; but those things that belong to the active life, other animals, also, in some sort share with man, although imperfectly.

And hence the final and perfect bliss, which is looked for in the future life, wholly and principally consists in contemplation. But imperfect bliss, such as we can possess in this

life, firstly indeed and principally consists in contemplation; but in a secondary sense, in the operation of the practical intellect setting in order human actions and passions, as is said in the "Ethics." (1-2-3-5-0.)

The practical intellect has its end outside itself, but the speculative intellect has its end in itself, namely, the contemplation of truth; and if that end is perfect, from this the whole man is made perfect and good; and this, indeed, the practical intellect has not, but it is directed to it. (1-2-3-5-2m.)

The enduring character of the active life, in man's present state, excelling that of the contemplative, does not arise from the nature of the lives considered in themselves, but from our weakness, who, from the weighing down of the body, are drawn back from the height of contemplation. Whence Gregory says that the soul by its own very infirmity, repelled from the immensity of so great an eminence, sinks back into itself. (2-2-181-4-3m.)

The moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life as preparing the way, by giving the disposition for it. For the act of contemplation, in which the contemplative life consists essentially, is hindered both by the vehemence of the passions, by which the soul's intent is withdrawn from things of the intellect to those of sense, and by exterior tumults. But the moral virtues hinder the vehemence of the passions, and still the tumults of exterior occupations. And hence the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life as preparing the disposition. (2-2-180-2-0.)

When the intellectual powers are occupied in intense contemplation, even the natural powers are impeded in their acts. (3 *Dist.* 16-1-3-6.)

THOUGHT, MEDITATION, AND CONTEMPLATION

THOUGHT strictly consists in the search after truth, which in God has no place. But when the understanding has arrived at truth, it does not think but perfectly contemplates the Truth. (1—34—1—2m.)

Thought, according to Richard of Saint Victor, seems to belong to the examination of many things from which one intends to gather one simple truth. Whence under the term thought may be comprehended both the sense perceptions directed to the knowledge of certain effects and imaginations and processes of the reason about diverse signs, or whatever lead to the knowledge of the truth on which the mind is bent; although, according to Augustine, every actual operation of the understanding may be called thought. But meditation seems to belong to the process of reason on certain principles touching upon the contemplation of a given truth; and to the same belongs consideration, according to Bernard, although the philosopher holds that every operation of the understanding may be called consideration. But contemplation belongs to the simple gazing on the truth, whence the same Richard says that "*contemplation is the penetrating and free gaze of the soul on things to be explored,*" but meditation is "*the gaze of the soul occupied in the search after truth: and thought is the disposition of the soul prone to wandering.*" (2-2—180—3—1m.)

According to Augustine, to think, to discern, and to understand are not the same things. To discern is to know a thing through its differences from others. But to think is to consider a thing as to its parts and properties: whence to

think (*cogitare*) is called, so to say, to urge together (*coagitare*). But to understand is nothing other than the simple gaze of the intellect upon that intelligible thing that is present to it. I say, therefore, that the soul does not always think about and discern God, nor itself; for if this were so every one would know naturally the whole nature of his soul, at which one may hardly arrive by great study; for such knowledge it is not sufficient that the thing should be present in any way, but it is necessary that it should be there in the way of an object of knowledge, and the intent of him knowing is requisite. But in so far as to understand is nothing other than a gazing upon, which itself is only the presence of the intelligible thing to the understanding in any way: in this manner the soul ever understands itself, and God indeterminate, and there follows a certain undefined love. Yet in another fashion, according to the philosopher, it is held that the soul ever understands itself, since everything which is understood is not understood except it be illuminated by the light of the active intellect, and received in the possible intellect. Whence just as in all colour corporeal light is seen, so in everything intelligible is seen the light of the active intellect, not, however, in the nature of an object, but in the nature of the medium of knowing. (1 *Dist.* 3—4—5—o.)

THE MODE OF CREATION

WITH regard to the production of plants Augustine differed from others. Some expounders say that plants were produced actually in their species on the third day, according to the literal meaning of the words. But Augustine says that then it is said that the earth produced herbs and trees causally, that is to say, it received the power to produce them. And this indeed he confirms from the authority of sacred Scripture. For it is said: "*These are the generations of the heavens and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made heaven and earth; and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew*" (Gen. ii. 4).¹ Before therefore they sprang up on the earth, they were made causally in the earth. But this is also confirmed by reason, for in those first days God made the creature as to its beginning, or causally, from which work he afterwards rested; and yet, with regard to the administration of the things he wrought, through the operation of extending, he works even until now. But to bring forth plants from the earth belongs to the operation of extending. And hence, on the third day plants were not produced actually, but only causally.

Although according to others it can be said that the first founding of species belongs to the works of the six days, but that the generation of things similar in species, from the species first founded, belongs to the administration of things. And this is what the Scripture says: "*Before they sprang up in the earth*" or "*Before it grew*"; that is to say, before like had produced like; as we see now falling out naturally by means of the seed. Whence the Scripture says in witness: "*Let the earth bring forth the green herb and such as yieldeth*"

seed ;” since, namely, the perfect species of plants were produced, from which the seed of others should spring forth. Nor does it affect the question in what part the seed is found, whether in the root, stem, or the fruit. (1—69—2—0.)

THE CREATION OF THE SOURCES OF LIGHT,
ON THE FOURTH DAY

In summing up the divine works Scripture speaks in this manner (Gen. ii. 1):¹ “ *So the heavens and the earth were made perfect, and all the adornments of them.*” In which words a triple work may be distinguished, namely, the work of creation, by which we read that the heavens and the earth were produced, but in a formless state; and the work of distinguishing things, by which the heavens and the earth are made perfect, whether this is by substantial forms assigned to matter which is completely unformed, as Augustine maintains, or whether as to a fitting beauty or order, as other saints say. And to these two works is added *adornment*, and this differs from perfection. For the perfection of heaven and earth seems to belong to the things that are intrinsic to heaven and earth. Adornment, however, belongs to those things that are distinct from heaven and earth, as man is made perfect by the possession of the parts and forms that are proper to him, but he is adorned by clothes and such like. But the distinguishing of certain things is especially shown by local motion, by which they are separated from one another. And hence to the province of adornment belongs the production of those things that have motion in heaven or in earth. As it has been said, however, mention is made of three things in creation, namely, of heaven, and water, and earth. And these three things are formed by the work of distinguishing on the three days. On the first day the heavens, on the second day the waters are distinguished, on the third day the separation of the earth takes place, of sea from dry land. And, similarly, in the work of adorn-

ment: on the first day, which is the fourth, the sources of light are produced which move in the heavens, to their beautifying; on the second, which is the fifth, birds and fish, for the adornment of the intervening element, because they have motion in air and water, which are taken as one; on the third day, which is the sixth, are brought forth the animals that have motion on earth, to its adorning.

But it must be noted that in the production of the sources of light Augustine does not disagree with other saints. For he says the sources of light are produced actually and not virtually only. For the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has the power of producing plants. Whence the Scripture does not say: "*Let the firmament bring forth lights,*" as it says: "*Let the earth bring forth the green herb.*" (1—70—1—0.)

As on the fifth day the element between heaven and earth is beautified, and this corresponds to the second day; so on the sixth day, the last body is adorned, namely, the earth, by the bringing forth of earthly animals; and this corresponds to the third day. Whence in both there is made mention of earth. And here also, according to Augustine, terrestrial animals are produced potentially, but according to other saints actually. (1—72—1—0.)

Nothing totally new was afterwards made by God that did not, in some way, pre-exist in the works of the six days. For some things pre-existed materially, as when God formed woman from the rib of Adam. Other things, however, pre-existed in the works of the six days, not only materially, but also causally; as the individuals which are now generated pre-existed in the first individuals of their species. And if any new species appear, they pre-existed in certain active principles; just as animals generated from putrefaction are produced by the virtues of the stars and the elements, which they received in the beginning; although new species of such animals may be produced. Some animals also, at times, of a new species come from the breeding of animals

that are different in species, as when from an ass and a horse a mule is produced; and these also pre-existed causally in the works of the six days. But certain things pre-existed according to likeness, as the souls that are now created. And similarly the work of the Incarnation, since as it is said (Phil. ii. 7):¹ "*The Son of God was made to the likeness of men.*" Spiritual glory also preceded in the angels, but corporeal in the heavens, especially in the empyrean heavens. Whence it is said (Eccles. i. 10):² "*Nothing under the sun is new . . . for it hath already gone before in the ages that were before us.*" (1-73-1-3m.)

THE BUILDING OF THE FIRMAMENT

As Augustine teaches in questions of this sort, two things are to be borne in mind. Firstly, indeed, that the truth of Scripture may be firmly held. Secondly, that when divine Scripture may be explained in many ways, that one should not cleave to any given exposition so absolutely that if by sure reasoning it shall have been established that something is false which any one believed to be the sense of Scripture this, notwithstanding, he may presume to assert; lest by this the Scripture become contemptible to unbelievers, and that a way of believing be not precluded them. (1-68-1-0.)

According to the opinion of Aristotle, it cannot be maintained that the firmament as to its substance was produced on the second day if by these days a succession of time is meant; for the heavens, since by their very nature they are incorruptible, have matter that cannot be subjected to any other form. Whence it is impossible that the firmament should be made from matter that had a prior existence in time. And hence the production of the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation. But according to these two opinions a certain forming of it belongs to the work of the second day, as also Denis says that the light of

the sun was formless in the first three days, and was afterwards formed on the fourth day. But if, by these days, only the order of nature is meant and not a succession of time, as Augustine holds, nothing prevents any one allowing, according to each of these opinions, that the substantial forming of the firmament belongs to the second day. . . . (1—68—1—0.)

WHETHER THE FIRMAMENT DIVIDES THE WATERS
FROM THE WATERS

Any one considering the word of Genesis superficially may conceive such an idea as agrees with the position of certain ancient philosophers. For certain of them maintained that water is a kind of infinite body and the principle of all other bodies; which immensity of waters can be taken from the term abyss, when it is said that "*darkness was over the face of the abyss.*" And they also held that the sensible heavens we see have not below them all corporeal things, but that there is an infinite body of waters above the heavens. And so one could say that the firmament of heaven divided the exterior waters from the interior waters, that is, from all bodies which are contained beneath the heavens, the principle of which they held was water. But since that position has been shown false by certain proofs, it must not be said that this is the sense of Scripture. But it must be borne in mind that Moses spoke to an ignorant people, and that, condescending to their weakness, he proposed to them only those things that manifestly appear to sense. But all, however uncultivated, discover that the earth and water are bodies by their senses. Air, however, is not perceived by all to be a body, inasmuch as certain philosophers said that air is nothing, calling what is full of air a vacuum. And therefore Moses makes an express mention of water and earth; but he does not expressly mention air lest he should propose an unknown thing to the ignorant. But in order that

he might deliver the truth to them capable of grasping it, he gives place for the understanding of air, suggesting it as being joined to water, when he says that "*darkness was over the face of the abyss.*" By which one is given to understand that over the face of the abyss there was a transparent body, which is the subject of light and darkness. And hence whether by the firmament, the heavens in which are the stars, or a clouded space of air, it is fittingly said that the firmament divides the waters from the waters, according as by water unformed matter is meant, or according as all transparent bodies are conveniently understood as water. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher. But the clouded air divides the higher air in which rains are formed, and such eruptions, from the lower air which is joined to the waters, and is understood under the name of waters. (1—68—3—0.)

THE INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE

It is necessary to hold the existence of an active intellect. And to make this clear, it must be remembered that, since the possible intellect is potential towards things that are intelligible, it is necessary for the intelligible things to move the possible intellect. But what is not cannot move anything. The intelligible through the possible intellect however is not anything existing in the world of nature, nor is it intelligible, for the possible intellect understands a thing as one in many, and from many. But such a thing is not found independently existing in the nature of things, as Aristotle proves. It is necessary, therefore, if the possible intellect must be moved by the intelligible thing, that this should be made intelligible by the intellect. And since it is impossible that what is in potentiality can be like its act, it is necessary to assume besides the possible intellect the active, which makes things actually intelligible, which move the possible intellect. But it does this by abstracting them from matter, and material conditions, which are the principles of individuation. For since the nature of a species, as to that which essentially belongs to the species, has no foundation for its multiplication in diverse things, and does not include in its notion the principles of individuation, the intellect can receive it beyond all individuating conditions; and so it will be received as one.

And, from the same reason, the intellect gathers the nature of genus by withdrawing its outlook from the specific differences, as one in many and from many species. But if universals of themselves independently exist in the realm of nature, as Platonists held, there would be no necessity to hold the existence of an active intellect. Whence it seems that Aristotle was led by this necessity to hold an active

intellect, as he did not agree with Plato's opinion of the existence of ideas. Yet there are certain things of their nature actually with an independent existence in the nature of things, as immaterial substances. Yet, however, the possible intellect cannot arrive at an understanding of them, but to some extent it gains a knowledge of them through those things which it abstracts from material and sensible things. (*On the Soul*, art. 4.)

THE INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SINGULAR

Every form of itself is common, whence the adding of form to form cannot be the cause of individuation, since whatever the number of forms collected together at one time, as whiteness, length, and curliness, and such like, they do not constitute a particular thing, since all these are at once in one, and this it is possible to find in many powers; but the individuation of a form comes from the matter, through which the form is drawn to a given determination. Whence, in order to know particular things, it is necessary that in the one knowing there should be not only the likeness of form, but in some sort of matter. Now the likeness of a thing known may be in the knower in two ways: firstly, as caused by the thing, as it is in those things which are known through the species abstracted from the things; secondly, as the cause of the thing, as is clear in the case of the artist, who knows his work through that form by which he contrived it. But the likeness which is caused in sense by the sense object, in so far as it is not entirely freed from material conditions, is the likeness of the form according as it is in matter; and, therefore, through it, the particular is known. But since the impression of the sense object as received in our intellect is already completely separated from material conditions, our intellect, through it, cannot directly know the particular, but by a certain recoil of the intellect upon the sense faculties, from which the intelligible species are taken. (*Quod. 7*, art. 3.)

KNOWLEDGE AND THE SENSES

WITH regard to this question (whether the human mind derives knowledge from sensible things) many opinions were current among the ancients.

For some held that the source of our knowledge is wholly from an exterior cause, which is separated matter, and these are divided into two sects. Some, like the Platonists, held that the forms of sensible things are separated from matter, and so they are actually intelligible, and by their being shared by sensible matter things individual are effected, and by the participation of them human minds gain science; and hence they held these forms to be the principle of generation and science, as the philosopher narrates. But this position is sufficiently exposed by the philosopher, who proves that one cannot maintain the existence of the forms of sensible things except in sensible matter, since also universal forms cannot be understood in the universal without sensible matter, just as we cannot understand a snub without a nose. And hence others not holding the separated forms of sensible things, but intelligences only, which we call angels, maintained that the origin of our science is wholly from these separated substances. Whence Avicenna held that, just as sensible forms are not acquired in sensible matter except from the influence of active intelligence, so intelligible forms are not impressed upon human minds except from intelligence acting, which is not a part of the soul, but a separated substance. But the soul needs the senses as exciting and preparing for science, just as inferior agents prepare matter to receive the form from acting intelligence. But this opinion does not seem to be reasonable, since according to this there would be no necessary dependence of the knowledge of the

human mind upon the sensitive powers; and the manifest contrary of this appears both from this, that with the failing of sense there fails also the science of its sensible objects, and also that our mind cannot actually consider those things that it habitually knows except by forming to itself certain phantasms; whence, also, if the imagination be injured, consideration is impeded. And moreover this position would take away the proximate principles of things, if all inferior things receive their forms, both intelligible and sensible, immediately from separated substance.

Another opinion was that of those who held the origin of our science to be wholly from an interior cause, and these were divided into two sects. For some held that human minds contain, in themselves, the knowledge of all things, but that by reason of the union with the body this knowledge is clouded; and, hence, they said that we need study and the ministry of the senses to take away the hindrances of science, saying that to learn is nothing else than to remember, as also it is manifestly clear that from those things which we have heard and seen we remember those things that we formerly knew. But this position does not seem to be reasonable. For if the union of the body and soul is natural, it cannot be that, by it, natural knowledge is wholly impeded; and so if this opinion were true we should not suffer complete ignorance of those things of which we have not sensible experience. But there was an opinion agreeing with this position which held that souls were created before bodies, and afterwards were united to the bodies; for then the composition of body and soul would not be natural, but come accidentally to the soul. And this opinion, both according to faith and according to the mind of philosophers, is to be judged condemned. But others said that the soul is the cause of science to itself, for it does not receive knowledge from sensible things, as though by their action the likenesses of things reached to the soul in some way; but the soul itself, under the presence of sensible things, forms in itself likenesses

of them. But this position does not seem wholly rational. For no agent acts except in so far as it actually is: whence if the soul forms in itself representations of all things, it is necessary that it should actually have in itself these likenesses of things, and so it returns to the opinion before described, which holds that the knowledge of all things is naturally inborn in the soul.

And, hence, more reasonable than all the positions described seems to be the opinion of the philosopher, who holds that the mind's knowledge is partly from the interior and partly from the exterior, not only from things separated from matter, but also even from sensible things. For when the mind is compared with sensible things, which are without the soul, it is found to stand to them in a double relation. Firstly, as act to potentiality, in so far as things that are without the soul are potentially intelligible. But the mind itself is actually intelligible; and according to this it has an active intellect, which makes things actually intelligible. Secondly, as potentiality to act, that is to say, in as much as in the mind the forms of things are determined only potentially, which exist actually outside the mind; and for this reason there is held to be in the soul the possible intellect, whose function it is to receive forms abstracted from sensible things made actually intelligible by the light of the active intellect. And this light of the active intellect in the rational soul proceeds, as from its first origin, from separated substances, especially from God. And, in this way, it is true that the mind receives knowledge from sensible things; yet, nevertheless, the soul forms in itself the likenesses of things, in so far as, by the light of the active intellect, forms abstracted from sensible things are made actually intelligible that they may be received in the possible intellect. And so also in the light of the active intellect all knowledge is, in a sense, originally inborn in us, through the medium of universal conceptions, which are immediately known by the light of the active intellect, through which, as by universal

principles, we judge of other things, and in them we foreknow those things.

And in this sense that opinion has the truth which holds that we have a fore acquaintance with those things that we learn. (*On Truth*—10—6—0.)

SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING

Now it might be believed that sense or memory alone is sufficient to cause an intelligible knowledge of principles, as certain among the ancients held, not distinguishing between sense and intellect. And, hence, to exclude this, the philosopher adds that simultaneously with sense it is necessary to presuppose that the soul has a nature of such a sort that it can suffer this, that is to say, that it may be open to receive knowledge of the universal, which indeed is achieved through the possible intellect; and, again, that it may be able actively to compass this by the active intellect, which makes things intelligible actually by the drawing forth of universals from things singular. (*Later Analytics*, ii.—20—12.)

THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE

THE NECESSITY OF A DILIGENT RULING FOR MEN LIVING TOGETHER

It is necessary, at the outset, to consider what is to be understood by the term king. Now in all things directed towards an end, in which it is possible to choose various ways of arriving thereat, there is need of some one to direct, by whose help one may come straightway to the end. For a ship, which is buffeted hither and thither by the impulse of changing winds, would not reach its destined end if it were not steered by the care of the navigator towards port. But man has an end towards which his whole life and action is directed, since he acts through his intellect, whose manifest nature it is to act for the sake of an end. Now men may proceed to the intended end by many different ways, as is shown by the very diversity of human studies and acts. Man therefore needs some one to direct him. But in every man there dwells by nature the light of reason, by which he is directed, in his acts, to the end. And if indeed it had happened to be in agreement with man's nature to live by himself, as is the case with many animals, he would have needed no other direction to the end; but each man would have been, under God, the King of kings, king to himself, in as much as by the light of reason, divinely given him, he could have directed himself in his acts. But it is natural for man to be a sociable and politic animal, living in the midst of his fellows, more even than all other animals, which is shown by a certain natural necessity. Since for all other animals nature prepares food, covering of hair, means of defence—as teeth, horns, nails, or at least speed that they may fly. But man

is fashioned with none of these provided for him by nature, but, in place of all, reason is given him, by which he can prepare all these things by the use of his hands; yet, to prepare all, one man is not sufficient, since of himself one man cannot sufficiently carry on his life. It is therefore natural for men to live in the society of many. Again, there is in other animals a greater diligence with regard to all those things that are of use to them, or hurtful, as the sheep instinctively sees an enemy in the wolf, and this by nature. Certain animals also, from natural assiduity, know medicinal herbs, and others that are necessary to life. But man has the knowledge of those things that are necessary to his life only in common, as though that were sufficient, through reason, for him to arrive at the knowledge of single things which are necessary to human life from universal principles. But it is not possible for one man to arrive at all these things by his reason. It is accordingly necessary for man to live with others, that one may be helped by another, and that different men may have scope for their reason in finding different things: one in medicine, one in this, and another in that. This is again most clearly shown by the fact that it is peculiar to man to use speech, by which one can fully explain his thought to another.

Other animals indeed express mutually their passions in common, as a dog his anger by barking, and other animals their passions in divers ways. Man is, therefore, more wont to communicate with others than any other animals that dwell together, like cranes, ants, and bees. For considering this, Solomon said in Ecclesiastes (iv. 9):¹ "*It is better that two should be together, than one; for they have the gain of each other's society.*" If, therefore, it is natural to man that he should live together with others, it is necessary that there should be among men one by whom the multitude is ruled. For when there are many men, and each one provides whatever he likes for himself, the energies of the multitude are dissipated, unless there is, also, some one who has the care

of that which is for the benefit of the multitude; just as the body of man would pass away, like that of every other animal, if there were not some common directive force in the body which is intent on the common good of all the members. And Solomon had this in mind when he said (Prov. xi. 14):¹ “*Where there is no governor the people shall fall.*” And this follows quite reasonably, for the particular good is not the same as the common good. We differ in our particular ends, but in the common good we are one. But the causes of different things are different. It is necessary, therefore, that besides that which moves to the peculiar good of each one, there should be something that moves to the common good of the many; for which reason, and in all things which are directed to one, there is found something that is directive of others. For in the realm of corporeal things other bodies are ruled by the first body, that is to say, the heavenly body, in the order of the divine providence, and all bodies by rational creatures. Moreover, in each man the soul rules the body, and, among the parts of the soul, the irascible and the concupiscible parts are ruled by reason. Again, among the members of the body one is the principal that moves all, either the heart or the head. It is necessary, therefore, that in every multitude there should be some sort of ruler.

Now it happens that in things that are directed to an end, they both proceed aright and wrongly. Whence also in the ruling of a multitude there is found both right and wrong. But a thing is directed aright when it is led to a fitting end, but wrongly when it is conducted to an end that is not fitting. Now the end that is fitting for a multitude of free men is not fitting to slaves. For he is free that is the cause of himself, but a slave is he who owes what he is to another. If, therefore, a multitude of freemen be directed by a ruler to the common good of all, that will be a right ruling and a just, such as is fitting for free men. But if the ruling be not directed to the common good of the multitude, but rather to the private good of the ruler, the rule will be unjust and

perverse, whence the Lord threatens such rulers, by the mouth of Ezekiel (xxxiv. 2),¹ saying: "*Woe to the shepherds that feed themselves,*" as seeking what is pleasing to themselves. "*Should not the flocks be fed by the shepherds,*" for the shepherds ought to seek the good of the flock, and rulers the good of the multitude that is subject to them.

If then an unjust rule be imposed by one alone, who seeks things pleasing to himself from his ruling, and not the good of the multitude that owns his sway, such a ruler is called a tyrant, a term derived from strength, since he oppresses by his power and judges not in justice; whence, by those of old, the powerful were called tyrants. But if the unjust rule be not imposed by one, but by many, or if by few, it is called an oligarchy, that is to say, the pre-eminence of the few, when, for instance, a few oppress the common people in pursuit of wealth, which differs from a tyranny solely by its plurality. But if the unjust rule be exercised by many it is called a democracy, that is to say, the dominion of the people, when for instance the common folk by the power of numbers oppress the rich. For in this manner the whole people become as a tyrant. Similarly, also, a just rule can be divided. For if it be administered by a multitude, it is commonly called a policy, as when an army rules in the province or city. If it be administered by a few, and these virtuous, such a rule is called an aristocracy, that is to say, the best dominion or the dominance of the best, who on account of this are called optimates (belonging to the best men). But if a just rule be imposed by one, he is properly and specially called a king, whence the Lord by the mouth of Ezekiel says (xxxvii. 24):² "*My servant David shall be king over all, and they shall have one shepherd.*" And from this it is clear that it is of the notion of king that one alone should rule, and that he should be a shepherd seeking the common good of the multitude, and not his own private pleasure.

But since man is fain to dwell with his fellows, because he is not sufficient of himself to provide the necessities of life

when he remains by himself, it follows that so much the more perfect is the society of a multitude by how much it provides, of itself, the necessities of life. For, in fact, there is a certain sufficiency for life in one family of one house, with regard, namely, to the natural acts of nutrition, and of bringing forth children, and such like; but I say in one, as far as those things that pertain to one art, but in a city, which is a perfect community, there is sufficiency with regard to all the necessities of life; but still more in one province, because of the necessity of fighting together, and of mutual help against the enemy. Whence he who rules a perfect community, that is a city, or province, is properly called king, but he that rules a house, not a king, but the father of a family; yet he has a certain likeness to a king, on account of which the fathers of the people were once called kings.

It is clear, therefore, that a king is he who rules the multitude of a city or province, and that for the common good; whence Solomon says in Ecclesiastes (v. 8):¹ “*The king reigneth over all the land subject to him.*” (Book i. chap. i.)

THE END OF SOCIETY BETTER SECURED BY SUBJECTION TO A SINGLE RULER

The intention of every king ought to be fixed on this, to procure the well-being of that state of which he has received the direction. For it is the duty of the navigator to preserve the ship against the perils of the waves and bring it unharmed to safe harbourage. Now the good and safety of a multitude dwelling together is that its unity, which is called peace, should be preserved, which being removed the utility of social life perishes; moreover, the multitude, distracted by dissensions, becomes burdensome to itself. This, then, is that to which the ruler of a multitude ought chiefly to attend, the procuring of the unity of peace. Nor is it right for him to think whether he should work peace in the multitude subject to him, as a doctor heals the infirm thing committed to

him. For no one ought to take thought of the end which he ought to intend, but of the means to the end. For this reason the Apostle, having commended the unity of the faithful, says: "*Be careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace*" (Eph. iv. 3).¹ In as far, then, as the rule is more efficacious in keeping the unity of peace, in so far is it more useful. For we call that more useful that better leads to the end. Now it is clear that that can better bring about unity which is of itself one rather than many; just as the most efficacious cause of heat is that which is of its nature warm. Hence the rule of one is more useful than that of many. (Chap. ii.)

TYRANNY IS MORE HURTFUL THAN AN OLIGARCHY, AND
THIS THAN A DEMOCRACY

A power that is united is more efficacious in producing its effect than a dispersed or divided power. For many congregated together achieve that which dividedly, by single units, could not be achieved. As, therefore, it is more useful for the power towards good to be more one, in order that it may be more efficacious in the working of good; so it is more hurtful if the power working evil is one than if it is divided. Now the power of one that unjustly rules works the evil of the multitude when it turns the common good of the multitude to its own private interest. Since, therefore, in a just government, the rule is more useful in the degree that he who rules is more one, so that a kingdom is better than an aristocracy, and an aristocracy than a policy; so, conversely, will it be in an unjust administration, that, namely, as far as the ruler is more one, will he be more hurtful. Hence a tyranny is more hurtful than an oligarchy, and an oligarchy than a democracy. (Chap. iii.)

BUT TYRANNY IS MORE IMMINENT FROM A DEMOCRACY THAN FROM THE RULE OF ONE

The rule of many does not less often turn into a tyranny than the rule of one, but perhaps more frequently. For when there arises a dissension among the many, it often happens that one dominates the rest and usurps the dominion of the multitude to himself, which may be seen in history. For the rule of the many nearly always ended in a tyranny, as clearly appears in the Roman Republic, which, while for some time the magistracy was exercised by many, enmities, dissensions, and civil wars having arisen, fell into the hands of the most cruel tyrants; and generally, if any one will diligently consider what has happened long ago, and what happens now, he will find more have exercised a tyranny in lands which are governed by many than in lands that are governed by one. If, therefore, the rule which is the best seems that it ought to be avoided because of the danger of tyranny, but tyranny not less but more usually happens in government by many than by one, it remains therefore, absolutely, more expedient to live under one king than under the governance of many. (Chap. v.)

PROVISION AGAINST TYRANNY

Now it is necessary that such a man should be elected king, by them whose office this is, as will not be likely to fall into tyranny. Whence Samuel, praising God's providence with regard to the institution of a king, says (1 Kings xiii. 14):¹ "*The Lord hath sought him a man after his own heart.*"

Then the governance of the kingdom is so to be arranged as to leave the king when instituted no occasion for tyranny. At the same time also his power should be so tempered that he may not easily fall into tyranny. . . .

And indeed, if the tyranny is not excessive, it is better to bear it for a time than, by acting against the tyrant, to be

involved in many perils, which are worse than tyranny. For it may happen that they who rise against a tyrant do not prevail against him, and so the tyrant, being incensed, rages the more violently. And if one should be able to prevail against the tyrant, from this there very often arise most grave dissensions among the people, either while he is striving against the tyrant or after the deposing of the tyrant whilst the multitude is separated in parties with regard to the ordering of the rule. It happens, also, sometimes that when by the help of any one the multitude expels a tyrant, he himself, having accepted the power, takes to himself the tyranny, and, fearing to suffer himself what he wrought against another, he oppresses his subjects with a more burdensome slavery. . . .

And if the tyranny should be unbearable, it seemed to some that it belongs to the power of the stronger men to kill the tyrant, and to expose themselves to the perils of death for the deliverance of the multitude. . . . But this is not in accord with the teaching of the Apostles. For Peter teaches us reverently to be subject not only to good and modest but also to overbearing lords (1 Pet. ii. 19):¹ "*For this is thankworthy, if for conscience towards God, a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully.*" . . . But it seems that the cruelty of the tyrant ought to be proceeded against by the public authority, rather than by the private presumption of a few. Firstly, if any society of people have the right of choosing a king for itself, it is not unjust if he be deposed by the same, or if his power be curbed, when by a royal tyranny he abuses his power. Nor is such a society to be held as acting unfaithfully in thus deposing the tyrant, even if it have before sworn to him for ever, for he deserved to be deserted in not keeping faith in the ruling of his people, since this is an obligation on the king's part, if the compact made with him by the subjects is to be maintained. . . . But if it belong to the right of some higher power to provide the people with a king, the remedy for the cruelty of the tyrant

is to be looked for from it. . . . But if human help against the tyrant cannot be had, recourse must be had to God, the King of all, who is the helper in weaknesses and tribulations. For it is in his power to turn the cruel heart of the tyrant to meekness, as Solomon says in Proverbs (xiii. 1):¹ “*The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, he will turn it wheresoever he will.*” (Chap. vi.)

THE KING'S REWARD

Since worldly honour and the praise of men is no sufficient reward for a king's solicitude, it remains to inquire what manner of reward is sufficient for him. Now it is fitting that the king should look for his reward to God. For he that serves looks for his reward to his master. But the king in governing the people is the servant of God, as the Apostle says (Rom. xiii. 1 and 4)² that all power is from the Lord God, and that “*he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.*” . . . So it may be taken as true that the king's reward is an eternal honour and glory. For what worldly and perishable honour can be compared to this honour, that a man may be a citizen and friend of God, and reckoned among his sons, and may attain with Christ to the heirship of the heavenly kingdom. This is the honour which, desiring and admiring, King David said (Ps. cxxxviii. 17):³ “*Thy friends, O God, are made exceedingly honourable.*” Moreover, what glory of human praise can be compared to this, which comes not from the deceitful tongue of flatterers, nor the deluded opinion of men, but from the testimony of the inner conscience, confirmed by the witness of God, who promises to them that confess him that he will confess them before the angels of God, in the glory of the Father? But they that seek this glory find it, and the glory of men that they do not seek they attain, as the example of Solomon shows, who not only received the wisdom that he sought from God, but was made glorious above all other kings. (Chap. viii.)

HIS GLORY IS PROPORTIONED TO THE NOBILITY OF HIS
ESTATE

It remains, therefore, to consider what degree of eminence in heavenly bliss they shall attain who worthily and praise-worthily exercise the office of king. For if bliss is the reward of virtue, it follows that the greater the virtue the greater the degree of bliss. Now the chief virtue is that by which a man can direct not only himself but also others, and so much the more is this the greater the numbers it directs; for bodily strength is reputed the greater by the numbers it can overcome, or the number of burdens it can lift. As, then, a higher virtue is required to rule a family than simply to rule oneself; much higher is it to rule a city or kingdom. It belongs, therefore, to surpassing virtue to exercise the office of a king well. And hence in bliss he ought to receive a surpassing reward. . . . Moreover, if it be the function of virtue to render the work of man good, it seems to be a higher that helps a man to work a higher good. Now greater and more divine is the good of many than the good of one, whence at times the ill of one is borne with if it be to the advantage of the many, as a thief is killed that peace may be preserved to the multitude; and God himself would not suffer evils in the world unless from them he could bring forth good to the well-being and beauty of the universe. But it belongs to the office of a king studiously to care for the good of the many. A much greater reward is, therefore, due to the king for ruling well than to a subject for a good action.

But this becomes more manifest if we take the subject in a less general way. For a private person is praised by men, and God reckons it to him for reward, if he succours the needy, brings peace to them at variance, delivers the oppressed, and, finally, if he confers on any one any sort of help or counsel for his welfare. How much more therefore ought he to be praised by men and rewarded by God who estab-

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lishes a whole province in peace, restrains violence, administers justice, and by his laws and precepts directs what is to be done by men? For in this way also the greatness of a king's virtue appears in that he specially bears the likeness of God, for he performs in his kingdom what God does in the world, whence in Exodus (xxii.) the judges of a multitude are called gods. But so much the more acceptable is any one to God in the degree that he approximates to his likeness, and hence the Apostle warns in Ephesians (v. 1):¹ "*Be ye imitators of God as most dear sons.*" (Chap. ix.)

THE KING IS TO THE KINGDOM AS THE SOUL TO THE BODY AND GOD TO THE WORLD

What then is the king's office and how should he bear himself? Now since the things that art contrives are assimilated to the order of nature, from which we learn how to work according to reason, it seems that the highest office of a king is taken from nature's form of governance. But in nature's realm there exists both a universal and a particular governance. The universal, indeed, inasmuch as all things are controlled by the divine ruling, who, by his providence, governs the universe. But the particular governance, having a special likeness to the divine ruling, is found in man, who for this reason is called a lesser world, for in him is found the form of universal governance.

For just as all corporeal creatures and all spiritual powers are contained under the divine rule, so the members of the body and the other powers of the soul are ruled by reason, and hence, in a certain sense, reason plays the same part in man as God in the world. But because, as we showed above, man is naturally a social animal, dwelling with his fellows, the likeness of the divine governance is found in man not only as far as each single man is ruled by reason, but also with regard to this, that by the reason of one man the

multitude is ruled, which especially belongs to the office of a king; while also in certain animals which dwell together a likeness of this rule is found, as in bees, among which also there are some called kings, not that, among them, their ruling is by reason, but by nature's instinct, impressed by the ruler of all, who is the author of nature. Let the king, therefore, recognise that he has received this office, to be in his kingdom as the soul in the body and as God in the world. Which if he shall diligently consider, from one the zeal of justice will be enkindled in him, when he recalls that he is appointed to administer justice in his kingdom in the place of God; from the other he acquires the gentleness of meekness and mercifulness, when he looks upon each one subject to his rule as his own members. (Chap. xii.)

It is necessary to inquire what is the function of God in the world, for so it will be made clear what the king ought to do. Now there are, in general, to be considered two works of God in the world: one by which he brought the world into being, the other by which he rules the world that exists. These two functions also the soul has in the body. For, firstly, by the soul's power the body receives its form, and then by the soul the body is ruled and moved. But of these the second more properly belongs to the office of the king, whence governing pertains to all kings, and from the rule of governing the name of king is derived. And the first work does not pertain to all kings; for not all found the kingdom or state in which they rule, but they hold the care of governance in kingdoms or states already founded. But it must be borne in mind that unless some one had before founded the state or kingdom there would have been no place for its ruling. For under the office of king is comprehended also the institution of the state or kingdom, for some instituted the cities in which they reigned, as Ninus Nineveh and Romulus Rome. Similarly, also, it belongs to the duty of a king to preserve the states he governs and use them for that purpose for which they were constituted. Therefore

the office of governance cannot be fully known if the idea of institution is ignored.

Now the idea of institution of a kingdom is to be taken from the example of the institution of the world, in which, firstly, is considered the production of the things themselves and then the ordered distinction of the world's parts. But further in different parts of the world the different species of things are seen to be distributed, as stars in the heavens, birds in the air, fish in the waters, and animals on the earth; then, to each, the things that it needs are seen abundantly by God provided. Now this order of institution Moses subtly and diligently expresses. Firstly, indeed, he propounds the production of things saying: "*In the beginning God created heaven and earth.*" Then, according to due order, he announces the placing of distinctions among things, namely, the distinction of day from night, the superior from the lower, water from the dry land. Then he relates the beautifying of the heavens with lights, the air with birds, the sea with fish, and the land with animals; and, finally, the assigning the dominion of animals to earthly men. But he announces the use of plants to be for them and for the rest of the animals from the divine providence. Now the founder of a city and kingdom cannot bring men into being or the places for them to dwell in, and the rest of life's necessities, but he has perforce to use those things that pre-exist in nature; as also the other arts obtain the matter for their work from nature, for example, the smith his iron, the builder the wood and stones for the use of his art.

It is necessary, therefore, for the founder of a city and kingdom firstly to select a convenient place which will preserve the dwellers in health, sufficiently fruitful in food, delightful by its agreeableness, and fortified to withstand the attacks of the enemy. And if any of these should be lacking, the more convenient shall be any place in so far as many or the more necessary of them may be found in it. Then, again, it is necessary that the founder of a state or a kingdom

should mark off the place selected according to the demands of those things that the perfection of a state or kingdom require; for instance, if a kingdom is to be founded, he must provide places suitable for the building of cities, others for towns, others for camps, others again where the pursuit of letters is to be followed, spaces for military exercises, marts where commerce may be transacted, and similarly with regard to other things that the perfection of a kingdom requires. But if he wish to found a city, it is necessary to decide which place shall be set apart for sacred functions, which for the administration of justice, which for the pursuit of the several arts. Finally, moreover, he must gather the men together who are appointed to the several offices in the places set apart for them. And last of all, he must provide that to each one necessities may be allowed according to his condition and state, for otherwise in no way could a kingdom or state hold together. (Chap. xiii.)

Now, just as the life by which men live well is directed to that blessed life which we hope for in heaven as to its end; so whatever particular goods may be procured by men, whether of riches or advantages, of health or eloquence or erudition, are directed, as to their end, to the good of society. If, therefore, as has been said, he that has the care of the last end ought to be set above those things that bear upon what is directed to the end and to rule them by his order, it is clear, from what has been said, that the king, as he ought to be subject to the dominion and governance that is administered by the office of the priesthood, so he ought to be set above all human offices and direct them by the authority of his rule. But he whose office it is to perfect anything, which is directed to something else as to its end, ought to attend to this, that his work be in agreement with the end; as the smith makes a sword suitable for use in fighting, and the builder ought so to arrange the house that it is convenient for dwelling.

Because, therefore, the end of a present virtuous life is

heavenly bliss, it belongs to the office of a king so to arrange the good life of the many that it shall be more suited to the attainment of heavenly bliss, that, namely, he shall command those things which lead to heavenly bliss, and their opposites, as far as is possible, he shall forbid. . . . And so, tutored by the divine law, his mind ought to be bent on this special study, how the multitude subject to him may live well; which study, indeed, is divided into three parts: that, firstly, he should set up the good life in his subjects; secondly, when set up he should preserve it; thirdly, preserved, he should stimulate it to better things.

Now for the good life of any one two things are required: the chief, which is working according to virtue (for it is virtue by which we live well), the other secondary, and in a way instrumental, namely, the sufficiency of bodily goods, the use of which is necessary to an act of virtue. But the unity of man is caused by nature, while the unity of society, which is called peace, is brought about by the diligence of the ruler. And hence to set up a good life in society three things are required. Firstly, that the people should be established in peace. Secondly, that the people united in the bond of peace should be directed to well living; for just as man can do nothing well unless the unity of his parts is presupposed, so a concourse of men lacking the unity of peace, while it strives against itself, is impeded from well doing. Thirdly, it is required that by the diligence of the king there should be at hand a sufficient supply of necessities for well living. And so a good life being set up in society, it remains that he should look to its preservation.

There are, however, three things that do not suffer the permanence of the public good, of which one indeed comes from nature. For the good of society is established not for a time, but that it should be in a manner perpetual. But men, being mortal, cannot endure for ever, nor while they live have they always the same vigour, because human life is subject to many changes, and so men are not equally useful

during their whole life in the performance of the same functions. Another impediment to the public good coming from within consists in the will's perversity, since either men are slow to perform those things that the public good requires, or even do hurt to the peace of society, since by transgressing justice they disturb the peace of others. But the third impediment to the public weal comes from an exterior cause, when, through the incursion of an enemy, peace is dissolved and the kingdom or city is shaken to its foundations. And, hence, for these three aforesaid evils a triple cure is demanded from the king. First, in connection with the succession of men and the changing of officials, just as in the divine governance in corruptible things, because the same things cannot last for ever, it is provided that one generation shall succeed to another so that the integrity of the universe may be preserved; so, through the zeal of the king, the good of the people subject to him is preserved when he carefully arranges that others should succeed in the place of them that pass away. Secondly, that he may by his laws, precepts, penalties, and rewards restrain his subjects from vice and induce them to virtue, following the example of God, who gave a law to men, recompensing the faithful with reward and the transgressors with punishment. Thirdly, the king must take care that the people subject to him be preserved safe from enemies, for it profits nothing to avoid dangers at home if they are at the mercy of those from without.

So, therefore, for the good establishing of a people there remains a third thing, belonging to the office of the king, that he should be solicitous of their advance, and as in those things already mentioned if there be anything inordinate he must correct it, so if there be any deficiency he must make up for it, and if there be anything that can be made better he should strive to bring it to perfection. Whence also the Apostle (1 Cor. xii.) warns the faithful "*to desire the better gifts.*" These, then, are the things that belong to this office. (Chap. xv.)

THE SITUATION OF A STATE

It is necessary especially to expound the office of a king in the institution of the city or kingdom. . . . Now in the establishing of a city or a kingdom, if plenty abounds, it is necessary for the king to choose a temperate region. For many good effects flow from the temperateness of a region. Firstly, men win health of body and length of days. For since health consists in a certain moderation of the humours, it is thus more easily preserved, for like is preserved by like.

Moreover, a temperate region lends itself to the necessities of war by which all human society is safeguarded. For as Vegetius testifies, all nations that dwell in tropical regions, being sapped by excess of heat, are said to be quicker in mind but less healthy of body, and, hence, they have not the constancy and confidence to fight their neighbours, because they fear wounds and know themselves to be weak. On the other hand the northern peoples, far from the sun's intenser heat, are ruder but, being full-blooded, they are ever ready for war. Those who dwell in temperate regions are full-blooded so that they do not fear its loss by wounds, are contemptuous of death, and do not lack prudence to preserve sobriety in their camps, and which is no small advantage to them in taking counsel in the time of strife. Finally, a temperate region is more suitable for a political life. For, as Aristotle says in his "Politics," nations that dwell in very cold places are full of illwill, but lacking in intellect and art, on account of which they remain more independent; but they do not lead a political life, and they are unable to conquer their neighbours because of their imprudence. Nations, however, that dwell in tropical regions are indeed intellectual, accomplished in their minds, but without illwill, through which they are often subject races, and subject they remain. But nations that dwell between the two partake of both characters, for which reason they remain free, and can

especially live a politic life, and they understand how to dominate others. (Book ii. chap. i.)

After the choice of a region it is necessary to select a place suitable for the site of a city, in which firstly it seems to be required that the air should be healthy. . . . Now a place situated on an eminence is apt usually to afford good air, because a high place is open to the play of the winds, which makes the air pure; for the vapours that, by the sun's radiation, are brought forth from the earth and the waters are more wont to settle in valleys and in depressions than on high places, whence in elevated spots the air is rarer. Now this rarity of the air, which is very valuable for free and full breathing, is checked by mists and snows, which are accustomed to abound in very damp places; and hence such places are inimical to health. And since marsh lands abound in moisture, it is necessary to choose a site for a town far removed from marshes. For when the morning breezes, at sunrise, reach that place, and they are joined by the rising mists from the marsh, the breaths of poisonous swamp animals are scattered mixed with the mists, and the place becomes pestilential. But if cities be constructed in the marshes that are near the sea, and that look towards the north, or about it, and these marshes be higher than the sea shore, they seem reasonably constructed. For when trenches have been dug there lies a way open for the water to the shore, and the sea, abounding in tempests, by flowing back upon the marsh, will not allow the birth of marsh animals. And if any animals come from the higher parts they will die by the prevalent saltness.

It is necessary that a place destined for the site of a city should be arranged temperately as to heat and cold with regard to the direction in which it looks. For if cities constructed especially near the sea look to the midday sun, they will not be healthy. Since such places indeed are cold in the morning, because the sun does not fall upon them, but at midday they are boiling hot because the sun is on them.

Places, however, that look to the west, at sunrise are tepid, or even cold, at midday they are warm, and in the evening they are burning, because of the continuity of heat and the sun being on them. But if they look to the rising sun, in the morning they are temperately warmed on account of the sun being directly opposite to them; and this is not much increased at midday, as the sun does not directly look to that place, but in the evening, the rays of the sun being completely turned away, the places grow cold. And if a site for a town should face the north the temperature will be the very opposite of that which was said of a place facing the midday sun. But from experience we know that in greater heat one becomes less healthy. For bodies that are drawn from cold places to hot cannot last, for the heat putting the vapour to flight dissolves the natural powers, whence, even in temperate places, bodies are rendered weaker by heat.

Now, because for the health of bodies the use of convenient foods is required, it is necessary to bear this in mind when consulting about the healthiness of a place which is chosen for the founding of a city, and this may be discerned from the condition of the food which springs from the earth, as the ancients were accustomed to discover from the animals nourished there. For, since it is common to men and animals to use for food that which the earth brings forth, it follows that if the inner organs of slain animals are found to be hale and vigorous, men also in the same place may live healthily. But if the members of the dead animals are diseased, it can be very reasonably assumed that neither for men would a dwelling in that place be healthy.

But, just as temperate air is required, so also pure water. For on those things more especially depends the health of the body which more often are taken for the use of men. And concerning air it is manifest that, daily, in breathing it we draw it within ourselves to our most vital organs, whence upon its healthiness the soundness of the body principally depends. Similarly, since among those things which are

taken in the way of nutriment water is that which we most often use both in drink and in food, hence after the purity of air nothing pertains to the healthfulness of a place so much as the purity of its waters. And there is another sign by which the healthiness of a place may be known, if, namely, the countenances of the men dwelling in that place be of a wholesome colour, if their bodies be strong, and their limbs well shaped, if they have many children, and they are vigorous, and if many among them live to old age. On the other hand, if the faces of the men be deformed, their bodies weak, their limbs deficient or diseased, if they have few or unhealthy children, and few old people are to be found among them, it is certain that the place is unfavourable to life. (Chap. ii.)

THE SITE OF A CITY SHOULD HAVE A SUFFICIENCY OF
FOOD AT HAND

It is necessary that the place selected for the building of a city should not only have healthiness which will preserve the inhabitants, but the fertility to suffice for food. For it is not possible for a number of men to live where there is not plenty of food. Whence, as the philosopher says, when Xenocrates, a most clever builder, showed to Alexander of Macedon how a beautiful city might be built on a certain hill, Alexander is said to have inquired whether there were fields to furnish an abundance of corn to the city. When he was told that there were not, he answered that it would be great wrong for any one to build a city in such a place. For as a new-born child cannot be nourished or induced to grow without the milk of its nurse, so a city without abundance of food cannot have many people in it.

There are two ways in which a city may abound in food-stuffs. Firstly, through the fertility of the district which produces, in abundance, all things that are necessary to human life. Secondly, from the thronging of merchants, by

which the necessities of life are brought from all parts. The first method is plainly preferable. For anything is more worthy according as it is found to be more self-sufficing, because a thing that has need of another is clearly wanting in itself. But a city manifestly possesses a fuller sufficiency to which the surrounding districts can supply the necessities of life than one which depends on receiving them from others by way of commerce. For a city is nobler if it have an abundance of things from its own land than if it abound through merchandise. Since this also is seen to be safer because the carrying of food can be easily prevented through the chances of war and the dangers of transit, and so the city might suffer from want of food. This also is more useful to civil business. For a city which needs for its sustenance a multitude of bargainings must necessarily suffer continual intimacy with strangers. But intercourse with strangers is very corrupting to the manners of citizens, according to the teaching of Aristotle in his "Politics," because it is inevitable that strangers, brought up to other laws and customs, will act in many ways not according to the custom of the city; and so, when the citizens are encouraged by their example to similar acts, civil intercourse is disturbed. Again, even if the citizens devoted themselves to merchandise, the door is opened to many vices. For since the zeal for business tends towards gain, cupidity is aroused through business in the hearts of citizens, so that all things in the city have their price and, faith being taken away, an opening is given to fraud, and, the public weal falling into contempt, each man ministers to his own convenience so that the pursuit of virtue fails, while honour, the reward of virtue, is withdrawn from all. Whence it follows, of necessity, that civil intercourse will be corrupted.

The use of business is likewise thoroughly opposed to military exercises. For when business men seek the shade, rest from labours and indulge in delights, their souls become luxurious and their bodies weak and unfit for military

labours; whence, according to civil law, business is forbidden to soldiers. Finally, a city is more peaceful when its people meet together more rarely, and when few dwell within the walls of the city. For by the frequent concourse of men occasion for quarrels is given and excuse for intrigue is furnished. Whence, according to the teaching of Aristotle, it is better that a people should be exercised outside the city than that they should always dwell within the city walls. But if a city is given over to business it is very necessary that the citizens should dwell within the city and there devote themselves to business. It is better, therefore, that a city should be supplied with a sufficiency of food from its own lands than that it should totally depend upon business. Nevertheless, merchants should not be altogether excluded from the city, because a place cannot easily be found that so abounds in all the necessities of life that it does not need some things brought from without; and also the plenty of those things which superabound in the same place may prove injurious to many if they cannot be transferred through the assistance of merchants to other places. Whence it is necessary that a perfect city should use merchants in moderation. (Chap. iii.)

THE SITE OF A CITY SHOULD BE AGREEABLE

The place chosen for the building of a city should be pleasing to the inhabitants by reason of its beauty. For an agreeable place is not easily deserted, nor does a multitude of inhabitants flow readily to a place that is wanting in beauty, since without pleasantness the life of man cannot long endure. Now, for this pleasantness, it is necessary that a place should be spread out over broad plains, that it should have an abundance of trees, with mountains near, pleasant groves, and be watered by many streams. But, for as much as too great agreeableness allures men easily to luxury, which is very injurious to a city, it is therefore necessary to use it

with detachment. For, firstly, men that give themselves up to delights become blunted in their senses, for the sweetness of them immerses the soul in the senses, so that in things that are delightful they cannot judge freely. . . . Then, superfluous delights make men fall away from the integrity of virtue, for nothing more leads to immoderate increase, by which the mean of virtue perishes, than yielding oneself wholly to delights: both because the nature of delighting is greedy, and so when one delights for a little space one is thrown upon the allurements of unclean pleasures, as faggots caught with a spark are lit up; and also because the yielding to delights does not satisfy the desire, but, tasted, leads of itself to a greater thirst. . . . Finally, softened by delights they become lazy, and, putting aside even necessary work and business due, they care only for pleasures, on which they lavishly squander the goods that have been collected by others. And hence descending to poverty, and not being able to do without their accustomed pleasures, they betake themselves to thefts and robbery, so that they may have the means to enjoy their delights. It is, therefore, injurious to a city to abound in superfluous pleasures, either from the disposition of the place or from other things. But it is fitting that there should be some pleasure in human intercourse, as it were a condiment, so that the soul of man may be refreshed. (Chap iv.)

MORALITY OF BUYING AND SELLING

THE SELLER AND THE DEFECTS OF HIS GOODS

To put any one in the way of danger or hurt is always unlawful, although it is not necessary that a man should always go to the assistance of another, or give him counsel destined to better him in some way; for this is necessary only in given cases, as when the other is under his care, or when he cannot be succoured by any one else. Now a seller, who offers a thing for sale, puts the buyer in the way of hurt or peril if he offers him an imperfect thing, if he can incur peril or hurt from the imperfection. Hurt he suffers if by reason of this imperfection the thing which is offered for sale is of a lower value, and he subtracts nothing from the price because of it; but a peril, if on account of the imperfection, the use of the thing is hindered or made harmful. For instance, if any one should sell to another a lame horse for a swift, or an unstable house for a firm, or rotten or poisonous bread for good. Whence if these defects are hidden and he does not show them, the sale is unlawful and deceitful, and the seller is bound to make recompense for the injury.

But if the defect is manifest, as, say, a horse with only one eye, or when the seller cannot make use of the thing but it can be of use to others, and if he on account of this defect subtracts as much as it behoves him from the price, he is not bound to point out the defect; since perhaps, pleading the defect, the buyer might wish to have the price diminished more than it ought to be. Whence the seller can lawfully consult his own indemnity by not mentioning the defect. (2-2-77-3-0.)

SELLING ABOVE THE ARTICLE'S WORTH

To admit fraud by selling a thing at more than a just price is certainly sinful, in so far as one deceives his neighbour to his hurt. Whence even Tullius says: "*Hence all deceit must be removed from the transaction of affairs: let not the seller appoint the bidder, nor the buyer one to bid against himself.*"

But if fraud is absent, then we may speak of buying and selling in two ways. Firstly, in itself, and in this light buying and selling seem to be introduced for the convenience of both, one needing a thing possessed by the other, and conversely, as is clear from the philosopher. Now what is instituted for the common convenience ought not to be more to the advantage of one than of another, and hence there ought to be formed a contract between them according to the equality of the thing. But the worth of a thing, which is of use to men, is measured by the price given; and this is the origin of money, as is said in the "*Ethics.*" And hence if either the price exceeds the worth of the thing or, conversely, the thing exceeds the price, the equality of justice is destroyed. And, therefore, to sell more dearly or to buy a thing more cheaply than it is worth is in itself unjust and unlawful.

We can speak of buying and selling in another sense, in so far as by accident it is of use to one and a detriment to the other; as when one very much needs to have a thing, and another suffers injury if he lacks it; and in such a case that will be a just price that not only regards the thing sold but also the hurt which the seller suffers by selling it. And in this way one can lawfully sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, although not for more than it is worth to its possessor. But if any one derives much advantage from receiving something from another, but the latter selling it suffers no hurt in its loss, we ought not to overcharge it, since the advantage which arises is not from the seller but from the state of the buyer. But no one ought to sell to another what is not his own, although he may sell

him what is of hurt to him. But he who, by receiving a thing from another, wins a great help may of his own free will add to the price paid to the seller; which belongs to his honesty. (2-2—77—4—0.)

Human law is given to the people, among whom are many lacking in virtue; and it is not given to the virtuous alone. And hence human law cannot prohibit whatever is against virtue, but it is sufficient to forbid things that destroy the living together of men; but it may hold other things lawful, not because it approves, but because it does not punish them. So therefore it allows as lawful, leading to no punishment, a man, without fraud, to sell his goods at a higher price, or a buyer to buy more cheaply; unless the excess be extreme, since then even human law enforces restitution, as if any one be deceived beyond the half quantity of the just price. But the divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue. Whence, according to the divine law, it is reputed unlawful if in buying and selling the equality of justice is not observed; and he who has the more is bound to make recompense to him who suffers injury, if this be notable. I say, therefore, that since the just price of things is not determined to a point, but rather consists in a certain estimation, a slight addition or diminution does not seem to affect the equality of justice. (1m.)

SELLING FOR MORE THAN WE BOUGHT

It belongs to business men to be occupied in the exchange of things. As the philosopher says, however, exchange may be of two kinds. One kind of exchange is in a sense natural and necessary; that, namely, by which exchange is made of thing for thing, or things, and money on account of the necessities of life; and such traffic does not strictly belong to business men, but rather to economists or politicians whose business it is to provide either for the house or city in things necessary for life.

But another species of exchange is that either of money for money, or some sort of thing for money, not on account of things necessary to life, but for the sake of gain; and this traffic strictly seems to belong to the business men, according to the philosopher.

Now the first kind of exchange is praiseworthy because it serves natural necessity. But the second is justly blamed, since in itself it is the minister of the lust for gain, which has no term, but tends to infinity.

And hence business considered in itself has a certain foulness, in so far as of its own nature it does not imply any honest or necessary end. But gain, which is the end of the business men, although in its own notion it does not suggest anything honest or necessary, yet it does not imply anything vicious or contrary to virtue, whence nothing stands in the way of gain being regulated to some necessary or even honest end; and so commerce may be rendered lawful, as when any one devotes the moderate gain, which he seeks in commerce, to the sustenance of his house, or even to succour the needy; or also when one is intent upon business for the sake of the public utility, so that, namely, things that are necessary may not be lacking in his country; and he looks for gain, not as to an end, but as the price of his labour. (2-2-77-5-0.)

Not every one who sells a thing dearer than he bought it is commercial, but only he who simply buys that he may sell at a higher price. But if one should buy a thing not to sell it again, but to keep it, and afterwards for some cause wish to sell it, this is not business, although he sell it at a higher price. For one may lawfully do this, either because he has improved the thing in some respect, or because the price of the thing is changed according to the diversity of place or time, or on account of the danger to which he exposes himself by conveying the thing from place to place or by causing it to be borne. And, as to this, neither buying nor selling is unjust. (2m.)

USURY

It is to be said that to receive usury for lent money is in itself unjust, because that which is not sold, through which inequality clearly arises, which is contrary to justice.

To make this clear it must be known that there are certain things whose use is their consumption, as we consume wine in using it for drink and wheat when we use it for food. And in such things we must not judge the use of the thing apart from the thing itself; but in granting the use the thing itself is necessarily granted, and for this reason by lending, the dominion over the thing is transferred. If then any one should wish separately to sell wine, and the use of wine, he would sell the same thing twice or he would sell that which is not, whence he would clearly sin by injustice. And for a like reason, he commits injustice who lends wine or wheat seeking two recompenses for himself, one for the restoring of an equal thing and the other the price of the use, which is called *usury*.

There are other things, however, which to use is not to consume; as the use of a house is the dwelling in it, but not its destruction. And hence in such things one can grant both things separately, as when any one gives to another the ownership of the house, reserving to himself the use for a certain time; or, conversely, when one grants the use of a house, reserving however its ownership. And for this reason one may lawfully take a price for the use of the house, and besides this he can seek a suitable house, as is clear in the hiring and letting of a house.

But money, according to the philosopher, was principally invented for the making of exchanges; and so the peculiar

and principal use of money is its consumption and division, according as it is laid out on exchanges. And for this reason, in itself, it is unlawful to accept a price for the use of money lent, which is called usury; and as man is required to restore other goods unjustly acquired, so also the money he has taken in usury. (2-2-78-1-0.)

Human laws allow many sins to go unpunished, because of the condition of men who are imperfect, for if all sins were strictly prohibited by the infliction of punishments, by this many utilities would be hindered. And therefore human law allows usury, not as though it judged it to be according to justice, but lest the advantages of many should be hindered. Whence in civil law itself it is said that a thing which is consumed in the use neither by natural reason nor by civil law earns an interest; and that the senate did not make the interest on them, but so to say agreed upon the interest, granting, that is to say, usury. And the philosopher, led by natural reason, says that the usurious acquisitions of monies is very much beyond nature. (3m.)

Everything is taken as money whose price may be measured by money. And therefore just as if any one, for the loan of money, or any other thing which is consumed in the use, accepts money either from a tacit or expressed compact he sins against justice, as has been said, so also whoever, from a compact implied or expressed, receives anything else, the value of which may be measured by money, incurs the same sin.

But if he accepts anything of this kind not necessarily, nor as from any obligation implied or expressed, but as a free gift, he does not sin; because even before he had lent the money he could lawfully have received a free gift, nor is he in a worse condition because of his loan.

But it is lawful to demand for a loan recompense in those things which are not measured by money, namely, a goodwill and love for him who made the loan, or such like. (78-2-0.)

He who makes a loan can without any sin make agreement

with him who accepts the loan for compensation for the loss, by which something is taken away from him which he ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of the money, but to avoid injury; and it may be that accepting a loan he avoids a greater hurt than he who gives incurs; whence he who accepts the loan should recompense the hurt of the other from the advantage it has done him. But the recompensing of loss which is considered in this, that there is no money gain, may not be matter of compact, because he cannot sell that which is not yet possessed and which in many ways he may be prevented from obtaining. (1m.)

RESTORATION OF USURIOUS GAIN

As has been said above (p. 248), there are certain things whose use is their consumption, which according to law do not acquire any payment for their use. And, therefore, if such payments are extorted by usury (say money, wheat, wine, etc.), a man is required to restore only that which he received; for that which has been acquired from such a thing was not the fruit of it, but of human industry, unless perchance by detaining such a thing the other suffer an injury by losing something of his goods, for then he is bound to give compensation for the hurt.

But there are other things to use which is not to consume them, and these have usufruct, as a house, a field, and other things of this character. And hence if any one should have extorted the house of another, or his field, by usury, he would be bound not only to restore the house, or field, but also the fruits obtained by them, since they are the fruits of things owned by another, and hence they are due to him. (78—3—0.)

RECEIVING A LOAN UNDER USURY

It is in no way lawful to induce a man to sin; but to use the sin of another for good is lawful, since God also uses all

sins for some good, for from every evil he draws some good. And hence Augustine replies to Publicola, who asked if it were lawful to use the oath of one who swore by false gods, in which he clearly sinned, showing them divine reverence, that "*he who uses the faith of him who swears by false gods not to evil but unto good, does not associate himself with his sin, by which he swore through demons, but with his good compact by which he kept faith. But if he should lead him to swear by false gods it would be sin.*"

So also, here, it must be said that by no means may one induce another to lend for usury; but he may accept a loan for usury from him who is prepared to do this, and who takes usury, for the sake of some good, which is the assistance in his necessity or that of another. . . . (78—4—0.)

He who takes money as a loan for usury does not give occasion to the usurer of receiving usury, but of lending. But the usurer himself takes occasion for sinning from the malice of his heart. Whence there is passive scandal on his part, but not active scandal on the part of him who seeks the loan. Nor yet because of this passive scandal should one desist from seeking a loan if he needs it, since this passive scandal comes not from infirmity or ignorance, but of malice. (2m.)

NATIONALITY AND THE STATE

NATIONALITY THE BEST FOUNDATION FOR A STATE

It belongs to the study of politics to know how great should be the magnitude of a state, and whether it should embrace men of one or of many races; for the greatness of a state should be such that the fertility of its land is sufficient to its needs, and that it should be able to repel violent enemies. For it ought rather to be founded of one race, since oneness of nationality, involving the same manners and customs, is that which brings about friendship among citizens, because of their likeness; whence states that were made up of diverse nations, by reason of the dissensions that they had because of the diversity of their customs, were destroyed, since one part joined with the enemy for hatred of the other part. (*Com. Pol.* 3—2.)

IDENTITY OF THE STATE

The state cannot be said to be the same if the order of governance is changed, for since that community of the citizens, which is called policy, belongs to the notion of a state, it is clear that when the policy is changed the state does not remain the same. And this we see . . . in all things that consist in a certain composition or communion, that whenever the species of composition is different the identity perishes: just as it is not the same harmony if at one time it is Doric, that is to say, of the seventh or eighth tone, and at another it is Phrygian, that is to say, of the third or fourth tone. Since, therefore, all such things share this

character, it is manifest that the state must be said to be the same with respect to the order of policy; so that when this order is changed, although the place and the people remain the same, it is not the same state, in spite of its being materially the same. But a state, changed in this fashion, may be called either by the same or by another name, but if it is called by the same name it will be equivocally so called. (*Ibid.*)

THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY

Two offices pertain to man with regard to exterior things. The first is the power of procuring and dispensing them, and, in respect to this, it is lawful for man to hold things as his own. It is even necessary for human life, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because every one is more solicitous about procuring what belongs to himself alone than that which is common to all or to many, since each shunning labour leaves to another what is the common burden of all, as happens with a multitude of servants. Secondly, since human affairs are conducted in a more orderly fashion if each has his own duty of procuring a certain thing, but there would be confusion if each man should procure certain things haphazard. Thirdly, because in this way the peace of men is better preserved, for each is content with his own. Whence we see that strife more frequently arises among those who hold a thing in common and undividedly.

The other office which is man's concerning exterior things is the use of them; and, with regard to this, a man ought not to hold exterior things as his own but as common to all, that he may portion them out readily to others in time of need. (2-2-66-2-0.)

The common claim upon things is traceable to the natural

law, not because the natural law dictates that all things should be held in common and nothing as belonging to any particular person, but because according to the natural law there is no distinction of possessions, which comes by human convention. (1m.)

A rich man does not act unlawfully if making use of a possession which in the beginning was common he also shares it with others, but it is sinful for him to withhold the use of it from others. (2m.)

When Ambrose says: "*Let no one call his own what is the property of all,*" he speaks of possessing with regard to the use, whence he adds: "*More than is sufficient to one's needs is wrongfully held.*" (3m.)

In urgent necessity a man may succour his need by taking the property of another, either openly or secretly, and this is not properly speaking theft. (2-2—66—7—0.)

FAVOURITISM

NOT to treat all men impartially is opposed to distributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in this, that men are treated differently according to their deserts. If, therefore, any one considers the gift of the person on account of which the reward was only his due, this is not to show a preference for the person but for the cause; whence the Gloss upon "*God is not an acceptor of persons*" (Eph. 6)¹ says that: "*God being a just judge regards deserts and not persons.*" Take an example: if any one should call a person to exercise authority because he possesses sufficient knowledge, here the fitting cause is considered and not the person; but if one should consider in a man, upon whom he has conferred a gift, not whether the gift be fitting or due, but simply that it is this man, Peter or Martin, this is to be an acceptor of persons, since the gift is set aside for him not because of his intrinsic worthiness, but simply for the person. For to the person is referred some condition which does not constitute a cause of worthiness: for instance, if any one should promote a man to a prelacy or to a position of authority because of his riches or because he is a relative, it is to be an acceptor of persons.

But yet it may happen that a certain condition may render a person worthy of one thing and not of another, as the tie of blood makes it fitting that one should come into his patrimony, but not that he should be raised to a prelacy of the Church. In the first case this is not being partial to a person, but in the second it is. (2-2—58—1—0.)

DUTY OF A CITIZEN IN REGARD TO KNOWN CRIME

THERE is this difference between making known and accusing, that in making known a fault the end is the reforming of the brother, but in accusation the punishment of crime. Yet the punishments of this present life are not wished for themselves, since this is not the time of ultimate retribution; but in so far as they are medicinal, bearing either upon the renewing of the sinner or the good of the state, the peace of which is procured by the punishment of sinners; and the first of these is intended in making the sin known, but the second belongs strictly to accusation.

And hence if the crime should be of such sort that it tends to the detriment of the state, it is a man's duty to make accusation, provided that he is able to prove it sufficiently, which belongs to the duty of an accuser; for example, when one's sin tends to the bodily or spiritual corruption of a multitude. But if the sin be not such as will fall upon the many, or if one cannot produce sufficient proof, there is no obligation to attempt accusation, since no one is bound to that which he cannot accomplish in due order. (2-2—68—1—0.)

It is objected that no one is bound to act against that faith which he owes to his friend, since we must not do to another what we do not wish done to ourselves. But to accuse is, at times, against the faith that one owes to his friend, for it is said in Proverbs (xi. 13):¹ “*He that walketh deceitfully revealeth secrets: but he that is faithful conceals what his friend commits to him.*” Hence man is not bound to accuse.

Now to this it must be said, that to reveal secrets to a person's hurt is against faith; but not if they are revealed for the sake of the common good, which is ever to be set before the private good. And hence it is not lawful for any one to receive a secret that is against the common good. Nor moreover is that altogether a secret that can be proved by sufficient witnesses. (3m.)

THE COMMON GOOD

THE goodness of each part is measured by its proportion to its whole, whence Augustine says: "*Unightly is every part which does not agree with its whole.*" Since, then, every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that one should be good unless he is well proportioned to the common good; nor can the whole exist well except it is knit together from parts proportioned to it. Whence it is impossible that the common good of the state should be well achieved unless the citizens are virtuous, at least those whose function it is to govern. But for the good of the community it is sufficient that the others should have enough virtue to obey the commands of the ruler. And hence, the philosopher says, the virtue of a ruler and of a good man is the same, but the virtue of every citizen is not the same as that of a good man. (1-2—92—1—3m.)

WAR

THREE things are required to justify a war. Firstly, the authority of the ruler at whose word the war must be waged. For it is not lawful for a private person to commence a war, or to call together such an assembly as war requires.

Secondly, a just cause is required.

Thirdly, that the intent of those making war should be right, so that it is sought to promote good or avoid evil. But it may happen that, although there is legitimate authority and a just cause for war, it may be rendered unlawful by evil intent. For as Augustine says: "*The desire to do hurt, the cruelty of vengeance . . . savageness of renewing combat, the lust for power and the like—these are things which are justly blamed in war.*" (2-2-40-1-0.)

Those who wage war justly also wish for peace, and hence do not oppose it, unless it be an evil peace. Whence Augustine wrote to Boniface: "*Peace is not sought as an occasion for war ; but war is waged that peace may be established. Be therefore peaceful in warring that, by conquering, you may lead to the usefulness of peace those whom you subdue.*" (Ad. 3m.)

Those things which are directed by art or reason should be conformed to the order of nature which is contrived by the divine reason.

Nature, however, has two tendencies: first, to order everything in itself; secondly, to resist whatever menaces it from without; and, hence, animals possess not only desire which draws them to things which preserve them in health, but also anger by which they resist when they are attacked.

Whence also in the things of reason, not only should there be political prudence which regulates the common good, but also military prudence by which the attacks of the enemy are repelled. (2-2-50-4-0.)

THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR

"*Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.*" This is after the command of the law, and treats of the love of our neighbour. But how much we ought to love our neighbour has been said already; and the manner of the love remains to be spoken of, which indeed is suggested when it is said, *as thyself*; about which word we may consider five points that ought to be observed in the love of our neighbour. The first is that we ought to love him *truly as ourselves*, which we do if we love him for his own sake and not for ours. Hence it must be noted that love is of three kinds: of which two are not true, but the third is true. The first is *on account of utility*. "*There is a friend, a companion at the table, and he will not abide in the day of necessity*" (Ecclesiasticus vi. 10).¹ But this is certainly not true love, for it fails when usefulness is lacking; and then we do not will good to our neighbour, but rather the good of usefulness we wish for ourselves. There is also another kind of love which is *for the sake of pleasure*; and this also is not true, because it fails with pleasure's failing; and hence we do not wish the good for the sake of our neighbour principally, but rather we wish his good for ourselves. The third is the love which is *on account of virtue*, and that alone is true love. For then we do not love our neighbour for our own but for his good.

The second is that we ought to love *in due order*, that is to say, that we should not love him above God, or as much as God, but in the same way as we ought to love ourselves. "*He set in order charity in me*" (Canticle of Canticles ii. 4).² This order the Lord taught in Matthew (x. 37),³ saying: "*He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me*;

and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me." The third is that we ought to love him *efficaciously*. For we do not only love ourselves, but also we diligently procure for ourselves good things and avoid evil. So also we ought to work for our neighbour. "*Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth*" (1 John iii. 18).¹ For surely those are worst of all men who love with their mouth and in their heart hate: "*They speak peace with their neighbour but evils are in their hearts*" (Ps. xxvii. 3);² "*Let love be without dissimulation*" (Rom. xii. 9).³ Fourthly, we ought to love him *perseveringly*, as we love ourselves: "*He that is a friend loveth at all times, and a brother is proved in distress*" (Prov. xvii. 17),⁴ that is, in the time of adversity rather than of prosperity; moreover, then, namely, in time of adversity a friend is especially proved, as is said in the same place.

But it must be observed that two things there are which make for the preservation of friendship. The first is *patience*: "*For an angry man stirreth up strife*," as is said in Proverbs (xxvi. 21).⁵ The second is *humility*, which causes the first: "*Among the proud there are always contentions*" (Prov. xiii. 10).⁶ For he that thinks much of himself, and despises another, cannot bear with the other's defect.

The fifth is that we love him *justly* and *holily*, that is to say, that we love him not to sin, for neither ought we so to love ourselves since by this we lose God. Whence John says: "*Abide in my love*" (xv. 9),⁷ of which love it is said: "*I am the mother of fair love*" (Ecclesiasticus xxiv. 24).⁸ (*Exposition on the two precepts of the law under the title given.*)

FRIENDSHIP

FRIENDSHIP AND PASSION

As the philosopher says, "*To love is to wish one good.*" Hence the motion of love tends towards two things, namely, towards the good which one wishes to himself or his fellow, and towards that to which he wishes the good. Towards that goodness, therefore, which one wishes to another goes out the love of *passion*; but for that to which any one wishes good, the love of friendship is felt.

But this division follows the logical distinction of the first and next in order. For that which is loved with the love of *friendship* is loved directly and of itself; but what is loved with the love of *passion* is not loved directly and in itself, but for another. For just as absolute and essential entity is that which has being, but relative entity that which is in another, so goodness which is entity is called simply goodness when it has goodness of itself, but when it is the good of the other it is goodness with a reservation; and as a consequence, when anything is loved that goodness may come to it, it is absolute love; but the love by which anything is loved that it may be the good of another is relative love. (1-2-26-4-0.)

Love is not divided into *friendship* and passion but into the love of *friendship* and that of *passion*; for he is, strictly speaking, a friend to whom we wish some good, but we are said to have a passion for that which we wish for ourselves. (1m.)

In useful and delightful friendship one wishes good to the friend, and in so far the nature of friendship is preserved. But because he refers that goodness further to his own delight

and use, it follows that useful and delightful friendship, in so far as it leads to the love of passion, falls short of the measure of true love. (3m.)

FRIENDSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE

Natural love is said to be given to something as to an end, not as that to which a man wishes good, but as the good which he desires for himself, and consequently for another in so far as the latter is one with him. (1-60-4-3m.)

Goodness is the cause of love as its object. Now this is not the object of desire unless it is known, and hence love requires a certain knowledge of the good that is loved. And for this reason the philosopher says that "*bodily vision is the principle of the love of sense,*" and similarly the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the foundation of spiritual love. Hence knowledge is the cause of love for the reason that goodness itself cannot be loved unless it is known. (1-2-27-2-0.)

Something is requisite for the perfection of knowledge that is not necessary for that of love. For knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to analyse those things which in nature are one, and to put together things which are diverse, comparing one with another. And hence for the perfection of knowledge it is necessary that man should know separately whatever there is in a thing, as its parts, powers, and properties. Now love is in the desire, which regards the thing according as it is in itself; whence for love's perfection it suffices that the thing be loved as it is seen in itself. For this reason it happens that a thing may be loved more than it is known, since it can be loved perfectly although it is not known perfectly; as is especially clear in the sciences, which many love on account of a certain summary knowledge they have of them. . . . And the same is to be said of the love of God. (1-2-27-2-2m.)

LIKENESS AND LOVE

Similarity is, strictly speaking, the cause of love. But it must be remembered that similarity between things may exist in two ways: firstly, from both possessing an actual identity, as two having the quality of whiteness are said to be similar; secondly, from one having potentially and as to a certain tendency that which another has actually . . . or even according as potentiality has a likeness to the act itself, for in potentiality itself, in some sense, there is actuality. The first kind of likeness, then, causes the love of friendship or goodwill—for from the fact that a certain two are alike, as it were having one form, they are in a sense one in that form; just as two men are one in the species of humanity and two white in whiteness—and hence the affection of one tends towards the other as towards one with himself, and he wishes him good as he does himself.

But the second kind of likeness causes the love of passion (or desire), or the love of the useful, or delightful, since in everything which exists in potentiality towards something, in so far as it is of this nature, there is the desire of its actuality, and in its possession it delights, if it feels and knows.

Now it has been said above (p. 261) that in the love of passion the lover strictly loves himself, since he wishes that good to which his passion goes out. But every one loves himself more than another, since he is one with himself in substance, but with another in the likeness of some form. And therefore if because the other is like him in the sharing of a form he himself is hindered from possessing the good which he loves, the other becomes hateful to him, not in so far as he is like to him, but in so far as he is a hindrance to his private good. (1-2—27—3—0.)

LOVE AND UNION

The union of the lover with the loved one is twofold: firstly, a real union, as when the loved one is actually present to the lover; secondly, according to affection, and this union must be considered from the preceding apprehension, for the motion of desire follows knowledge. But since there is a twofold kind of love, namely, that of passion and that of friendship, both are founded on the recognition of the union of loved and lover: for when one loves anything, as desiring it, he apprehends it as belonging to his well-being. Similarly, when one loves another with the love of friendship, he wishes him good, just as he wishes it for himself, whence he looks upon him, as another self, in so far as he wishes him good, just as to his very self; and hence it is that a friend is said to be another self; and Augustine says: "*He has well called his friend the half of his soul.*"

Hence, the first kind of union love makes as its effect, since it moves one to desire and seek the presence of the loved one as one agreeing with and belonging to self.

But the second kind of union it makes formally, for love itself is such a union or bond. Whence Augustine says that "*love is a certain joining of two desiring union, or to unite,*" the lover, namely, and what is loved. For when it says *union*, it refers to the union of affection without which love is not, but when it says *intending to unite*, it belongs to real union. (1-2-28-1-0.)

Another kind of union is essentially love itself; and this is union according to the predilection of affection, which is assimilated to substantial union in so far as the lover looks to the beloved in the love of *friendship*, as to himself, but in the love of *passion*, as to something he possesses. Another union is the effect of love; and this is real union, which the lover seeks from the thing loved, and this union is after the competence of love. For as the philosopher says: "*Aristo-*

phanes said, that lovers desired that the two be made one. But since in this either both or one of the two would necessarily be destroyed, they seek such union as they can have and is seemly, that, namely, they may walk together, and talk together, and in such like things be united." (2m.)

THE UNION OF LOVED AND LOVER

The effect of mutual indwelling may be understood both as to the faculty of understanding and that of desire.

For, as to the faculty of knowledge, the loved one is said to be in the lover in so far as the loved dwells in the knowledge of the lover, according to that of Philippians: "*For that I have you in my heart*" (i. 7).¹ But the lover is said to be in the beloved as to knowledge in so far as the lover is not content with a superficial knowledge of the beloved, but strives to search out interiorly each single thing belonging to the beloved; and so his zeal reaches to the most inner things, as it is said of the Holy Spirit, who is the love of God, that "*he sounds even the deeps of God*" (I Cor. ii. 10).²

But as to the faculty of desire, the loved is said to be in the lover by a certain complacency in his affection so that he either delights in him or in his gifts when he is present, or in his absence he tends by desire towards the loved itself with the love of *passion*, or towards the good things which he wishes to the loved one by the love of *friendship*: not indeed from some extrinsic cause, as when one desires something on account of another, or when any one wishes good to another on account of something else, but because of the complacency with the loved one rooted within him; whence also love is called *intimate* and the *bowels of charity*. On the other hand, the lover is within the loved one in one way by the love of *passion*, in another way by the love of *friendship*. For the love of *passion* does not rest in any extrinsic or superficial possession or enjoyment of the loved one, but seeks to possess the loved one perfectly, so to say, penetrating

to its most intimate things. But in the love of *friendship* the lover is in the loved in so far as he regards the gifts or sufferings of his friend as his own and his friend's will as his own, as though he seems to be affected by and to suffer his good fortune and evil. And for this reason it is the property of friends "*to wish the same things, and in the same to sorrow and rejoice*" (Philosopher); so that, in so far as they are his friends, he looks on them as his own, and the lover seems to be in the beloved as though made one with him; but, on the other hand, in so far as he wishes and acts for the sake of the friend as for himself, as if reputing the friend identical with himself, so the beloved is in the lover. But in yet a third manner one can understand a mutual indwelling in the love of *friendship* according to return of love, in so far as friends love each other mutually and wish and work good to each other. (1-2—28—2—0.)

FRIENDSHIP AND DISAGREEMENT IN OPINIONS

As the philosopher says, concord in opinions does not belong to friendship, but agreement in such things as bear upon life, especially in the greater, since to dissent in certain minor matters is hardly to be esteemed a dissent. And for this reason there is nothing to prevent men having friendship from disagreement in opinions. Nor is this repugnant to peace, since opinions belong to the intellect, which goes before the desire, which peace unites. Similarly also, when concord exists in the principal objects of desire, dissent in certain small things is not against charity, for such disagreement is grounded in diversity of opinions, when one thinks this on which they disagree belongs to that desirable object to which they are in harmony and the other thinks it does not pertain to it. And according to this, such dissension in details and opinions is repugnant to perfect peace, in which full truth will be known and every desire fulfilled; but it is not repugnant to the imperfect peace which we may have in this life. (2-2—29—3—2m.)

HABITS

WHETHER A HABIT IS A QUALITY

THE term *habit* is taken from *having*, and it is derived from this in two ways: firstly, in so much as man or any other thing is said to have anything; secondly, according as a thing has a certain disposition in itself or with regard to some other thing.

As to the first, it is necessary to consider that *to have*, as far as it regards that which is had, is common to diverse genera. Whence the philosopher places *having* among the post-prædicaments which apply to diverse genera of things, such as *opposites*, *the previous and the subsequent*, and such like.

Now among those things which one may have this seems to be the distinction, that there are certain things in which there is no medium between him who has and what he has, as between the subject and quality or quantity there is no medium; but there are certain others in which no medium exists between the two, but only a relation, in which manner any one is said to have a companion or friend; there are other things, again, between which there is a medium, not indeed action or suffering action, but something after the fashion of action and suffrance of it, for instance, as one ornaments or rules and the other is ornamented or ruled. Whence the philosopher says that "*habit means a certain action of him who has and that which he has*," as it is in those things which we have ourselves. And, therefore, these things constitute one special genus of things, which is called the *prædicament of habit*; of which the philosopher says that "*between him that has clothes and the clothes which he has, there is something intervening*."

But if to have is considered according as a thing has a certain disposition in itself, or with regard to some other thing, since that disposition is owing to a certain quality, in this way habit is a kind of quality; of which the philosopher says that "*a habit is a disposition by which that which receives the disposition is disposed well or badly either in itself or towards some other thing,*" in the same manner that health is a kind of habit. And in this way we are speaking now of habit, whence it must be said that habit is a quality. (1-2—49—1—0.)

Disposition is always a certain order of that which has parts; and this may be in three ways, as the philosopher adds, namely, according to place, power, or species, in which, as Simplicius says, are all dispositions comprehended; corporeal, indeed, in that *according to place*, and this belongs to the prædicament of *position*, which is the order of parts in a place; that *according to power* includes those dispositions which are in preparation, and in agreement, not yet perfect, as the beginning of science and virtue; but that *according to species* includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits, as complete science and virtue. (3m.)

WHETHER HABIT IS A DETERMINED SPECIES OF QUALITY

The philosopher places first among the species of quality *disposition and habit*.

And of these Simplicius explains the differences when he says that some qualities are natural which inhere by nature and always, but others are adventitious which are produced from without and can be lost. And these which are adventitious are habits and dispositions, differing according to the *ease or difficulty with which they are removable*. Now of natural qualities some are according to the potentiality of the thing, and such belong to the second species of quality; others, according to the actuality of the thing, and this throughout the thing, or as to its surface; if throughout the thing, this

is the third species of quality; if as to the surface, it is of the fourth species of quality, as *figure and form*, which is the figure of the animated. But this distinction of the species of quality does not seem to be suitable. For there are many figures and passive qualities which are not natural but adventitious, and many dispositions not adventitious but natural, as health, and beauty, and such like; and for this reason it does not harmonise with the order of species, for that which is natural is ever first.

And hence, the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities must be sought elsewhere. For each quality implies a certain mode of substance; now a mode is, as Augustine says, "*that which measure sets up*," whence it implies some determination according to a measure. And hence, just as that by which the potentiality of matter is determined as to its substantial being is called quality, which is the specific difference of the substance, so that by which the potentiality of the subject is determined as to its accidental being is called an accidental quality, and this is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the philosopher. Now the mode or determination of the subject as to its accidental being may be considered as having a relation to the very nature of the subject, or with regard to the action and suffrance of action, which respond to the principles of nature which are matter and form, or according to quantity. But if the mode or determination of the subject is considered with regard to quantity, this is the fourth species of quality. And since quantity, of its nature, is without motion, and has neither goodness nor badness, therefore it does not belong to the fourth species of quality to be disposed either well or evilly, or that it should either quickly or tardily pass.

But the mode or determination of the subject as to receptiveness belongs to the second or third species of quality. And, therefore, in both one may consider that anything becomes easy or difficult, or that it is easily lost or lasting; but there is not to be considered in them anything of good-

ness or evil, because the motions and passions do not pertain to the end. But goodness and evil are named with respect to the end. Now the mode and determination of the subject with respect to the nature of the thing belongs to the first species of quality, which is *habit* or *disposition*. For the philosopher says, speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that they are "*certain dispositions of the perfect towards the best, but I call perfect that which is disposed according to its nature.*" And because "*the form itself and the nature of a thing is an end, and that for the sake of which something is done,*" as the philosopher says, therefore in the first species is considered both the *good* and *evil*, and also the *ease* or *difficulty of removal*, according to which a certain nature is the end of generation and motion. Whence the philosopher defines habit as "*the disposition by which any one is disposed well or evilly,*" and he says that "*habits are they by which we are regulated either well or evilly with regard to our passions.*" For when it is a mode agreeing with the nature of the thing, then it has the nature of goodness; but when it does not agree, then it has the nature of evil.

And for as much as nature is that which is first considered in a thing, therefore *habit* is called the first species of quality. (Art. 2.o.)

The difference "*difficult to move*" does not mark off habit from other species of quality, but from disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways: firstly, as being the genus of habit, for *disposition* is used in the definition of habit; and disposition, properly so called, may be considered to be divided from habit in two ways: firstly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, that is to say, *disposition* retains the common name when it inheres imperfectly, so that it may be easily lost, but is called *habit* when it inheres perfectly so that it may not be lost with ease, and so a disposition becomes a habit as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of a sub-alternate genus, as those qualities of the first species are called *dis-*

positions, with the nature of which it agrees, according to their special essence, to be easily removable, since they have causes which are changeable, as sickness and health. But those qualities are called *habits* which, according to their nature, are not easily changed, since they have immovable causes, such as the sciences and the virtues, and according to this disposition does not become habit. And this seems to be more in accord with the intention of Aristotle. Whence to the proof of this distinction he brings forward the common usage of speech, according to which qualities which are of their nature easily removable, if by any chance they are rendered difficult to remove, are called *habits*, and it is just the opposite with qualities which are by their nature removable with difficulty. For if any one should imperfectly have science, so that he could lose it easily, he is more truly said to be disposed to science than to have science. And from this it follows that the term *habit* implies a certain duration, but not the term *disposition*. Nor does it follow from this that *easily* and *with difficulty removable* should not be specific differences, for the reason that they pertain to receptiveness of action and motion and not to the genus of quality; for those differences, although they seem to have reference to quality indirectly, yet denote specific and essential differences of qualities, just as, in the genus of substance, accidental are frequently taken for substantial differences, for as much as by them essential principles are denoted. (3m.)

THE RELATION OF HABIT TO ACTION

To have a relation to action may pertain to habit both as a habit and on account of the subject in which the habit inheres.

By the nature of habit every habit has a relation of some sort to action, for the notion of a habit implies a certain disposition in relation to the nature of the thing, according to which it essentially agrees or disagrees with it. Now the

nature of a thing, which is the term of generation, is further directed to another end, which is either operation or something operated, at which one arrives by operation. Whence habit not only implies a relation to the nature of the thing, but also, as a consequence to operation, as the end of nature, or a means to the end. Whence it is also laid down in the definition of habit that "*it is a disposition by which the disposed thing is directed either well or evilly in itself,*" that is, according to its nature, "*or towards some other thing,*" that is, with respect to the end.

But there are some habits which even by reason of the subject in which they inhere first and principally imply relation to action; since, as it was said in the preceding article, habit primarily and naturally implies a relation to the nature of the thing. Hence, if the nature of the thing in which the habit inheres consists itself in relation to action, it follows that the habit principally implies a relation to action. But it is manifest that the nature and reason of a potentiality is that it should be the principle of action. Whence every habit which inheres in a potentiality as a subject, principally, implies a relation to action. (Art. 3.o.)

THE NECESSITY OF POSSESSING HABITS

It has been said that habit implies a disposition in relation to the nature of a thing, and to its operation or end, by which a thing is well or evilly disposed towards it.

Now three things are required that a thing should need to be disposed towards another: firstly, that that which is disposed should be other than that to which it is disposed, and be related to it as potentiality to act. Whence, if there should be anything the nature of which is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance is its operation, and whose end is itself, there habit or disposition has no place, as is clear in God. Secondly, it is required that that which is in potentiality towards another is capable of being

determined in many ways and to many things. Whence if anything is in potentiality to another, in such a way that it can be in potentiality only to that thing, there disposition or habit cannot exist; because such a subject has, by its nature, the relation it requires to the act. Whence, if the heavenly body is composed of matter and form, since that matter is not in potentiality to any other form . . . there is no ground for disposition or habit as to the form or even to the operation, since the nature of the heavenly body has a potentiality determined to one motion. Thirdly, it is necessary that many things should concur in disposing the subject towards one of those things to which it has a potentiality, which may be brought about in diverse ways, in order that by this means it may be disposed well or evilly to the form or the operation. Whence simple qualities of elements, which agree with the natures of the elements according to one determinate mode, are not called *dispositions* or *habits*, but simple qualities. But we call dispositions or habits, health, beauty, and such like, which imply a certain ordering of many things, which may be brought about in many diverse ways. And for this reason the philosopher says that "*habit is disposition*," and disposition is "*the order of that which has parts, either according to place, potentiality, or species*." . . .

Since, therefore, there are many entities, for the natures and operations of which it is necessary that many things should come together, which can be achieved in diverse ways, the possession of habits is necessary. (Art. 4.o.)

A faculty, at times, is potential to many things, and therefore it requires to be determined by some other thing. But if there should be a faculty which has not a potentiality to many things, it has no need of a habit determining it, as is said above; and for this reason the natural powers do not perform their functions through the medium of habits, since of their natures they are determined to one thing. (3m.)

BODILY HABITS

As has been said, a habit is a certain disposition of the subject in potentiality to the form or to its operation. Now in as much as a habit implies a disposition to an operation, no habit is principally in the body as in a subject. For every operation of the body comes either from the natural condition of body or from the soul moving the body. With regard, therefore, to those operations which proceed from nature, the body is not disposed by any habit, because the natural powers are determined to one operation. But it has been said that an habitual disposition is required where the subject is in potentiality to many things. Now the operations which proceed from the soul through the body belong principally to the soul, and only in a secondary sense to the body. But habits are proportioned to their operations, whence from "*similar acts similar habits are caused.*" And, therefore, the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul, but they may be secondarily in the body, in so far as the body is disposed and accustomed promptly to wait upon the soul's operations.

But if we speak of the disposition of the subject to the form, in this way an habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as the subject to its form; and for this reason health and beauty and such like are called *habitual dispositions*; but they have not perfectly the nature of habit, for their causes, from their very nature, are easily changed.

Now Alexander said that in no sense is there habit or disposition of the first species in the body, as Simplicius remarks, but he held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone, and that Aristotle brought forward health and sickness, not as pertaining to the first species of quality, but by way of example, and that the sense is that, just as sickness and health may be easily or with difficulty removed, so also the qualities of the first species, which are called

habit and *disposition*. But this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle, both because he uses the same manner of speech amplifying that concerning health and sickness and concerning virtue and science, and also because he expressly puts beauty and health among habits. (1-2—50—1—0.)

Corporal dispositions are not simply *removable with difficulty* on account of the changeableness of bodily causes, but they may be *removable with difficulty* with regard to such a subject, since, namely, while the subject endures they cannot be removed, or because they are *removable with difficulty* in comparison with other dispositions. But the qualities of the soul are simply *removable with difficulty* on account of the immovableness of the subject. And, therefore, it is not said that health, which is *removable with difficulty*, is absolutely a habit, but that it is *as a habit*, as it appears in the Greek. But the qualities of the soul are absolutely called *habits*. (2m.)

WHETHER THE SOUL IS THE SUBJECT OF HABITS BY ITS ESSENCE OR BY ITS POWERS

As it has been said above, a habit implies a certain disposition in relation either to the nature of the thing or to its operation.

If, then, habit is taken as having a relation to the nature, it cannot be in the soul, if we are speaking of human nature, for the soul is the form which completes human nature. Whence, in this light, a habit or disposition may rather reside in the body as having a relation to the soul than in the soul with a relation to the body.

But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may be a sharer, according to that: "*That we may be sharers of the divine nature*" (2 Pet. i. 4),¹ in this sense there is nothing which prevents habit being in the essence of the soul, namely, grace. . . .

But if habit be taken as having a relation to operation, in

this way, in the highest degree, habits are found in the soul, for as much as the soul is not determined to one operation but regards many things, which is necessary for the existence of habit. And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, according to this, habits are in the soul's powers. (Art. 2.o.)

WHETHER HABIT CAN RESIDE IN THE SENSITIVE PART
OF THE SOUL

The sensitive powers may be considered in two ways: firstly, as far as they operate from the instinct of nature; secondly, as operating at the command of reason.

In as far as they operate from the instinct of nature, they are directed to one thing, just as nature is, and therefore, as there are no habits in the natural powers, so also there are none in the sensitive powers, in so far as they operate from the instinct of nature.

But in so far as they act at the command of reason they may be directed to diverse things, and so there can be habits in them, by which well or evilly they are disposed to anything. (Art. 3.o.)

The sensitive powers in animals do not operate at the command of reason, but if they are left to themselves they act by nature's instinct, and so in animals there are no habits directed to operations, but there are in them certain dispositions agreeable to their nature, such as health and beauty. But because animals are disposed by a sort of custom to perform things in this or that way, in this sense there may be said to be habits in animals in some manner. Whence Augustine says that "*we see the most savage beasts deterred from the greatest delights by fear of sorrows, so that, when they have changed their custom, they are called tame and meek.*" But the nature of habit is lacking with regard to the use of the will, since they have not the power of using or not using,

which seems to belong to the nature of habit. And therefore, speaking strictly, there cannot be habits in them. (2m.)

"*The sensitive desire, by its nature, is destined to be moved by the rational desire,*" as is said by the philosopher; but the rational powers of apprehension, by their nature, receive from the sensitive powers. And hence it is more agreeable that habits should be in the sensitive powers of desire than in the sensitive powers of apprehension, since in the sensitive powers of desire there are no habits, except in so far as they act at the command of reason. Yet even in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension one may hold that there are certain habits by which a man easily remembers, thinks, or imagines. Whence also the philosopher says that "*custom contributes very much to a ready memory,*" since also those powers are moved to act at the command of reason. But the exterior apprehensive powers, such as sight and hearing and the like, are not receptive of habits, but according to the disposition of their nature are directed to their determined acts, just as the members of the body, in which are no habits, but rather in those powers that call forth their motion. (3m.)

HABITS AND NATURE

A thing can be natural in two ways: firstly, according to the nature of the species, as it is natural to man to laugh and for flames to rise; secondly, according to the nature of the individual, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be sick or in health by reason of their own peculiar state of being. Again, according to both natures, a thing can be called natural in two ways: firstly, in as much as all is from nature; secondly, in as much as with regard to one thing it is from nature and with regard to another it is from an exterior principle, as when any one is healed of himself all the health comes from nature, but when any one is healed by means of medicine the healing is partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle.

If, therefore, we speak of habit as being the disposition of the subject in relation to the form or nature, in each of the above ways it happens that habit is natural. For there is a certain natural disposition, which belongs to the human species, outside of which no man is found; and this is natural according to the nature of the species. But because this disposition has a certain breadth, different grades of it belong to different men, after the nature of the individual; and this disposition may be either wholly from nature or part from nature and part from an exterior principle, as was said above about those who are healed by art.

But habit, which is a disposition with regard to operation, the subject of which is the power of the soul . . . can be natural both according to the nature of the species and according to the nature of the individual. . . . For, according to the nature of the species, by which it is attributable to the soul itself, which is the form of the body, it is the principle that determines the species; but according to the nature of the individual it is attributable to the body, which is the material principle. Yet, still, in neither way does it happen that there are in man natural habits that are totally from nature. But in angels it is the case, because they have the species of understanding naturally impressed, and this does not pertain to human nature. There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits as partly coming from nature and partly from an exterior principle.

But it is one way with the powers that apprehend and another with those that desire. . . . For in the apprehensive powers there can be a natural habit as to its beginning, both according to the nature of the species and according to the nature of the individual; according to the nature of the species on the part of the soul itself, as the understanding of principles is said to be a natural habit, for from the very nature of the intellectual soul it is congruous to man that as soon as he knows what a whole is, and what a part, he should know that every whole is greater than its part,

and it is the same with the rest. But he cannot know what is a whole, and what a part, except from the species of understanding taken from the phantasms of the imagination. And for this reason the philosopher shows that the knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. But as to the nature of the individual, there is a certain intellectual habit with regard to the natural preparation, in so far as one man from the state of his bodily organs is more apt to receive knowledge than another, since for the operation of the intellect we need the sensitive powers. But in the powers of desire there is no natural habit as a preparation on the part of the soul itself so far as regards the substance of the habit itself, but only as to certain beginnings of it, as the principles of the common law are said to be the *seeds of the virtues*. And this obtains because the inclination to their special objects, which seems to be the beginning of habit, does not belong to habit, but rather belongs to the very reason of the faculties. But, on the side of the body, according to the nature of the individual, there are certain habits of desire, as far as regards natural preparations, for there are some who from the state of their bodies are disposed to chastity and meekness or to other virtues. (1-2—51—1—0.)

HABITS AND ACTS

Some agents are constituted from the active principle alone of their acts, as in fire there is the active principle of making hot alone; and in such an agent no habit can be caused from its own act. Whence natural things "*cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed to anything*," as is said by the philosopher.

But in other agents there is both an active and a passive principle of their acts, as is clear in human acts. For the acts of the faculty of desire proceed from it, according as it is moved by the faculty that apprehends representing the

object; and, further, the faculty of understanding, as far as it reasons about conclusions, has, as an active principle, propositions which are immediately known. Whence from such acts can be caused habits in the agents, not indeed as to the first active principle, but as to the principle of the act, which moves the moved thing. For everything which suffers and is moved by another thing is disposed by the act of the agent. And hence from multiplied acts there is generated in the passive and moved power a certain disposition which is called *habit*; just as the habits of the moral virtues are caused in the faculties of desire according as they are moved by reason, and the habits of the sciences are produced in the intellect in as much as they are moved by the first propositions. (Art. 2.0.)

WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CAUSED BY ONE ACT

As has been said, a habit is caused by acts in as much as the passive power is moved by some active principle. But in order that a quality should be produced in the passive power, it is necessary that the active should completely overcome the passive. Whence we see that since fire cannot wholly overcome combustibles, it does not immediately set them on fire; but little by little it casts out contrary dispositions, in order that, by totally conquering them, it may impress its likeness upon them.

Now it is manifest that the active principle, which is reason, cannot wholly overcome the faculty of desire in one act, because the latter is inclined variously and towards many things. But the reason judges in a particular act that a certain thing is to be desired according to certain determined reasons and circumstances. Whence, from this, the faculty of desire is not wholly overcome, so that it should be borne towards the same as it happens in many things by nature, which belongs to the habit of virtue. And therefore the habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act but by many.

Now in the faculties of desire it must be remembered that there is a double passivity: first, indeed, the possible intellect itself; secondly, the intellect which Aristotle calls *passive*, which is a certain *special reason*, that is, the thinking power together with that of memory and imagination. With respect to the first passivity, it is possible for an active thing, by one act, completely to overcome the potentiality of its passivity, just as one proposition which is known immediately prevails upon the intellect to assent firmly to the conclusion, which indeed a probable proposition does not achieve. Whence from many acts of reason it is necessary that there should be caused a habit of conjecture, even on the part of the possible intellect. But it is possible that there should be caused a habit of science from one act of the reason with regard to the possible intellect, but with respect to the lower faculties of apprehension it is necessary for the same acts to be many times repeated, in order that anything should be firmly impressed upon the memory. Whence the philosopher says that "*meditation strengthens the memory.*" But it is possible that bodily habits should be caused by one act, if the active principle is very potent, as sometimes strong medicine produces health immediately. (Art. 3.0.)

INFUSED HABITS

Habits are infused by God for a double reason: the first is because by certain habits a man is well directed to an end, which exceeds the power of human nature. Whence such habits can never be in man except by God infusing them, as it happens in all gratuitous virtues.

The other reason is because God can produce the effects of secondary causes without those secondary causes. . . . Hence, just as at times, to show his power, he produces health without the natural cause, which, however, could be produced by nature, so also at times, to show his power, he infuses in man even those habits which can be caused by

natural power; as he gave to the Apostles knowledge of the Scriptures and all languages which men by study or custom can acquire, although not perhaps perfectly. (Art. 4.0.)

Because God works in all things after their own condition it does not follow that he should not perform certain things which are impossible to nature, but that he should not work anything contrary to that which is agreeable to nature. (2m.)

THE INCREASE OF HABIT

Increase, like other terms which belong to quantity, is transferred from corporeal quantities to the things of the spirit and intellect on account of the agreement of nature between our intellect and things corporeal which fall within the province of the imagination. Now a thing is called great in corporeal things according as it leads to the due perfection of quantity, whence a certain quantity would be called great in a man which would not be thought great in an elephant. Hence also in forms a thing is called great in so far as it is perfect. And because goodness shares the nature of perfection, for this reason: "*In those things which are not great in mass, to be greater, is to be better,*" as Augustine says. But the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: firstly, with regard to the form itself; secondly, with regard to the manner in which the subject participates in the form. So far, then, as the perfection of the form, taken in itself, is considered, it is called small or great; such as great or little health or science. But as to the manner in which the subject shares the form it is called more or less, as more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction does not proceed from the form having being outside the matter or subject, but because it is one thing to consider it according to its specific nature and quite another with regard to the manner in which it is shared by the subject.

For this reason there were, therefore, four opinions among philosophers about the intensifying and loss of habits and

forms, as Simplicius relates. Plotinus and other Platonists were of the opinion that qualities and habits themselves can become more or less for the reason that they are material, and on account of this they are in some way indeterminate because of the infinity of matter. Others, again, on the contrary, thought that the qualities and habits themselves are not susceptible of becoming more and less, but that those who possess them are called more or less from the different manner in which they participate in them; for instance, justice is not called more or less but a just man. And Aristotle mentions this opinion in the "Prædicaments." The third was the opinion of the Stoics, a middle way between these; as they held that certain habits, considered in themselves, may become more and less, such as the arts; but certain others cannot, like the virtues. A fourth opinion was held by some that immaterial qualities and forms cannot become more or less, but the material forms can.

And hence, in order that the truth of this thing may be made quite clear, it must be remembered that that by which anything is constituted in a species must be fixed and stable and as an indivisible. Whatever things arrive at this are contained under a species; whatever things recede from it, either by more or less, belong to another species, more perfect or less perfect. Whence the philosopher says that "*the species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction changes the species.*" If therefore any thing or form, either of itself or by something of its own, should be constituted in a species, it follows that, considered in itself, it has a determined nature, which can neither exceed by addition, nor can it fall short by loss, and of this sort are heat and whiteness and similar qualities, which are not so named in relation to something else; and much more is substance, which is being, existing of itself. But those things that receive their specific existence from something to which they are directed may in themselves be changed either more or less, and yet they remain of the same species because of the

unity of the thing to which they are directed and from which they take their species; for instance, motion, in itself, may be more intense or weaker, and yet it remains of the same species on account of the unity of its terminus by which it is specified. And the same appears in health; for the body reaches the standard of health when it is disposed in the manner which the nature of an animal requires, and many different dispositions may satisfy this; whence the disposition may vary as to more or less and yet always retain the nature of health. And hence the philosopher says that health itself may become more or less, for the measure is not the same in all, nor always in one and the same, but, when weakened, health remains to a certain extent. Now these different dispositions or measures of health are as that which exceeds or an excess; whence if the name of health were to be given only to the most perfect measure, then health could not be called more or less. And from this it is clear how any quality or form can, considered in itself, be increased or diminished, and how this is impossible.

But if we consider quality or form as to its possession in a given subject, in this way also there can be found certain qualities and forms that may be increased or diminished, and certain others which do not admit of it. And the reason of this diversity Simplicius suggests is that substance in itself does not admit of being more or less, because it is independent being. And therefore every form that is substantially possessed in a subject is not capable of intensification and weakening. And for as much as quantity most intimately touches substance, form and figure also follow quantity, hence it is that neither in these can we speak of more and less. And so the philosopher says that: "*When anything receives form and figure, it is not said to be altered, but rather to become.*" But other qualities that do not touch substance so intimately, and are connected with the passions and active powers, are capable of receiving increase or being diminished as to the way they are shared by a subject.

And the reason of this diversity can be much more readily explained. For, as was said above, that from which a thing derives its species must be fixed and stable and indivisible. In two ways, therefore, can it happen that a form may not be shared more or less intensely: firstly, because the subject that shares the form has its species of itself, and hence no substantial form is shared more or less intensely, and for this reason the philosopher says: "*Just as number does not admit of more or less, so neither does substance which is specified,*" that is to say, as far as the possession of the specific form; "*but if indeed it is attached to matter,*" that is, as to material dispositions, "*we may speak of more and less in substance.*" Secondly, this may happen for this reason, that indivisibility belongs to the nature of form. Whence it is necessary that if anything participates in a form it should share it as indivisible. And hence it is that the species of number cannot be said to be more and less since each species in them is constituted by an indivisible unity. And the same reason obtains in the species of continuous quantity, which is founded upon number, as a bicubit or a tricubit; and of relation as double and triple; and of figures as triangle and quadrangle. And Aristotle gives the reason of this when, suggesting the reason why figures do not admit of increase or diminution, he says: "*That which receives the nature of triangle or circle, similarly is a triangle or circle.*" For indivisibility is of their nature, whence whatever shares their nature must share it indivisibly.

And hence it is clear that since habits and dispositions have by nature a relation to something, in two ways intensification or weakening may be taken: firstly, in itself, as we speak of more or less health, or more or less science, which extends to many or fewer facts: secondly, as to the sharing in a subject, in so far as equal science or health is better received in one than in another, by reason of their different aptitude from nature or custom. For habit and disposition do not give a species to a subject, nor do they include indivisibility in their nature. (1-2—52—1-0.)

WHETHER EACH ACT INCREASES A HABIT

"*Similar acts cause similar habits.*" But similarity and dissimilarity are not only applied to the same or a different quality, but also to the same or a different measure of its possession. For not only is black dissimilar to white, but also the less white to the more white; for the change from less white to more white is as from one thing to its opposite, as the philosopher says. Now since the use of habits lies with the will, as is said above (p. 272), for it may happen that one who possesses a habit does not use it or even acts contrary to it; so also it may happen that one may from a habit perform an act which is not of the intensity of the habit.

If, then, the intensity of the act is equal to that of the habit, or if it exceeds it, each act intensifies the habit, or disposes the faculty for an increase, as we speak of the growth of habits in the same way as of the growth of an animal. For not every piece of food actually increases the animal, just as not every drop does hollow out a stone, but the continued reception of food at length causes an increase; and so also from multiplied acts a habit grows. But if the intensity of the act falls short of that of the habit, such an act does not tend to the increase of the habit, but rather to its diminution. (Art. 3.o.)

Successive stages in the generation of a habit do not come from this that one part of it is generated after another, but that the subject does not immediately achieve a disposition that is firm and difficult to remove, and that at first it commences to dwell imperfectly in a subject, but by degrees it comes to perfection, as it is also with other qualities. (1-2—54—4—1m.)

THE CORRUPTION OF HABITS

A form is said to be brought to corruption directly by its contrary, but indirectly by the corruption of the subject in

which it inheres. If, therefore, there should be any habit whose subject is capable of corruption, and whose cause has a contrary, in both ways it may come to corruption, as is clear of bodily habits, such as health and sickness. But habits whose subject is incorruptible cannot suffer corruption indirectly.

Now there are certain habits which, although they are principally in an incorruptible subject, are, in a secondary sense, in a corruptible subject, as the habit of science which is principally in the possible intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension . . . and therefore on the side of the possible intellect they cannot suffer corruption indirectly, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.

It remains, therefore, to consider if these habits may come to corruption directly. If, therefore, there should be any habit that has any opposite either on its own part or on that of its cause, it can come to corruption directly, but if it has no opposite it cannot be destroyed directly. Now it is manifest that the species of understanding existing in the possible intellect have no opposite; nor again in the active intellect which is their cause can there be an opposite. Whence if there is any habit in the possible intellect caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and indirectly. But of this sort are the habits of first principles both speculative and practical, which by no forgetfulness or deception can be destroyed, and so the philosopher says, speaking of prudence, that "*it is not lost by forgetfulness.*"

But there is a certain habit in the possible intellect caused by reason, namely, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which there can be in two ways an opposite. Firstly, on the part of the propositions themselves, from which reason sets out. For to the statement "*Good is good*" is the contrary "*Good is not good*," as the philosopher points out. Secondly, in the process of reasoning, in as much as a sophistic syllogism is opposed to a

dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. So, therefore, it is clear that from false reason the habit of true opinion and even of science can reap corruption. Whence the philosopher says that "*deception is the corruption of science.*" . . . Now among virtues certain are intellectual, which dwell in the reason itself, and the same argument applies to them as to science or opinion.

But other virtues are in the desiring part of the soul, and these are the moral virtues, and the same applies to the opposite vices. But the habits of the desiring part of the soul are caused by this, that reason is, by nature, the mover of the desiring part. Whence by the judgment of the reason moving towards the contrary in whatever manner, that is, whether from ignorance, or passion, or even election, the habit of virtue or vice is destroyed. (1-2—53—1—0.)

Science is not removed by bodily motion as far as the very root of the habit, but only with regard to the hindrance of the act, in as much as the intellect, in its act, needs the sensitive powers by which a hindrance is offered through bodily change. But by the intellectual motion of reason the habit of science can be destroyed even to the very root of the habit; and similarly also the habit of virtue can come to corruption. And yet what is said: "*Virtues are more lasting than sciences,*" is to be taken not on the part of the subject or cause, but on the part of the act, for the use of virtue is continuous throughout the whole life, but not the use of sciences. (3m.)

WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE DESTROYED OR DIMINISHED SIMPLY BY THE CESSATION FROM USE

As the philosopher says, a thing may be a mover in two ways: firstly, of itself, namely, that which moves by the nature of its own form, as fire warms; secondly, indirectly, as that which removes what is in the way of motion. And in this manner ceasing from work causes the corruption or

diminution of habits, in as much as it removes the acts which prevent the destroying or diminishing causes of habits. For it has been said that a habit is directly destroyed or diminished by a contrary agent. Whence where the contraries of habits grow by the lapse of time, which must be removed by an act proceeding from the habit, this kind of habit is diminished or even taken away altogether by a long cessation from act, as is clear even in science and virtue. For it is manifest that a habit of moral virtue renders a man prompt in choosing the mean in operations and in the passions. But when any one does not use the habit of virtue to regulate his passions or his own special operations, it follows that many passions and operations, outside the virtuous mean are brought forth from the inclination of the sensitive desire and other things which move us from without. Whence virtue either perishes or diminishes by cessation from act. In similar fashion is it with regard to the intellectual habits, by which a man is rendered prompt to judge aright in what the imagination provides. When therefore any one ceases to use an intellectual habit there arise extraneous imaginations, at times leading to contraries, so that unless they are cut down and repressed, in some manner, by the frequent use of an intellectual habit, man is rendered less fitted to judge aright, and at times he is totally disposed towards the opposite. And so by ceasing from act the intellectual habit is diminished or even destroyed. (Art. 3.o.)

WHETHER HABITS ARE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO
GOODNESS AND BADNESS

Habits are specifically distinguished not only by their objects and active principles, but also in relation to nature, which happens in two ways: firstly, as to their agreement with nature or disagreement with it; and in this way habits are specifically distinguished by their goodness and badness.

For that is called a good habit which disposes the subject to an act in agreement with the nature of the agent, and that is called a bad habit which disposes the subject to an act not agreeing with the nature of the agent; since an act of virtue is in agreement with human nature because it is according to reason, but an act of vice, for as much as it is against reason, is not in accord with human nature. And so it is manifest that by the difference of goodness and badness habits differ in species.

In another way also habits are distinguished according to nature, from this that one habit disposes to an act of the lower nature, and another habit disposes to an act agreeing with the higher nature. And in this manner human virtue, which disposes to an act in agreement with human nature, is distinguished from heroic or divine virtue, which paves the way for an act agreeing with a certain superior nature. (1-2-54-3-0.)

The goodness which is common to every entity is not the difference constituting the species of a habit, but a certain determined good, which agrees with a determined nature, namely, human nature. Similarly also, evil, which is the differentia that constitutes a certain habit, is not merely privation but is something determinate that is repugnant to a determinate nature. (2m.)

THE SCOPE OF NATURAL SCIENCE

It is necessary, at the beginning, to determine what is the matter and subject of natural science. Hence, it must be noted that, since every science is in the understanding, and a thing is made actually intelligible by this that to some extent it is withdrawn from matter, according as certain things are differently connected with matter they belong to

different sciences. Again, since every science is arrived at by demonstration, and the means of demonstration is definition, it is necessary that sciences should be differentiated according to their different manner of definition.

Let it be observed, then, that there are some things whose being depends upon matter, and without introducing matter they cannot be defined; but there are other things which, although they cannot exist except in sensible matter, yet the latter does not enter into their definition. And these things differ from one another as a curve and a snub. For a snub is in sensible matter, and it is necessary that sensible matter should enter into its definition, for a snub is a curved nose; and of this kind are all natural things, such as man and stone; but a curve, although it cannot exist except in sensible matter, yet the latter does not enter into its definition; and of this sort are all mathematical things, such as numbers, quantities, and figures. But there are other things which depend upon matter neither as to their being nor according to reason; either because they are never in matter, like God and other separate substances, or because they are not universally in matter, as substance, potentiality, and act, and entity itself.

Of these, then, metaphysics treats, but with things which depend upon sensible matter as to being but not according to reason mathematics is occupied; of those things, however, which depend upon matter, not only as to their being but also according to reason, natural science treats, which is called physics. And for as much as everything possessing matter is movable, it follows that movable entity is the subject of natural philosophy. For natural philosophy is of natural things, but natural things are those whose principle is nature; nature, however, is the principle of motion and rest in that in which it exists; hence natural science treats of those things which have in them the principle of motion. (*Com. Phys.* 1, lect. 1, §§ 1, 2, 3.)

SEMINAL CAUSES

THE coming forth of creatures from God is like the coming forth of the contrivances of art from a craftsman; whence just as from the art of the latter flow artificial forms in matter, so also from the ideas existing in the divine mind flow all natural forms and powers. But since, as Denis says: "*The qualities that dwell in things that are caused, are in the causes more fully,*" forms that appear in matter do not adequately represent the uncreated power or art from which they proceed. Whence there remains in the craftsman, from his art, the power of working something different with regard to what he has contrived, to which the power of art is not bound; and, similarly, it is in the divine power to add, or change, or take away something from created things. But in two ways the operation of God differs from that of the craftsman. Firstly, on the part of the matter: because, since the craftsman does not produce the matter, but works upon given matter, he does not confer upon the matter the power to receive the forms which he causes in it, nor can he introduce anything into the matter. But God, who is the author of the whole of the thing, not only confers upon things natural forms and powers, but also the power of receiving in matter whatever he wishes to work. Secondly, on the part of the form: for the forms which the craftsman causes do not produce like forms, for when a couch falls into decay it does not bring forth a couch, but a plant, as is clear from what the philosopher says; but natural forms can produce their like, and therefore they have the property of seed, and may be called seminal.

Now the forms of things as existing in the divine art are said to be primordial, because they are absolutely the first principles of things to be produced; but the power which is

impressed upon things of receiving that within themselves which the will of God disposes by some are called obediential causes, according as there is in matter that which God wills may be produced from it. But those powers residing in matter, through which natural effects follow, are called seminal causes. Yet what seminal causes are actually is explained by men in different ways. . . .

And, hence, I grant that in matter no power is active, but purely passive, and that what are called seminal causes are complete active powers in nature with their proper passives, as heat and cold, and the form of fire, and the sun's power, and such like; and they are called seminal, not because of the imperfection of their being, like the formative power in seed, but because these powers were conferred upon the first created individual things in the works of the six days, so that from them as from seeds natural things might be produced and multiplied. (2 *Sent.* 18—1—2—0.)

THE ELEMENTS

HE (Aristotle) gives three definitions of element. Of which the first is, that an element of other bodies is that into which other bodies are divided or resolved. For not every cause may be called an element, but only that which enters into the composition of the thing. Whence universal elements are matter and form, as is clear in the first book of "Physics." (*On the heavens and the world*, book 3, lect. 8, § 6.)

Those things are said to be the principles and causes of natural things from which they are and are made directly and not accidentally; but everything that is made exists and is made of subject and form; hence subject and form are direct causes and principles of everything that is made according to nature. But that what is brought about

according to nature is effected from subject and form he proves in this fashion. Those things into which the definition of a thing is resolved are components of that thing, since everything is resolved into those things from which it is composed. But the definition of that which comes to be according to nature is resolved into subject and form, for the definition of a musician is resolved into that of man and that of music; for if any one wishes to define a musician it is necessary for him to give the definition of man and of music. Hence whatever comes to be in nature is, and is effected from subject and form. And note that here Aristotle intends to inquire the principles not only of being made, but also of being; whence he says significantly, "*from which first things they are, and are made.*" And he says, "*from which first things,*" that is to say, essentially and not accidentally. Essentially, therefore, the principles of everything that is made according to nature are subject and form. (*Com. Phys.* I, lect. 13, § 2.)

ELEMENTS IN A COMPOUND

Avicenna held that the substantial forms of elements remained entire in a compound, but that the compound was made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to a mean.

But this is impossible, since diverse forms of elements can only be in diverse parts of the matter, and to the diversity of these we must remember belong dimensions, without which divisible matter cannot be. But matter, which is subject to dimension, can only be in a body, and diverse bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements are in a compound with a definite position; and so the compound is not a true and complete one, but a compound to the senses, which is the juxtaposition of parts.

Averroes, however, held that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are means between accidental

and substantial forms; and, therefore, they may be added to or subtracted from; and, therefore, they are modified in a compound, and reduced to a mean, and one form is made from them.

But this is even more impossible, for the substantial being of anything remains indivisible; and every adding to or subtracting from it changes its species, as in the case of numbers, as Aristotle says. Whence it is impossible for any substantial form to be susceptible of addition or subtraction. And it is not less impossible for there to be a mean between substance and accident.

And hence it must be said, after the philosopher, that the forms of elements remain in a compound not actually but virtually, for the properties peculiar to the elements, in which is the virtue of the forms of elements, remain, although modified. And the quality of such a compound is the peculiar disposition to the substantial form of the compound body, as, say, the form of a stone or of any animate thing. (1—76—4—ad. 4.)

NATURAL SELECTION AND PURPOSE

ALL things that arise naturally always or frequently come about thus; but none of those things that come about by fortune or meaninglessly, that is to say, by chance, happen always or very often. For we do not say that it is fortuitous or by chance that it very often rains in winter, but we should say it was chance if it should rain much in the dog days; and, similarly, we do not say that it is by chance that warm weather comes in the dog days, but if it should be in winter.

And from these two it is reasoned in this way. All things that arise, either come by chance or to some end, for things

that happen outside the intending of an end are said to happen by chance; but it is impossible that things which always or frequently arise happen by chance: hence those things that arise always or frequently arise purposely.

As a second reason . . . he (Aristotle) says that in all things there is some aim, and the first and subsequent factors in an act all work in virtue of purpose. Taking this for granted, the argument thus proceeds. A thing acts naturally in the way in which it is constituted adapted to act, for when I say *naturally*, it means *made adapted*. And this proposition is convertible, since in the way that anything is constituted adapted to act, so it acts; but it is necessary to add this condition, unless something impede it. Let us accept, then, the first, which has no urgency, that as a thing acts naturally so it has been given an aptitude to act. But those things that arise naturally so act that they are led to an end; therefore they are *so* constituted adapted to act that it may be for a purpose: and this is to say that nature craves a purpose, that is, it has a natural aptitude for a purpose. Whence it is manifest that nature acts to an end. (*Com. Phys.* 2, lect. 13, §§ 2 and 3.)

ACTION THROUGH A MEDIUM

THE action of no agent, no matter of how great a power, can fall upon an object at a distance unless in so far as it acts upon it through a medium. But this belongs to the greatest power of God that he acts immediately upon all things. Whence nothing is distant from him, as though it had not God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by unlikeness of nature, or grace, just as, also, he is above all by the excellence of his nature. (1—8—1—3m.)

PLANTS AND SEX

IN those things which have perfect life, in generation, agent and patient are distinguished on account of the perfect generation in them. But in plants, which have imperfect life, in the same dwell both powers, that is to say, the active and passive, although perhaps in one plant the active and in another the passive power may dominate; for which reason one plant is called masculine and another feminine. (3 *Dist.* 3—2—1.)

WEIGHT AND DENSITY

THE size of a sensible body is extended or amplified in rarefaction, not by matter receiving something superadded to it, but because matter, which was formerly in potentiality to be great or small, is changed from one to the other. And hence a thing is not made dense or rarefied by the addition or subtraction of parts that make it up, but through this, that the matter of the rare and the dense is one. . . .

From the difference of rarity and density the difference of other qualities arises, namely, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness. And so it is clear that rarity and density diversify qualities and not quantities.

He (Aristotle) says, then, that lightness goes with rarity, and, with density, weight. And this with reason: for rarity results from this, that the matter receives greater dimensions, but density from matter receiving smaller dimensions; and so if different bodies are taken equal in quality, one rare and the other dense, the dense has more matter. (*Com. Phys.* 4, lect. 14, §§ 12 and 13.)

ACCIDIA

ACCIDIA, according to Damascene, is "*a certain burdensome sorrow*," which so weighs down the soul of man that no work is pleasing to him. . . . And hence accidia implies a certain weariness of work, as is clear from what is said in the Gloss upon that of the Psalm (cvi.): "*Their soul loathed all food*;" and from what is said by some that accidia is a "*Stupor of the mind heedless to begin good works*."

Now this kind of sadness is ever evil, sometimes even in itself, but sometimes according to its effect. For sadness in itself is evil, which is consequent upon what is apparently evil and really good; just as, on the other hand, the delight is evil which is of some apparent good, that in truth is evil. Since then spiritual goodness is truly good, sadness which is from spiritual good is in itself evil. But even sadness, which is from real evil, is evil according to its effect, if it burdens man so as to lure him completely from good works. Whence the Apostle (2 Cor. ii.)¹ does not wish that the penitent be "*swallowed up by over much sorrow*."

Since, therefore, accidia, as it is here considered, describes sadness over spiritual goodness, it is doubly evil, both in itself and in its effect. And hence accidia is sin. (2-2—35—1—0.)

Every corporal defect of its nature prepares the way for sadness, and hence those who fast about the hour of noon when they have already begun to feel the lack of food, and to be oppressed by the sun's heat, are more attacked by accidia. (2m.)

At times the motion of accidia is in the passion of sensuality alone on account of the repugnance of the flesh to the spirit, and then it is venial sin; but at other times it reaches even to reason, which consents to the disinclination, and horror, and detestation of the divine goodness, the flesh

completely prevailing over the spirit; and then it is manifest that accidia is mortal sin. (2-2—35—3—0.)

EFFECTS OF ACCIDIA

As far as sadness is with regard to divine goodness, this belongs to the nature of accidia, which gives itself up to undue rest in the measure that the divine goodness is spurned. But the things that Isidore says arise from accidia and sadness are reducible to those that Gregory holds. For *bitterness*, which Isidore holds to be a child of sadness, is an effect of *rancour*. *Idleness* and *drowsiness* are reduced to *torpor about precepts*, as to which one is idle, completely neglecting them, and drowsy, fulfilling them carelessly. And the other five, which he says arise from accidia, pertain to the "*wandering of the mind about unlawful things*," which, as far as it resides in the mind importunately wishing to spend itself on diverse things, is called the *importunity of the mind*, but according as it pertains to knowledge, is called *curiosity*; but as to change of position of the body it is called the *restlessness of the body*, when any one by disordered motions of the members gives evidence of the mind's wandering; but as to diverse places it is called *instability*; or instability may be understood as to changeableness of purpose. (2-2—35—4—3m.)

REMEDIES FOR SADNESS

Crying and groaning naturally mitigate sadness, and this for a twofold reason.

Firstly, since every hurtful thing that is pent up in the interior of the soul works a greater affliction, since then the mind's intent is multiplied upon it; but when it achieves an exterior outlet then the mind's attention is in a sense dispersed over exterior things, and so the interior grief is diminished. And for this reason when men, immersed in

sadness, show their grief exteriorly, either by crying or groaning or even by word, their sadness is lessened.

Secondly, action which is agreeable to the state in which a man is at the time, is ever enjoyable to him; but crying and groaning are operations that are adapted to one sorrowing or grieving, and hence they are made enjoyable to him. Since therefore every enjoyment mitigates sadness or grief, it follows that by wailing and groaning sadness is mitigated. (1-2-38-2-0.)

A friend's condolence in sadness is naturally a consolation. And the twofold reason of this the philosopher gives.

The first is that, since it belongs to sadness to weigh down, it has the nature of a kind of burden, from which any one strives to relieve himself. When, then, any one sees others labouring under his sadness, it suggests the idea of others bearing the burden with him, as though striving to relieve him of the burden; and hence he bears the burden of sadness more lightly, as it also happens in the bearing of bodily burdens.

The second reason, and the better, is that by the fact of friends condoling with him he perceives that he is loved by them, which is a delightful thing. Whence as every delight tempers sadness, it follows that the condolence of a friend mitigates sadness. (1-2-38-3-0.)

Sadness is repugnant to vital motion of the body, and hence those things that tend to restore the bodily nature to its due state of vital motion are repugnant to sadness and temper it. By this also, that in these remedies nature is restored to its due state, delight is caused by them; for this is what induces delight. Whence . . . by these remedies—sleep and the taking of baths—bodily sadness is mitigated. (1-2-38-5-0.)

Anxiety so burdens the soul that it can see no refuge, whence by another name it is called *straitness*. But if this burdening should proceed so far that it even makes the exterior members immovable, this belongs to *accidia*. . . . Hence, moreover, *accidia* is specially said to cut off the voice,

since the voice of all the exterior motions expresses the interior thought and affection more, not only in men, but also in other animals, as the philosopher says. (1-2-35-8-0.)

WOMAN

It must be said that, if Adam had not sinned nor any of his stock, it seems sufficiently probable that an equal number of men and women would have been born. (*Quodlibet* 3-11-25-0.)

It was necessary that woman should be made for the help of man; not indeed for the help of every work, as some have said, since in every other work a man is more conveniently helped by another man, but as his partner in generation. (1-92-1-0.)

Subjection is twofold. Firstly servile, according to which the ruler uses the subject for his own advantage: and this subjection was introduced after sin. But another kind of subjection, called economic or civil, is that by which the ruler uses his subjects for their advantage and good: and this subjection would have existed even without sin. For there would have been lacking the perfection of order in the human race if some had not been governed by others who were wiser. And so in this kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, for as much as man has a greater stock of rational discretion. (*Ibid.* 2m.)

Woman even as to the soul was, in a state of innocence, more imperfect than man. But ultimately (in heaven) there will be such a subjection of body to soul that even the quality of the body will follow the virtue of the soul; whence according to the diversity of merit will one soul possess a higher dignity than another and a more glorious body,

whence there will be no difference as to diversity of sex. (2 *Dist.* 21—1—2m.)

Both in man and woman is to be found the image of God, as to that in which the essence of the image principally consists, that is, as to the intellectual nature. Whence in Genesis (i. 27),¹ when it has been said: "*To the image of God he created him,*" is added: "*Male and female he created them.*" And he uses the plural *them*, as Augustine says, "*lest one should think that both sexes were joined in one individual.*" But in a secondary sense the image of God is in man in a sense in which it does not exist in woman. For man is the beginning and the end of woman, as God is the beginning and the end of every creature. Whence when the Apostle (1 Cor. xi. 7)² had said: "*Man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man,*" he shows why he said this, by adding: "*For the man is not of woman but the woman of man; and the man was not created for woman, but the woman for man.*" (1—93—4—1m.)

BEAUTY

FOR beauty three things are requisite. Firstly, integrity or perfection, for things that lack something are ugly; secondly, due proportion or harmony; and, thirdly, effulgence, whence things with a resplendent colour are called beautiful. (1—39—8—o.)

The beautiful appeals to the knowing power, for those things are called beautiful which delight when seen; whence beauty consists in due proportion, for the sense delights in things duly proportioned, as in things like to itself, for the sense is also a kind of reason, and so with every other knowing power. (1—5—4—1m.)

The beautiful and the good are identical, differing solely

by a distinction of reason. For since the good is *what all things desire*, it is of the nature of the good that in it the desire should be set at rest. But to the nature of the beautiful it belongs to satisfy the desire by its vision or knowledge. Whence those senses especially regard the beautiful which are especially destined to know, namely, sight and hearing, which are the handmaids of reason, for we speak of *beauteous sights and beautiful sounds*. But in the sensible things that are objects of other senses we do not use the name of beauty, for we do not speak of *beautiful tastes or smells*. And so it is clear that the *beautiful* adds to *the good* a certain relation to the knowing power; so that *the good* is that which simply gives pleasure to the desire; but *the beautiful* that the perception of which gives pleasure. (1-2—27—1—3m.)

PERFECTION AND MARRIAGE

PERFECTION not only of poverty but also of continence was introduced by Christ. . . . And so that from no one the hope of attaining to perfection should be taken away, he drew to the state of perfection even those whom he found joined in marriage. For it could not be without injury that husbands should forsake their wives, as it came about that they left all their possessions without hurt. And hence Peter, whom he found joined in wedlock, he did not separate from his wife; but John wishing to be espoused he recalled from espousals. (2-2—186—4—1m.)

LANGUAGE

THERE are some things in man that another can perceive from him naturally, such as things that are discerned by the exterior senses; but there are others that he is not able to see, like the thoughts of the mind. Hence the ideas inwardly conceived, according as they remain solely in the conception of the understanding, have the nature of the intelligible only; but in so far as they are directed by him who understands them to be manifested to others, they are of the nature of a word, which is called the word of the heart; but in so far as they are adapted and in a way directed by signs that appear exteriorly, if they are signs that appeal to sight, they are called nods, but if to hearing they are called vocal speech, for these two senses are capable of training. (*2 Dist. 11—2—3—0.*)

THE USE OF ANIMALS

A MAN does not sin if he uses a thing for the purpose for which it exists. But in the order of things the less perfect exist for the benefit of the more perfect, just as also in the development of things nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. . . . Plants, which only have life, are mostly for the sake of animals, and all animals for man. If, therefore, man makes use of plants for the good of animals, and animals for himself, this is not unlawful.

Among other uses it seems to be especially necessary that animals should use plants for food and man animals, which cannot be unless we may kill them. And hence it is lawful both to kill plants for the use of animals and animals for the use of man. (*2-2—61—1—0.*)

SIMONY

BUYING or selling is unfitting with regard to a spiritual thing for three reasons. Firstly, because no earthly treasure can ever be the equivalent of a spiritual thing. . . . Secondly, because that cannot be a thing to be sold whose seller is not the owner. But a prelate of the Church is not the owner of spiritual things, but their dispenser. . . . Thirdly, because the selling of spiritual things does not seem worthy of their origin, which is the free will of God. . . .

And hence by buying or selling a spiritual thing a man shows irreverence for God and divine things, and sins by irreligion. (2-2-100-1-0.)

SCANDAL

As Jerome says, the Greek word *σκάνδαλον* means offence, or ruin, or the impact of the foot. For it happens that at time a hindrance is placed before any one externally, which, if one strikes against it, occasions injury, and such a hindrance is called a scandal.

And similarly in the way of the spirit, it happens that one is disposed to spiritual ruin by the word or deed of another, in so far as any one by his persuasion, or leading, or example, allures another to sin, and this is properly called scandal.

But nothing disposes to spiritual ruin according to its own nature, except that which has some defect of rectitude; for that which is perfectly right rather fortifies a man against falling than leads him to ruin. And hence it is well said that a *word*, or "*fact lacking complete rectitude, giving occasion of ruin*," is scandal. (2-2-43-1-0.)

The word or deed of another can, in two ways, be the cause of another's sinning: firstly, directly; and secondly, indirectly. It can be the cause directly, when any one, by his evil word or deed, intends to lead any one to sin; or, although he does not intend this, yet the fact is of such a nature that, of its very nature, it seduces to sin; as when any one publicly commits a sin or that which bears the likeness of sin: and then he who commits this act strictly gives occasion to ruin, whence it is called *active scandal*. But indirectly the word or deed of one may be the cause of another's sin, when both beyond the intent of the worker, and beyond the nature of his work, some one, evilly disposed, by this work is induced to sin, for instance, when any one envies the goods of another: and then he who works this good deed does not give any occasion considering the deed in itself, but the other takes occasion, according to that of Romans (vii. 8):¹ "*But sin taking occasion in me by the commandment, wrought in one all manner of concupiscence.*" And hence this is *passive scandal* without any active scandal, since he who acts aright, in so far as it concerns him, gives no occasion for the ruin that the other suffers. At times therefore it happens that, at the same time, there is active scandal in one and passive scandal in another, as when any one, to induce another to sin, sins himself; at times, again, there is active without passive scandal, for instance, when any one tempts another to sin by his word or deed, but he does not consent; and again there is at times passive without active scandal, as is said above. (*Ibid.* 4m.)

SCANDAL AND HOLINESS

Scandal implies a certain moving of the mind from good in him who suffers scandal. But no one is moved who firmly cleaves to the immovable. But the great and the perfect alone adhere to God whose goodness is immovable; for although they cleave to those that are set above them, they

do not except in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to that of the first Epistle to the Corinthians (iv. 16):¹ "*Be ye followers of me, as I am also of Christ.*" Whence, no matter how much they see others bearing themselves wrongly in words or deeds, they do not depart from their rectitude, according to that of the Psalm (cxxiv. 1):² "*They that trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion; he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem.*"

And hence in those that perfectly cleave to God by love is found no scandal. (2-2—43—5—0.)

When a man takes scandal there is always some active cause responsible for it, but not always the active scandal of another, but that of him who is scandalised, for he scandalises himself. (2-2—43—6—1m.)

WHETHER WE ALWAYS WISH FOR WHAT IS GOOD

THE will is rational desire, and every desire is for good alone. The reason for this is that desire is simply a certain inclination, of the agent desiring, towards a thing. But nothing is inclined to anything except to its like, or to what is agreeable to it. Since, therefore, everything, in as much as it is being and substance, has a certain goodness, it is necessary that every inclination should be towards good. And hence it is that the philosopher says that "*good is what all things desire.*"

But we must take into consideration that, since every inclination is consequent on a certain form, the desire which is by nature follows a form as it exists in nature; but sense desire, or that which is rational, which is called the will, is consequent on an apprehended form. Hence just as that, towards which the natural desire tends, is good really existing

in the thing, so what the animal or voluntary desire tends to is the apprehended good. In order that, therefore, the will should go out to a thing it is not necessary that it should be the true good, but that it should be apprehended as good, and for this reason the philosopher says that "*an end is either good or seeming good.*" (1-2-8-1-0.)

LETTER OF SAINT THOMAS

SINCE thou hast asked me, John most dear to me in Christ, how it behoves thee to study to obtain the treasure of science, I give thee this counsel, that thou shouldst not seek to plunge at once into the sea of knowledge, but go by way of the streams that flow thither, since it is wiser to reach the more difficult by way of the less difficult things. This then is my advice and instruction. I charge thee be slow to speak and slow to frequent places where men talk; embrace cleanness of conscience, be instant in prayer, love to dwell in thy cell, if thou wouldst penetrate to the cell of thy Beloved. Be courteous with all, search not too deeply into the deeds of others, be not over-familiar with any, for too great familiarity breeds contempt and offers occasion for desisting from study. Into the words and deeds of people in the world do not in any way pry. Flee useless conversations; do not forget to imitate the ways of the saints and of holy men; regard not him that speaketh, but the good that is uttered commit to memory. And whatever thou readeth or heareth, understand; make certain the doubtful, and lay up in thy mind all that thou canst, in like manner as one who would fill a vessel. Seek not things above thee. By such steps thou shalt bring forth useful branches and fruits in the vineyard of the Lord of Sabaoth while life is with thee. If thou walkest in this way, thou mayest attain to thy desire.

NON-BAPTISED INFANTS AND THE
VISION OF GOD

ON this subject there are three opinions. For some say that the children will experience no sorrow, since reason will be so far clouded in them that they shall not know the fact of their loss; but it does not seem to be probable that the soul, loosed from the weight of the body, should not even know of those things which can be investigated by reason, and also many other things.

And hence others say that in them there is perfect knowledge of those things which are subject to natural knowledge, and they know God, and that they are deprived of the vision of him, and from this they will feel some sorrow; but it will be mitigated, because they have not incurred by their will the guilt for which they are condemned. This also does not seem probable, since the sorrow cannot be slight which is concerned with the loss of so great a good, and especially since there is no hope of recovering it: whence their suffering would not be very slight. Besides, for exactly the same reason by which they will not be punished with exterior sensible pain, they will not feel a lower sorrow, since the sorrow of punishment would not correspond to the delight of the fault; whence as delight is lacking in original sin all sorrow will be excluded from the punishment of it.

And, therefore, others say that they will have perfect knowledge of those things which are subject to natural knowledge, and they will know that they are deprived of eternal life, and the reason of this deprivation, but they will not be afflicted by it; and it remains to be seen how this may be.

It must be remembered that a man, if he be of right reason, does not suffer from the knowledge that he lacks something which exceeds what is due to his condition; but only from

lacking that which is his due, just as no wise man is distressed because he cannot fly like a bird . . . since this is not due to him; but he would be distressed if he were deprived of that for which he was adapted.

I say, then, that every man having the use of free will is fitted to possess eternal life, since he can prepare himself to receive grace, by which eternal life will be deserved; and, hence, if he fall short of this his sorrow will be extreme, since he loses what is possible for him. But children were never fitted to receive eternal life, for it was due to them neither from the principles of nature, since it exceeds every power of nature, nor could they perform acts for themselves by which they might gain such a good, and hence they will have no sorrow at the lack of the vision of God; moreover, they will rather rejoice from this, that they will share much of the divine goodness and of natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they were fitted to receive eternal life, although not by their own actions, yet by the action of others in their regard, since they were able to be baptised by others, just as many baptised children of the same state have won eternal life; for this is from super-excelling grace, that any one should win reward without any act on his own part; whence the lack of such grace does not cause more sorrow in children dying unbaptised than in the wise that they have not received many graces which were shown to others like them. (2 *Dist.* 33—2—2—0.)

APPENDIX

WORKS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

I

Commentary upon the Book of Job.

Exposition of the Psalms of David.—An exposition of the first fifty-one Psalms.

Commentary upon the Canticle of Canticles.

Commentary upon Isaías.

Commentary upon Jeremias.

Commentary upon Lamentations.

Commentary upon the Gospel according to St. Matthew.

Commentary upon the Gospel according to St. John.

A Continuous Exposition of the Four Gospels from the Writings of the Greek and Latin Fathers.—This work is usually called the "Catena Aurea"—the golden chain.

Exposition of the Epistles of St. Paul.—This embraces all the Epistles of St. Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Exposition on the Two Precepts of Charity and the Ten Commandments.—This is an exposition of the commands, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and . . . thy neighbour as thyself."

Exposition of the "Our Father."

Exposition of the "Hail, Mary."

Exposition on the Articles of Faith and the Sacraments of the Church.—The first part of this work is a treatise upon the Christian faith which St. Thomas resolves into certain articles on the divinity and humanity of Christ.

Exposition on the Apostles' Creed.

Exposition on the First Decretal.—This is an exposition on the decretal on the Trinity and the Catholic faith, and was written to a "Tridentine Archdeacon."

Exposition on the Second Decretal.—On the error of the Abbot Joachim concerning the essence and unity of the Trinity; written to the same. These two decretals were promulgated by Innocent III. with the approbation of the Lateran Council of 1215.

Exposition of the Book "On the Divine Names."—A book ascribed to the "Blessed Denis," treating of certain properties of God with reference to the likeness of them in creatures.

Exposition on the Book of Boethius "De Hebdomadibus."—This is an exposition of the book which treats the question, whether everything that is, is good, since the good is not a substance. The title means "seven," or "seven days," although it is translated by St. Thomas "on publications" from a different, but similar, Greek root.

Exposition and Questions on Boethius' Book "On the Trinity."

Commentary on the four Books "Of the Sentences of Peter Lombard" (1100-1160 c.).—This work was compiled in performance of the ordinary duty of the licentiate before proceeding to the doctorate in theology. It was when in Paris (p. 8) that St. Thomas commented on the Lombard. The latter divided his work into books containing a number of distinctions. For purposes of commenting Aquinas broke up the text into a certain number of questions, consisting of articles. These commenced by setting forth objections to the true or more reasonable view, a solution or solutions was then given, and then the objections were answered. The first book treats of the nature and attributes of the Trinity; the second of the creation of spiritual and human beings, and also of corporeal things and their relation to their last end; the third treats of the return of the creature to God with regard to the effectual means, namely, the Incarnation; and the fourth with regard to the formal means, that is to say, the sacraments. (1 *Dist.* 3-2-1-0. The first number refers to the book [*i.e.* the first], the second to the distinction, the third to the question, the fourth to the article, and 0, 1m., 2m., 3m., etc., to the body of the article, or responses to the first, second, or third objections.)

On disputed Questions :—

On the Power of God—Ten questions.

On Spiritual Creatures—Eight questions.

On Evil—Sixteen questions.

On the Soul.

On the Union of the Incarnate Word.

On Virtues—Five questions.

On Truth—Twenty-nine questions.

Quodlibetal Questions.—Each quodlibet is divided into questions, and these into articles, and the twelve do not form a connected treatise. They treat of various questions of theology which were not dealt with in the schools, but were, so to say, casual questions reserved for special occasions or were suggested to Aquinas by others. Thus, in the first four questions of the first quodlibet are treated of problems concerning Christ, the angels, and grace. (*Quod.* 7, etc.)

On the Truth of the Catholic Faith against the Gentiles (*Summa contra Gentiles*).—This work was undertaken at the command of Raymond of Pennafort in order to serve for the instruction of Moorish and Jewish converts. The purpose of the work in the words of the Angelic Doctor is "to make manifest the truth which the catholic faith professes by ruling out contrary errors." It treats of the whole of natural and revealed theology. The first three books deal with what may be known of God and creatures' relation to him by natural reason, while the fourth concerns those

things which, being beyond the human intellect, are strictly the objects of belief. This division suggests the style in which the books are written.

Against the Errors of the Greeks.—This work written at the command of Urban IV. treats of the generation of the Son, of the procession of the Holy Spirit, the power of the pope, and purgatory.

Declaration of certain Articles against the Greeks, Armenians, and Saracens.—This work, inscribed to the "Cantor of Antioch," discourses on the reasons of faith.

Compendium of Theology.—Inscribed to his "most dear companion, Brother Reginald." A short treatise on "Faith, Hope, and Charity" as the three things by which God is served. The work deals with the nature of God, angels, and men and other creatures; "of the Incarnation, sin, virtue, grace, and the gifts (of the Holy Spirit), precepts and counsels, sacraments and the final judgment, the resurrection and the glory and pains of the next life." (St. Antoninus, Chronicle.)

Reply to certain Questions of John of Vercelli.—This letter addressed to the master-general of the order contained the answers of Aquinas to forty-two difficulties of the former.

On the Form of Absolution.—A reply to the same master-general as to the teaching of a book which the latter had sent to St. Thomas.

Reply to a Lector of Venice.—This letter treats of thirty-six difficulties proposed by the correspondent of St. Thomas and they are of much the same character as the questions of John of Vercelli.

Reply to a Bisuntine Lector.—This letter treats of six trivial difficulties proposed by Brother Gerard (O.P.) of Bisuntinum. The style of these questions may be gathered from a remark of Aquinas in the course of the letter: "I do not think that frivolities of this kind ought to be preached when there is at hand so great a store of things that belong to the most certain truth."

On Separated Substances.—This treatise, on the nature of angels, inscribed to Brother Reginald, was left unfinished.

On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists.—The latter held that the possible intellect (p. 215) was, as to its being, separated from the body and in some way united to it as a form; and further that the possible intellect of all men is one.

On the Difference between the Word Human and Divine.—This is a short treatise on the differences between the word of the intellect in God and in man.

On the Nature of the Word of the Intellect.

On the Casting of Lots.—This work is inscribed to James "de Burgo."

On the Consulting of Astrologers.—A letter to Brother Reginald.

On the Eternity of the World.—This short treatise was written against certain "murmurers."

Against Those who impugn the Worship of God and the Religious State.—The existence of this book is due to the attack of William of St. Amour upon the mendicants (p. 9).

On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life.—This work is also due, in all probability, to the same controversy (p. 9), as also the following:—

Against the Pestilent Teaching of Those who dissuade Others from entering the Religious Life.

Office of Corpus Christi.—This office which is now part of the liturgy of the Catholic Church was written at the command of Urban IV., and it is a curious fact that, although it was thus written by a Dominican, the complete office, as translated in this work, is not to be found in the liturgical books of the Order of Preachers.

On the Ruling of Princes.—This work, written for the king of Cyprus, is due only in part to St. Thomas. The part he wrote is traversed by the translation (p. 221-43).

On the Ruling of the Jews.—This letter was a reply to certain questions proposed by the Countess of Flanders as to her behaviour towards the Jews.

The Sum of Theology.—This, which is the best known and most famous of the works of the Angelic Doctor, covers the whole ground of theology. Unfortunately, the Saint did not live to finish the work completely and the supplement was gathered from the commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences*, probably by Henry of Gorcom. The work is divided into three parts, the first of which treats of the nature and attributes of God. The second part treats of the motion of the rational creature towards God. This division is subdivided into two parts, the *prima* and the *secunda secundæ*. The *prima secundæ* deals with the intrinsic principles of human actions—virtues and vices—considered generally; and the exterior principles of human actions, law and grace. The *secunda secundæ* treats of virtues and vices in particular. The third part treats of Christ who, as man, is the way to God.

The whole of the *Sum of Theology* is divided into questions and articles. Each article proceeds in the same way, first setting forth three or four objections to the thesis, then adding an exposition, and, finally, giving the answers to the objections. The references have been given as briefly as possible. The first number refers to the part, the second to the question, the third to the article, and the fourth to the section of the article, either the body of the article (o) or the answers to the objections (1m., 2m., etc.). The parts are distinguished by 1, 1-2, 2-2, 3.

The above works, with a treatise on "Fate," which seems to be of more than doubtful authorship, make up the Venetian edition (1787) of the "*Opera Divi Thomæ Aquinatis*," and it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that "*Opera*" (works) is not necessarily the same as "*Omnia Opera*" (complete works).

II

St. Thomas also wrote the following commentaries on works of Aristotle:

Exposition on the First Book on " Interpretation."—This work (*Perihermeneias*) treats of the parts of enunciation. The commentary is incomplete. In the arrangement of Aristotle, immediately after this work follows that on the "prior analytics," that is to say, on the absolute nature of the syllogism. Following on this comes the next work which St. Thomas commented:—

Exposition of the First and Second Books of the Later Analytics.—This treats of demonstration.

Exposition of Aristotle's Eight Books of Physics. (*Com. Phys.* 1 [book], lect. 1, § 1, etc.)

Exposition of the Parva Naturalia :—

On Sense and its Object.

On Memory and Reminiscence.

On Sleep and Watching, and two books of doubtful authorship, viz.:—

On Dreams.

On Divination by Dreams.

Exposition on the Twelve Books of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

On the Ten Books of Ethics.

Exposition on the Politics.—Only the first and second books and the third as far as the end of chapter six were finished by St. Thomas, but this has not prevented many scholars from including passages later than this as the work of Aquinas. (*Com. on Pol.*, the first number the book, the second the section.)

Exposition of " The Heavens and the World."—This work also was not finished by St. Thomas.

Exposition on the Books " On Generation and Corruption."—Aquinas' work finishes at the end of chapter seventeen, of the first book.

Exposition on the Books on " Meteors."—Only the first two books were finished by St. Thomas.

Commentary on the Three Books " On the Soul."

Exposition on the Book " On Causes."

III

Other works which St. Thomas wrote are short treatises:—

On the Nature of Matter and Indeterminate Dimensions.—This work treats of the nature of matter and form, and attacks the opinion of Averroes that indeterminate dimensions pre-exist in matter.

On the Hidden Works of Nature.

On the Four Opposites.

On Demonstration.

On the Principles of Individuation.

On Instants.—A treatise on time and the measure of angelic activity, since it is not time.

On Elements in a Compound.

On the Motion of the Heart.

On the Plurality of Forms.

There is some doubt about the last-mentioned work; but, as far as one can say, it seems to be more probably authentic. The next two works are less probably authentic:—

On the Nature of Accident.

On the Nature of Genus.

More doubtful still is the authorship of the following:—

On Fate.

On Modal Propositions.

On Fallacies.

On the Powers of the Soul.

On Time.

On the Nature of the Syllogism.

On the Sum of the Whole of Aristotle's Logic.

Most doubtful is the authorship of the following:—

On the Intellect and the Intelligible.

On the Sense as to Singular Things and the Intellect with regard to Universals.

On the Finding of the Middle Term.

On the Nature of Light.

On the Nature of Place.

On Universals (two treatises).

Exposition on Youth and Old Age.

St. Thomas left many sermons, and a letter is extant which, although of doubtful authorship, I have included in the translation (p. 308). Other letters have been noted among the works.

SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES TO THE AUTHORISED VERSION

The Scriptural references in the body of the book are, like the quotations, translated from Aquinas, and therefore refer to the Vulgate version of the Bible. It has been thought better to give here the references to the more familiar Authorised version, with sufficient indication—where the quotations are widely different—of the text quoted. Where the index numbers have been omitted here, the reference is sufficiently accurate for both versions.

Page	46	¹	lxxx. 3, Cause thy face to shine..
		²	cxix. 35, Make me to go..
	47	¹	xxvii. 8, My heart said..
		²	1 Samuel i. 13, She spake..
		³	Hoshea xiv. 2
		⁴	xvi. 9
	48	¹	xiv. 14, If I pray..
	50	¹	iv. 6, Let us therefore..
		²	xc. 15, He shall call..
	51	¹	— Ye ask..
		²	lxiii. 4, I will lift..
	52	¹	cii. 17
		²	Apocrypha
	58	²	Apocrypha
	60	¹	Apocrypha
		²	— Thou also..
	75	¹	lxxiii. 28, It is good for me..
		²	— Turn thou me..
	80	¹	Apocrypha
	82	¹	Apocrypha
	83	¹	— Having predestinated..
	84	¹	Apocrypha
	85	¹	2 Pet. i. 4, Whereby are given..
	87	¹	— The powers that be..
		²	— The manifestation..
	95	¹	Apocrypha
	96	²	Ephes. iv. 7, Unto every..
	97	³	Job ix. 11, He goeth by me..
	98	¹	— I judge not..
		²	Rev. ii. 17
		³	1 Cor. iv. 4, I know nothing..
		⁴	xix. 12, Who can understand..
	99	¹	— But to him that..
	100	¹	— Whosoever committeth sin..

- Page 101 ¹ lxxxv. 6, Wilt thou not..
- 102 ² Apocrypha
³ — Her sins which..
⁵ Text omitted between vv. 27 and 28 in A. V.
- 109 ¹ — Eye hath not seen..
- 111 ¹ — It shall be..
² — And if children..
- 112 ¹ xi. 6, And if by grace..
- 113 ¹ — In bringing many sons..
- 116 ¹ lxxiii. 28, But it is good..
² xxxiv. 10, They that seek..
³ xxxvii. 25, Yet have I not..
- 117 ¹ ii. 11
³ — Henceforth I call..
- 118 ¹ — Our conversation..
² Rev. xxii. 3-4
- 119 ¹ — He that is joined..
- 121 ² viii. 38-39, I am persuaded..
- 123 ¹ — There be many..
- 124 ² Apocrypha
³ Apocrypha
⁴ — He that despised..
- 125 ² — If ye be..
⁴ — Repent ye..
- 126 ¹ — He that dwelleth..
² Hoshea, And their abominations..
³ — He that is joined..
⁵ — If a man love..
- 127 ¹ — Vaunteth not itself..
² — All things work..
³ — Henceforth there is..
⁴ — Charity shall cover..
⁵ — Love covereth..
- 128 ¹ — Her sins which are many..
² — We cannot order our speech..
³ — The anointing teacheth..
⁵ Apocrypha
⁶ — He that dwelleth..
⁷ — But the wicked..
- 129 ¹ cxix., Great peace have they..
² cii., Who satisfieth thy mouth..
³ — Henceforth I call..
- 130 ² Apocrypha
³ — Not that we loved..
⁴ — The love of God is shed..
⁵ cxix.
⁶ cv. 19, The word of the Lord tried him..

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² — Put away the evil of your doings..
³ Apocrypha
⁴ Apocrypha
 132¹ Song of Solomon viii. 7
 134³ xxxvi. 27-28
⁵ — Take, my brethren, the prophets..
 143¹ — My soul is exceeding..
³ — Your new moons..
 147¹ — He hath made us accepted..
 148¹ xii. 27
 155² — Surely he hath borne..
³ — But made himself of no..
⁵ — Him that endured such..
 163¹ xiv. 36
 168¹ — To give an answer..
 172¹ xvii. 21
 176¹ — When thou art converted..
 178¹ i. 17
 197¹ — He walketh in the circuit..
 212² — Is there anything..
 222¹ — Two are better than one..
 223¹ — Where no counsel is..
 224¹ — Woe be to..
 225¹ v. 9, The king himself is served..
 227¹ 1 Samuel xiii. 14
 229¹ xxi. 1
³ cxxxix. 17, How precious also..
 255¹ vi. 9, Neither is there..
 256¹ — A tale bearer
 259¹ Apocrypha
² Song of Solomon, His banner over me..
 260² xxviii. 3
⁵ — So is a contentious man..
⁶ — Only by pride..
⁸ Apocrypha
 265² — Yea the deep things..
 298¹ cvii. 18, Their soul abhorreth..
² ii. 7
 307¹ iv. 16
² cxxv. 1

CORRIGENDA

Page	85	¹	read 2	Pet. i. 4	instead of	xi. 4	
	96	²	„	iv. 7	„	iv. 12	
	97	³	„	ix. 11	„	ix. 2	
	112	¹	„	xi. 6	„	ii. 9	
	116	²	„	xxxiii. 10	„	xxxiii. 2	
	117	¹	„	ii. 11	„	xi. 11	
	148	¹	„	xii. 27	„	xiii. 27	
	163	¹	„	xiv.	„	xvi.	
	172	¹	„	xvii. 21	„	xvii. 12	
	178	¹	„	i. 17	„	i. 7	
	229	¹	„	xxi. 1	„	xiii. 1	
	307	¹	„	iv. 16	„	iv. 6	

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